The ethnopolitics of democratisation : democratisation, nationality policy and ethnic relations in Burma 1948-1962 by Buzzi, Camilla
 The Ethnopolitics of 
Democratisation 
Democratisation, nationality policy and ethnic relations in Burma,  
1948-1962 
Camilla Buzzi 
Thesis for the degree of Cand.Polit. 
Department of political science 
University of Oslo 
Spring 2003 
 2
Table of content 
         
1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE TOPIC............................................................. 7 
1.1 ETHNIC RELATIONS AS A POLITICAL FACTOR IN BURMA..................................................... 8 
1.2 BURMA – A PATCHWORK OF ETHNIC GROUPS ................................................................... 10 
1.3 SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THESIS.................................................................... 12 
1.3.1 Subject................................................................................................................... 12 
1.3.2 Structure, time horizons and levels of analysis ..................................................... 13 
1.4 ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON ETHNIC RELATIONS IN BURMA.............................................. 15 
2. CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL APPROACHES.................................................... 19 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 19 
2.2 DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS................................................................................................. 21 
2.2.1 Democracy and democratisation .......................................................................... 22 
2.2.2 State, nation and nationalism................................................................................ 22 
2.2.3 Ethnic identity ....................................................................................................... 24 
2.3 THE STATE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY.................................................................................... 26 
2.4 DEMOCRATISATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS ................................................................... 28 
2.4.1 Democracy, national identity and ethnic conflicts ................................................ 29 
2.4.2 Transition and ethnic relations ............................................................................. 31 
2.4.3 The constitution of a democratic political order and ethnic relations .................. 32 
2.4.4 Party structure ...................................................................................................... 35 
2.5 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALITY POLICY ......................................................................... 37 
2.5.1 Five factors determining the choice of strategy .................................................... 37 
2.5.2 Five strategies compatible with democracy .......................................................... 40 
2.6 SUMMING UP .................................................................................................................... 43 
3. CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE MATERIAL 45 
3.1 WHY CHOOSE A CASE STUDY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CASE STUDIES.............. 46 
3.1.1 History as a political tool...................................................................................... 46 
3.1.2 History as a model ................................................................................................ 48 
3.1.3 An extension in time and space ............................................................................. 49 
3.2 COLLECTING THE DATA.................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 VALIDITY OF CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 53 
3.4 RESEARCH AND POLITICS IN A BURMESE CONTEXT .......................................................... 53 
4. CHAPTER FOUR: THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY ............................ 55 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN STATE................................................................................ 55 
4.2 ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COLONIAL BURMA ........................................................................ 56 
4.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM .............................................................................. 58 
4.4 SUMMING UP .................................................................................................................... 62 
5. CHAPTER FIVE: THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY......................................... 64 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 64 
5.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRACY, 1922-1940 ............................................................ 64 
5.2.1 Preparing for self-government .............................................................................. 64 
5.2.2 Introducing elections............................................................................................. 65 
5.2.3 The emergence of political parties ........................................................................ 66 
5.2.4 Interruption: World War II ................................................................................... 66 
5.3 THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, 1945-1948 ............................................................. 67 
5.3.1 Political actors...................................................................................................... 67 
5.3.2 The transition to democracy, 1945-1948 .............................................................. 72 
5.4 THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA ......................................................................... 74 
5.4.1 The concept of democracy in Burmese elite political thinking.............................. 74 
5.4.2 Democratic institutions in Burma ......................................................................... 75 
5.5 SUMMING UP .................................................................................................................... 84 
 3
6. CHAPTER SIX: EFFORTS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE POLITICAL 
ARENA 86 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................86 
6.2 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN MULTIETHNIC DEMOCRACIES ...............................87 
6.2.1 Elections and party system.....................................................................................87 
6.2.2 Political parties in Burma......................................................................................88 
6.2.3 Other ethnically-based organisations....................................................................93 
6.3 THE SINO-BURMESE BORDER AGREEMENT AND BURMAN-KACHIN RELATIONS................94 
6.4 NATIONALITY POLICY IN THE POLITICAL ARENA ...............................................................97 
6.4.1 Redefining internal boundaries and creating states ..............................................97 
6.4.2 Redefining the relationship between union and state governments .....................101 
6.4.3 Promoting democracy in an ethnic minority area: Political reforms in Shan State102 
6.5 SUMMING UP...................................................................................................................106 
7. CHAPTER SEVEN: CULTURAL ASPECTS OF EFFORTS AT DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION..........................................................................................................................108 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................108 
7.2 LANGUAGE POLICY AFTER 1948......................................................................................108 
7.2.1 Language in the political arena...........................................................................108 
7.2.2 Education and cultural life ..................................................................................109 
7.3 RELIGIOUS POLICIES AFTER 1948....................................................................................111 
7.4 SUMMING UP...................................................................................................................118 
8. CHAPTER EIGHT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EFFORTS AT DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION..........................................................................................................................119 
8.1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................119 
8.2 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND ...........................................................................120 
8.3 NATIONALITY POLICY IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA ............................................................123 
8.3.1 Economic relations between the union and the states..........................................123 
8.3.2 Economic demands by ethnic minorities..............................................................124 
8.3.3 Economic planning ..............................................................................................125 
8.3.4 Land nationalisation ............................................................................................127 
8.4 SUMMING UP...................................................................................................................128 
9. CHAPTER NINE: THE FAILURE TO CONSOLIDATE DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL WAR
 129 
9.1 THE PATTERN OF THE CIVIL WAR ....................................................................................129 
9.2 CONSEQUENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR.................................................................................133 
10. CHAPTER TEN: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................136 
10.1 FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................136 
10.2 SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ...........................................................................139 
10.3 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE .........................................................................................141 
 
 
 4
Foreword:  
This thesis is the outcome of an interest for Burma and its people that began in 1994, 
when I joined the Burma Support Group/Norway, which was then in the process of 
being formed by students at the University of Oslo. Since then activities carried out 
by a community of Burma solidarity groups in Norway as well as abroad have played 
a key role in keeping my fascination for Burma alive and in deepening my knowledge 
of the country. I remain deeply appreciative of the friendships that have been forged 
in the course of these years.  
 
In the autumn of 1998, I moved to Mae Sot, a border in Thailand adjacent to Burma, 
where I stayed with Burmese political dissidents in exile until late winter 2000. 
During my stay, I had the privilege of meeting with political dissidents, migrant 
workers and refugees from Burma.  I was able to interview several of them and to 
discuss with many more. They always showed me the outmost grace in telling me 
their stories and introducing me to their country’s politics, history and culture.  The 
stay in Thailand thus added new dimensions to my knowledge of Burma. 
 
I am grateful to my academic supervisors, Harald Bøckman and professor Anton 
Steen, for their suggestions and their patience in guiding me through the working 
process leading up to the thesis. I also would like to thank Tom Kramer for lending 
me valuable source material. Thank you to David Arnott for the Online Burma 
Library, which has greatly facilitated the search for documents on Burma, and to the 
staff at the University Library in Oslo for all their assistance in locating various 
materials. Many friends  - I will not mention all of them here – have provided their 
contributions in different ways. Dennis (a) Mun Awng and my family have remained 
very supportive.  
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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the ethnopolitics of democratisation in Burma. I analyse the 
consequences of democratisation for ethnic relations from the country’s 
independence in 1948 until the military coup d’état in 1962. As Burma has been 
under military rule since 1962, these fourteen years represent modern Burma’s sole 
experience with democratic rule.  
The thesis is a historical case study. However, it also provides a background for 
assessing the future prospects of democracy in Burma. Indeed, ethnic identity has 
played a key role in Burmese politics since the colonial era, and it remains a 
significant factor for the understanding of current Burmese politics and the lack of 
democratic development in this country. Ethnicity continues to shape Burmese 
politics, together with the impact of Burma’s colonial past, the emergence of the 
armed forces as the dominant political and economic actor in the country as well as 
the ongoing civil war.  
The first part of the analysis follows a thematic and chronological path. It begins 
with an examination of the development of a modern state in Burma, followed by a 
study of the emergence of Burmese nationalism and changes in ethnic relations 
during the colonial era. This section of the thesis provides a framework for the core of 
the analysis, which centres on political, economic and social developments after 
1948.  
There are three foci to the main analysis. Firstly, I examine to what extent ethnic 
fragmentation in Burma was an impediment to decolonisation and the transition to 
democracy after World War II. Secondly, I engage in a critical analysis of how the 
Panglong agreement and the constitution drafted in 1947 sought to address issues 
concerning Burma’s ethnic minorities and the integration of various ethnic groups. I 
also examine how democratic processes, such as elections and party formations, 
affected ethnic relations after 1948. Finally, I identify which nationality policy 
strategies (political, economic and cultural) were applied after independence and 
what consequences these strategies had for the consolidation of democracy and for 
ethnic relations in this country. The analysis ends with a study of the outbreak of the 
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civil war, which occurred in two phases - first in Burma Proper in 1948-1949, and 
then in the former Frontier Areas from 1959 onwards. I analyse the causes of this 
pattern as well as the consequences of the failure to manage ethnic diversity after 
1948, until the collapse of democracy in 1962. The thesis concludes with a mixed 
record for democracy in Burma. While there was progress in the process of 
democratisation before 1962, there were also impediments to the consolidation of 
democracy.  
While recognising that much has changed in Burma since 1962, I argue that the 
case of Burma remains an example of how ethnic fragmentation complicates 
democratisation in a multiethnic society. Burma’s history shows that while it remains 
possible to design democracy in order to deal with fragmentation, such design ought 
to be done with great care. Still, constitutional design remains insufficient for the 
consolidation of democracy in a multiethnic state. Burma’s history is testimony to the 
need to devise a comprehensive solution to deal with ethnic diversity and to include 
all relevant actors in this process. It also shows that ethnic diversity cannot be 
addressed solely by constitutional design at a given point in time, because ethnic 
relations are also shaped by the dynamics of everyday politics. The full impact of 
democratisation on ethnic relations cannot be regarded solely as the result of various 
political processes. Democratic consolidation hinges on policies that seek to address 
ethnic fragmentation in the political, as well as in the economic and in the cultural 
arenas. A country’s political elite plays a key role in advancing integration or 
bringing about further fragmentation through its activities in each of these arenas. 
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1. Chapter one: Introducing the topic 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the consequences of democratisation for 
ethnic relations in Burma between 1948 and 1962. One concept underlying the choice 
of topic is “ethnopolitics”, which refers to “all types of politics between and among 
ethnic entities (…) that impinges on the relative power or position of ethnic groups” 
(Karklins 1994: p.4). While studies of ethnopolitics may cover the causes, consequences 
and means by which ethnicity is introduced into the political arena, this thesis focuses 
on the ethnopolitics of democratisation, that is, the impact of democratisation for the 
distribution of power between ethnic groups and the application of nationality policy 
strategies. Burma is a country fragmented along ethnic cleavages. I seek to determine 
to what extent democratisation has served to integrate the country’s ethnic groups and 
to what extent it has brought further fragmentation. There are three foci in the 
analysis. Firstly, I will examine to what extent ethnic fragmentation acted as an 
impediment to the transition to democracy before 1948. Secondly, I will determine 
how the democratic regime was designed in 1945-1947 to integrate ethnic groups and 
how democratic processes impacted on ethnic relations after 1948. Finally, I will 
identify nationality policy strategies applied after 1948 and determine their 
consequences for the consolidation of democracy and for ethnic relations. I will argue 
that ethnic fragmentation complicates the process of democratisation, but that it is 
possible to design democracy in order to deal with a fragmented society. I will also 
argue that a proper design is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to consolidate 
democracy in a multiethnic state, and I will point to the importance of political 
leadership. Finally, I will argue that democratisation cannot be regarded solely as a 
political process in a multiethnic state, but that the consolidation of democracy hinges 
on policies that seek to address ethnic fragmentation in politics as well as in 
economics and in the cultural arena. Ultimately, the consolidation of democracy 
failed in Burma, and I will examine whether ethnic fragmentation contributed to this 
failure.  
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1.1 Ethnic relations as a political factor in Burma 
 
Ethnic identity has played a significant role in Burmese politics since the colonial era, 
and particularly since 1948, when the country achieved independence. Indeed, some 
scholars regard the quest for national unity as the paramount issue of concern in the 
country for the past fifty years (cf. below).  
Colonialism created the present state boundaries of Burma after Arakan and 
Tenasserim were brought under British control in 1824-1826, Lower Burma in 1852 
and Upper Burma in 1885-1886. Shan and Karenni areas came under the British 
sphere of influence in the 19th century as a result of colonial rivalries between France 
and Great Britain for control over Southeast-Asia. Burmese society underwent radical 
changes during colonial rule. The country developed into a society where ethnic 
identity gained increasing social, economic and political significance. Burma was 
described as a plural society where ethnic groups live side by side and ”mix but do 
not combine” (Furnivall quoted in Adas 1974: p.103).  
Ethnic identity became politicised in the early 20th century as a result of 
colonial rule. The first nationalist movements in Burma emerged among Burmans and 
Karen. The Burman nationalist movement later developed into the Anti-Fascist 
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which led the anticolonial movement in the 
1940s, and subsequently dominated the various governments of independent Burma 
until 1962. 
In 1922, pressure from Karen nationalists led to the creation of communal 
seats for Karen, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indians in the country’s first elected 
legislative assembly. These electoral reforms were part of a broader set of political 
reforms intended to prepare the country for self-rule. Communal representation 
remained a controversial issue during the 1930s and 1940s. When decolonisation 
began in 1945, the question of ethnic relations was again topical. The constitution 
that was drafted in 1947 sought to combine socialism in the economic arena with the 
tenets of liberal democracy in the political arena as well as autonomy for ethnic 
groups in the border areas and special representation rights for the Karen (Silverstein 
1964: p.113; M. Smith 1991: p.82).  
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Burma’s colonial past, tensions between the country’s various ethnic groups - in 
particular between the Burman majority and various minority groups, the military’s 
influence in politics, economics and social affairs and the civil war are four factors 
that remain vital to grasp the nature of modern-day Burmese politics. In 1962, the 
process of democratisation failed in Burma, and the armed forces have since become 
the dominant political force in the country.  
Civil war erupted in Burma less than a year after the country gained its 
independence and had a strong impact on the democratisation process. Until 1962, the 
democratic government faced groups seeking to overthrow democracy – chiefly the 
Burma Communist Party (CPB) – as well as a number of ethnically based 
organisations fighting for self-determination1. The war disrupted political, social and 
economic life during the first decade of independence and contributed to alienate 
ethnic and religious minorities. It also brought the armed forces to the forefront of the 
country’s politics.  
The military has been a significant political actor in Burma since it was 
established during the anticolonial struggle. After 1948, the civil war served to 
legitimise military intervention in political, social and economic affairs. 
Organisational reforms within the armed forces created a stronger military during the 
1950s. Finally, a number of political and economic crises during the first decade of 
independence - including a split in the ruling AFPFL in 1958 - contributed to 
discredit the civilian government and civilian politicians. Increasingly, the military 
appeared to hold a solution to the country’s problems. As result of the split in the 
AFPFL, Prime Minister U Nu lost his backing in parliament and a parliamentary 
crisis followed. U Nu handed over power to a caretaker government led by the 
commander of the armed forces, General Ne Win, in a move that was sanctioned by 
parliament. In 1960, Ne Win handed power back to a civilian government after an 
election which U Nu’s faction of the AFPFL had won by a landslide. The caretaker 
government became the armed forces’ first experience with governing the country, 
                                              
1 In the thesis I will use the terms insurgency and insurgent to talk about armed conflicts and participants in armed conflicts. 
The choice of terms should not be construed as a value judgment about armed conflicts.  
 10 
but in March 1962, the military again seized power. Since then, Burma has been 
under military rule.  
 Disagreement over how to deal with ethnic diversity was one reason for the 
coup d’état in 1962. The coup coincided with a meeting in Rangoon between the 
AFPFL government and representatives of the country’s non-Burman ethnic groups 
to discuss federalism and autonomy for ethnic minorities. This meeting is often 
regarded as the factor that precipitated the coup d’état. Burma’s military has 
historically been opposed to federalism, which it regards as the first step towards the 
disintegration of the union. General Ne Win, who directed the coup d’état, argued in 
1962 that the union was about to break up as a result of ethnic discontent and that the 
military had to step in. But he also pointed out that Burma’s economy was in 
shambles, and that the country’s economic policies had deviated from the socialist 
path followed since independence in order to justify the coup (Lintner 1999: pp. 16-17; M. 
Smith 1991: pp. 195-196; Steinberg 1981: pp.21-.23). I will discuss the significance of the 
Rangoon meeting, as well as causes of the breakdown of democracy in 1962 in the 
course of the thesis.  
1.2 Burma – a patchwork of ethnic groups  
 
Burma represents a society deeply fragmented along ethnic lines. The 
population is made up of a large number of ethnic groups with distinct cultures as 
well as economic, social and political organisation. The eight main indigenous groups 
in the country are Burman, Karen, Shan, Mon, Arakanese, Kachin, Chin and Karenni. 
Burmans constitute about two-thirds of the population, while the other ethnic groups 
number less than ten percent each (table 1.1, map2)3. Indians and Chinese are the largest 
immigrant groups. The majority of the population lives in the plains along the 
Irrawaddy River. The mountainous border areas make up half the territory and 
constitute a horseshoe around the plains. They are inhabited by less than a fifth of the 
                                              
2 This is a reference to map 2 in Smith, Martin (1991): Burma – insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. London: Zed books 
Ltd.  
3 I use the term Burman to refer to the largest ethnic group, while Burmeses refers to any person from Burma regardless of ethnicity. In 
1989, the name of the country was changed to Myanmar. I retain the old name, which was in use during 1948-1962.  
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population (Silverstein 1993a p.27). In Burma – as elsewhere in Southeast Asia - the 
distinction between valley and hills is of prime importance for ethnic relations (Scott 
2002). The valley economy is based on irrigated rice cultivation. The valley as well as 
Shan and Karenni areas were centres for a number of precolonial states. The hill 
economy, on the other hand, is based on slash-and -burn cultivation. No state 
formation occurred in precolonial times among Kachin, Chin and Karen. The 
inhabitants of the hills and valleys also represent distinct cultures. Although there has 
been extensive contact between the two populations, they continue to stand in 
“radical opposition” to each other with “remarkably few” cultural similarities (Leach 
1960: pp. 64-65). Most valley people belong to one of four ethnic groups – Burman, 
Arakanese, Mon and Shan. These groups are in majority Buddhists, which is the 
religion of the vast majority of the population in the country. Hill people belong to a 
variety of ethnic groups who speak several different languages. The traditional 
religion among hill people was Animism, while Christianity has been spreading since 
the arrival of Western missionaries during the 19th century - particularly among 
Kachin, Karen, Chin and Karenni. In 1948, Christianity, Islam, Animism and 
Hinduism constituted the largest minority religions in Burma and were more 
frequently found among non-Burmans. Ethnic and religious cleavages thus tend to 
coincide. A sense of inferiority vis-à-vis valley people also plays a role in the identity 
of many hill dwellers (Corlin 1994).  
 
Table 1.1: Population by ethnic group and religion, 1931 census 
 
 Total (figures) Buddhist Animist Hindu Muslim Christian Total 
(percentage) 
Burma group 9,627,196 9,574,053 35,645 … … 14,596 65,7 
Kuki-Chin 348,994 67,712 269,101 … … 7,821 2,38 
Kachin 153,345 … 136,731 … … 15,532 1,05 
Shan (Tai) 1,037,406 1,030,686 … … …  7,08 
Karen 1,367,673 1,049,613 98,873 … … 218,700 9,34 
Indian 1,017,825 12,600 … 565,609 369,504 30,135 
 
6,95 
Chinese 193,594 43,399 … … 1,474 1,466 
 
1,32 
European,  
Anglo-Indian 
30,851 … … … … 30,851 
 
0,21 
Other 870,613 569,974 222,893 5,344 186,861 11,915 5,94 
TOTAL 14,647,613  763,243 570,953 584,839 331,106  
Percentage 100 84,30 5,21 3,90 3,99 2,26 100 
 
Source: Chambers 1950. Slight defects are due to ordinary errors in census operations; Burma Group 
comprises Burmans, Arakanese, Tavoyans and other smaller minorities 
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1.3 Subject, structure and scope of thesis 
1.3.1 Subject 
 
This thesis will focus on efforts to consolidate Burma’s democracy in the political, 
cultural and economic arenas. I will show that democratic consolidation in a 
multiethnic society like Burma cannot be regarded as a mere political process without 
taking into account how the democratic government’s engagement in the economic 
and cultural arenas affect ethnic groups and these groups’ perceptions of democracy. 
I seek an answer to the following questions:  
1. What characterised the democratic regime that was established in Burma in 1948, 
and what foundation did this framework lay for ethnic relations? 
2. What nationality policies did the government formulate and carry out after 1948 in 
the political, cultural and economic fields to address ethnic demands? 
3. What were the ethnopolitical consequences of these policies and other efforts to 
consolidate democracy after 1948? 
 
I will begin by a critical examination of the constitution that was drafted in Burma in 
1947. Political institutions set a framework for ethnic relations by orienting the polity 
towards accepting and managing ethnic diversity or rejecting and eliminating it. A 
democratic regime provides opportunities and determines the limitations to the 
orientation of the polity and to the manner in which ethnic demands are to be 
addressed. I will argue that the 1947 constitution set a course for dealing with ethnic 
differences in Burma, but that this course was hampered by lacunas in the drafting 
process and key provisions regarding the relationship between ethnic groups.  
Although a constitution creates a framework for ethnic relations, it is also 
necessary to interpret the law in order to address new issues. I will therefore continue 
by examining policies aimed at consolidating democracy in Burma after 1948. These 
policies can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand, political reforms were 
carried out with the aim of improving the quality of the democratic regime, some of 
which also had a bearing on ethnic relations. Examples of such reforms include the 
promotion of electoral reforms in Burma’s Shan State. On the other hand, nationality 
policies were formulated in order to address ethnic demands. I will examine whether 
such policies also contributed to enhance the legitimacy of Burma’s democracy and 
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develop a common sense of national solidarity. As Bakke (1996: p.5) explains, a 
nationality policy consists of a political programme for dealing with the political, 
cultural and economic demands of ethnic groups as well as of measures to carry out 
this programme. In Burma, government goals included finding a solution to the 
insurgency through constitutional reforms and by promoting a common national 
culture. However, the government did not succeed in its endeavours. Instead, it 
alienated religious and linguistics minorities. I will argue that one reason was 
inconsistencies in terms of how similar demands by different ethnic groups were 
addressed as well as in terms of the strategies with which the same ethnic group was 
met in response to different demands. These inconsistencies laid the basis for future 
disagreements between the state and ethnic groups, and contributed to the breakdown 
of democracy in 1962.   
1.3.2 Structure, time horizons and levels of analysis 
Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. The theoretical framework for the analysis is 
introduced in chapter two. In chapter three, I discuss the use of case studies as 
research method. I discuss advantages and drawbacks of using case studies. I also 
discuss some challenges linked to the data material that I have collected as well as to 
the choice of Burma as a case for research. In the subsequent two chapters, I present 
two factors regarded as significant premises for the prospects for democratic 
consolidation, namely national identity (chapter four) and the transition from colonial 
rule to democracy (chapter five). The analysis is developed in three chapters. I 
distinguish between efforts of democratic consolidation in the political, the cultural 
and the economic arenas (chapters six-eight), and I examine changes in ethnic 
relations in each arena. In chapter nine, I engage in a short study of the civil war as I 
sum up the findings of the three previous chapters. Indeed, the war is the main 
indication that the consolidation of democracy failed in Burma, and I seek to argue 
why this is the case. In chapter ten, I seek to draw some conclusions about the future 
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prospects for democracy and ethnic relations in Burma based on the country’s past 
experience.  
Time boundaries 
  
Democratisation is a long-term process. For the purpose of the analysis, it is therefore 
necessary to determine when the case study should begin and end, in other words to 
fix time boundaries. The roots of democracy in Burma date back to the first elections 
in the 1920s. During World War II, the country was occupied by Japan. The 
occupation brought an end to the political regime that had existed in the country 
before the war. The main political parties and key political actors of the pre-war era 
were marginalised (Silverstein 1964: p.101). Instead, a new generation of politicians 
emerged that came to dominate Burmese politics after the war. The focus of the 
present thesis is thus the transition to democracy after 1945 and the consolidation of 
democracy after 1948.  
Levels of analysis 
 
It is also necessary to decide upon the level of analysis that will be applied because 
this decision determines the selection of data material. Democratisation can be 
initiated at two levels – the national and the local level. The two levels are 
interdependent. As Sørensen (1993: p.23) argues, democratisation at the local and the 
national levels tends to reinforce each other, but there may be discrepancies between 
the degree of democracy at either level prior to the consolidation of democracy. I 
have chosen to limit the thesis to an analysis of the development of democracy in 
Burma at a national level. There are two reasons for this choice. Firstly, national-level 
democracy preceded reforms at the local level in Burma, because the transition took 
place within the larger framework of decolonisation. Reforms to develop local 
democracy were only initiated after 1948, including a Local Democracy Act in 1949 
and the organisation of local elections. Secondly, the purpose of this thesis is to 
examine changes in ethnic relations. Due to the hill-valley aspect of ethnic cleavages 
in Burma, ethnic relations tend to follow geographical boundaries. Although a study 
of local politics (if enough data material were available to support such a study) 
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would be interesting in terms of the relationship between ethnic groups within a 
region, the most significant results can be found in an inter-regional analysis of ethnic 
relations.  
1.4 Academic literature on ethnic relations in Burma  
 
Studies of the political aspects of ethnic relations in Burma since 1948 are relatively 
sparse and focus primarily on the civil war. One reason is the present political 
situation in Burma: The country has been largely closed to the outside world since 
1962, and academic freedom within the country is severely curtailed. This isolation 
has hampered academic research and media interest in Burmese affairs. Contributions 
on Burma published in the 1980s and 1990s include Martin Smith’s (1991) monograph 
on ethnicity and insurgency in Burma as well as writings by Lintner (1994), who has 
published a large number of articles and books dealing with Burma and with the civil 
war. I have selected four examples of contemporary scholarship on Burma, which I 
will examine critically in the course of the thesis, namely Silverstein (1980), Fistié 
(1985), Brown (1994) and Gravers (1999). Silverstein and Smith trace the evolution of 
ethnic relations in Burma since World War II, while Fistié and Brown argue that the 
roots of present-day ethnic relations in Burma can be found in the precolonial and 
colonial era respectively. In the following section, I will provide a presentation of the 
arguments of Silverstein, Fistié, Brown and Smith concerning the period between 
1948 and 1962.   
Silverstein – the quest for national unity 
 
According to Silverstein (1980), the search for national unity has been the main 
concern for Burma’s leaders since 1948. Silverstein argues that the failure to develop 
national unity stems from a disruption in leadership at a crucial stage in Burma’s 
political history. The pattern of ethnic relations that was set in the country’s 
constitution from 1947 was largely inspired by Aung San, who led the AFPFL in the 
struggle for independence after World War II. Aung San played a key role in 
negotiating the transfer of independence from the British and setting the premises for 
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constitutional negotiations in 1947. Aung San was assassinated in July 1947, shortly 
before independence in January 1948. His death broke the continuity in the 
anticolonial movement’s strategy for dealing with ethnic diversity. Aung San was 
succeeded by a fellow nationalist leader, U Nu, who later served as Burma’s first 
Prime Minister. Silverstein argues that Aung San and U Nu differed in their ideas 
about how to achieve national unity. While Aung San’s ideas shaped the constitution 
that was drafted in 1947, U Nu’s ideas shaped the government’s nationality policies 
after 1948, which grew increasingly distant from the terms set by Aung San. But due 
to Aung San’s unique position in Burmese political history, the government’s policies 
continued to be presented publicly as a heritage from Aung San. The outcome was 
ethnic discontent and civil war.  
Silverstein’s monograph is based on his doctoral dissertation from 1960 and a 
long-time acquaintance with the country. It constitutes a basis for my thesis. 
However, I examine the consequences of the government’s policies for ethnic 
relations, rather than their causes. In addition, Silverstein focuses primarily on the 
contradiction between political and cultural politics. I will include the economic arena 
in the analysis as well.  
Fistié on Burma’s quest for unity 
 
Fistié (1985) concurs with Silverstein that ethnic diversity and efforts to reach national 
unity are the keys to understand modern Burma. For Fistié, politics in Burma reflect a 
continuous quest for unity with has pre-modern roots. Fistié demonstrates that 
Burma’s political history displays a high degree of continuity from the precolonial era 
to modern times. He argues that the Burmans have sought to dominate the region 
since the first Burman kingdom was established at Pagan in the 11th century. Non-
Burman groups have sought to retain their autonomy. Fistié sees Burma’s history as 
the story of a continuous struggle between Burman kings in Upper Burma, Mon kings 
in Lower Burma and Shan kings in the eastern hills. Colonial rule reproduced and 
reinforced the existing pattern of ethnic relations rather than creating a new pattern. 
Since 1948, the Burmans have sought to reproduce the same pattern by either 
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eliminating ethnic diversity through assimilation or by controlling ethnic minorities 
with a system of internal autonomy based on Burman overlordship.  
Fistié’s arguments bring to our attention some significant aspects of ethnic 
relations in Burma. Firstly, we ought to remember that the colonial era in Burma was 
relatively brief. It began with the fall of Mandaly in 1885 and ended in 1948. 
Memories of the precolonial era were still alive in the country in 1948. Fistié’s 
description of Burmese history as marked by warfare is also fruitful. This history has 
frequently served as an argument to justify demands of autonomy by various ethnic 
groups. But I will also argue that in his dissertation, Fistié’ underestimates the 
magnitude of changes that took place in Burma during and after colonial rule. For 
instance, Fistié does not engage in an analysis of the evolution of the state and state 
power from the precolonial to the modern era, nor does he look into the introduction 
and development of modern concepts of national identity in Burma during this 
period.   
Smith on ethnic insurgencies 
 
Martin Smith’s (1991) monograph is a detailed study of the history of armed conflict 
in Burma between 1948 and the 1990s. His analysis has become a work of reference 
for scholars attempting to understand the complexity of ethnic relations in this 
country. It is also a source of information for my thesis. Smith’s contribution explores 
the links between the Communist and ethnic rebellions in Burma and outlines why 
the two insurgencies cannot be examined separately. However, Smith does not 
develop a conceptual framework for explaining the causes and mechanisms by which 
ethnic consciousness is politicised and develops into armed rebellion. Furthermore, 
his focus is on the armed insurrection, and his sources are mainly linked to armed 
organisations. There is less information on non-military aspects of ethnic relations in 
Burma and on strategies of nationality policy that are not military.  
Brown on the development of an ethnocratic state 
 
Brown (1994) argues that ethnic rebellions in Burma are the product of state 
domination by the majority ethnic group and that they have emerged as the result of a 
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development in three stages that began with the British colonisation. Brown thus 
differs from Fistié in assessing the impact of colonisation: Brown argues that 
colonisation played a key role in bringing about change in the traditional state in 
Burma. Colonisation and the introduction of a modern state system disrupted the 
traditional structures of authority in Burma, which were based on Buddhism, kingship 
and local level authority. Then, the Burman majority was allowed to capture the new 
state. An ethnocratic state developed in which Burmans came to dominate at the 
expense of other ethnic groups. Finally, ethnic conflicts erupted when this Burman-
dominated state sought to penetrate the non-Burman periphery. Because the state was 
weak, it proved unable to control the eruption of violence in the periphery.  
 For Brown, ethnic conflicts in Burma are primarily the result of centre-
periphery relations combined with state-building and the assimilation policies of the 
modern state. Brown also points to the impact of administrative centralisation and 
economic disparities, but he does not engage in a detailed analysis of the nexus 
between politics, economic and culture. Furthermore, Brown does not distinguish 
between state and regime, and he therefore does not examine how changes in ethnic 
relations are also a result of the nature of particular regimes.  Finally, Brown’s 
analysis follows a centre-periphery matrix, with the state as one actor and ethnic 
minorities as another. I will show that the interaction between the state and ethnic 
groups changed from one ethnic group to another, and that ethnic groups reacted 
differently to state penetration.  
 19
2. Chapter Two: Theoretical approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Perspectives on the relationship between democracy and ethnic fragmentation can be 
grouped into two academic schools. One school argues that democracy is a 
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and that democracy has a positive 
impact on ethnic relations, thus serving as an integrating force. The second school 
argues that democracy increases the prospect for ethnic conflict because more people 
participate in the political process and differences between ethnic groups can be 
articulated openly. In other words, democracy breeds fragmentation (Ellingsen 1997: 
pp.152-153; Gleditsch 1998: p. 308; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: pp. 258-261).  
Arguments from both schools can be found in analyses of democracy and ethnic 
relations in Burma. One assessment of Burma’s postcolonial history is that a gradual 
consolidation of democracy took place before 1962 and that parliamentary and local 
elections conducted during the 1950s and 1960s were reasonably free and fair 
(Silverstein 1964: p.128-131). Impediments to the consolidation of democracy as a result of 
ethnic demands were reduced as the civil war receded and government forces 
regained control over the country. A government Arms-for-Democracy programme in 
1958 was successful in bringing insurgents from ethnically based organisations to 
give up armed struggle (Butwell 1963: pp.201-202; M. Smith 1991: pp.168-169).  
The alternative view is that democracy was not about to consolidate in Burma in 
1962. Proponents of the second view point to politically motivated violence that 
occurred during the electoral campaigns of the 1950s and argue that the elections 
were not fully free and fair (Callahan 1998b: p.54). In addition, several issues critical for 
ethnic relations were not addressed. It can be argued that more ethnically based 
organisations were waging armed resistance in 1962 than in 1948 (M. Smith 1991: pp. 190-
195; M. Smith 1994: p.25). In 1948-1949, the leading armed ethnic organisations were 
Karen, Arakanese and Mon, Karenni, and Pao. None of the major hill-dwelling ethnic 
groups had taken up arms. The first armed organisations were set up among ethnic 
 20 
groups who did not reach an agreement with the AFPFL before 1948 about future 
arrangements in an independent state. Ethnic groups who reached such an agreement 
– the Panglong agreement from 1947 - were not initially engaged in the civil war. 
This is the case of the Shan, the Kachin and the Chin. By the late 1950s and early 
1960s, however, armed opposition groups were emerging among the Shan and the 
Kachin as well, while members of other ethnic groups in the border areas were 
increasingly being recruited into the army of the CPB and other insurgent 
organisations.  
Discrepancies between the two perspectives of democracy in Burma stem in part 
from the failure to distinguish between the various phases of democratisation, 
particularly between transition and consolidation. Gunther et al (1995: p.3) propose the 
following definition:  
The “(t)ransition begins with the breakdown of a former authoritarian regime and ends with the 
establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic 
regime. Consolidation (…) refers to the achievement of a substantial attitudinal support for and 
behavioural compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game which they 
establish”   
Snyder (2000: pp.28-29) suggests that the impact of democratisation on ethnic relations 
varies from one phase to the next. While ethnic conflicts tend to increase during the 
transition from authoritarian rule, they tend to subside during consolidation. The 
reason is that the transition remains open-ended until political institutions are 
established which define the future democratic regime and create roles for various 
political actors. It also sets the framework for ethnic relations. The consolidation of 
democracy, on the other hand, hinges on the ability of the democratic government to 
carry out policies to promote democracy within the framework established by the 
transition, and, if necessary, to reform this framework to remove hindrances to the 
consolidation of the democratic regime.  
The consolidation of democracy is more complicated in multiethnic than in 
monoethnic states. This raises the question of whether a common national identity is 
a necessary premise for the consolidation of democracy. Firstly, the consolidation of 
democracy is a result of policies to promote democracy that may also have a bearing 
on ethnic relations. Indeed, democratisation sets in motion broader political, social, 
economic and cultural changes that make affect the relationship between ethnic 
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groups. This is the rationale behind the concept of ethnopolitics. Karklins (1994: p.5) 
argues that “(…) one premise of the concept of ethnopolitics is that politics in any 
multiethnic state inevitably takes on an ethnic dimension”. Such changes may spur 
ethnic conflicts in societies lacking a common national identity. In addition, 
democratic consolidation may be affected by nationality policies that seek to address 
ethnic demands through reforms in political structures and procedures. A common 
national identity may reduce the need for a nationality policy. 
In the next section, I will first define key concepts that will be used in this 
thesis: democracy, state, nationalism and ethnicity. I will then proceed with a 
discussion of the argument advanced by Brown and other scholars that ethnic 
relations are shaped by the state. While I will concur that the state has an impact on 
ethnic identity, I will argue that this impact is related not only to the strength of the 
state, but also to the nature of the political regime. I am therefore going to continue 
with an analysis of the relationship between democratic regimes and ethnicity. I begin 
by asking whether a common national identity is a premise for democracy. I continue 
by examining the relationship between the transition from non-democratic rule and 
ethnic relations. Given that the outcome of such a transition is the establishment of a 
democratic political order, I will examine some constraints and opportunities inherent 
in a democratic government for the development of ethnic relations. In the final 
section of the chapter, I will examine some strategies for dealing with ethnic 
differences in democracies. I will discuss what factors determine the choice of 
strategy as well as advantages and drawbacks associated with these strategies.  
2.2 Defining key concepts 
 
The study of democratisation and ethnic relations requires the use of concepts such as 
democracy, state, nation, nationalism and ethnicity, which are originally Western 
concepts, and which pose certain challenges when applied in a non-Western context, 
as I will do in this thesis.  
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2.2.1 Democracy and democratisation 
The focus of this thesis is on the process of democratisation rather than on its 
outcome, namely democracy. Etymologically, democracy means rule by the people. It 
is a concept closely associated with that of the state. Indeed, Linz and Stepan (1996: 
p.19) argue that the existence of a state is a condition sine qua non of democracy.  
Democracies are political regimes, i.e. a manner of organising the state’s political 
institutions and selecting political leaders. However, this definition conceals a great 
variety of views of what democracy is. These views range from definitions of 
democracy that emphasise the formal aspects of democratic regimes to substantial 
definitions of what should be “contained” in a democracy. In this thesis, I will show 
that both viewpoints were found in Burma, and that this distinction was also a part of 
the discourse on how democracy ought to address majority and minority issues in a 
multuethnic state. However, I will apply a liberal concept of democracy that draws on 
the theories of Schumpeter and Dahl in order to assess the quality and extent of 
democracy in Burma before 1962.    
For Schumpeter (in Sørensen 1993: p.10), a democracy is primarily a method for 
selecting political leaders in elections. Dahl (quoted in Sørensen 1993: p.12), on the other 
hand, argues that elections are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
democracy. In addition, democracy requires that the government be responsive to the 
preferences of its citizens. As a result, Dahl argues that democracies require the 
existence of a number of conditions deemed necessary for the meaningful exercise of 
elections: respect for basic civil and political rights – including freedom of 
expression, organisation and association - as well as access to alternative sources of 
information. Dahl thus produces a set of eight institutional guarantees necessary for 
democracy (Rasch 2000: p.40; Dahl in Sørensen 1993: p.12). In other words, Dahl locates 
democracy as unfolding within the framework of a broader political arena. The 
quality of democracy is linked to the quality of that arena.  
2.2.2 State, nation and nationalism 
 
In this thesis, I will focus on two aspects of nationalism, namely how the nation is 
conceived and how an organised national movement emerges. The basis of 
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nationalism is the idea of the nation-state where boundaries of states and nations 
coincide. A definition of nationalism thus hinges on a definition of state and nation. I 
will follow Weber’s distinction between the state as a territorial concept linked to the 
distribution of power and authority and the nation as a value concept (in Hutchinson & 
Smith 1994: p.22). The nation is, in this sense, “a cultural and political bound, uniting in a 
single political community all who share a historic culture and homeland” (A. Smith 
1991: p. 14).  
Nations and ethnic groups tend to be identified by ascriptive traits such as 
name, culture, history, territory and ancestry and/or by a subjective sense of shared 
identity and community (Schermerhorn quoted in Hutchinson and Smith 1996: p.6; A. Smith 1991: 
p.14). I will use the term ethnic group to refer to a group that shares a number of 
ascriptive traits, while I reserve the term nation for identity linked to the state. I will 
thus speak of the various ethnic groups of Burma, including the Burmans, on the one 
hand, and of the Burmese nation that includes all these groups on the other hand. I 
will show that a Burmese nation did not exist before 1948. 
Furthermore, I found it useful to distinguish between a civic and an ethnic 
model of the nation (A. Smith 1991: pp. 11-12). The civic model of the nation presents the 
nation as a territorial and legal-political community which individuals may choose to 
join or leave. In the ethnic model, on the other hand, the nation is seen as constituted 
by members who share a common descent and culture. Membership is organic and 
independent of the will of individuals. The ethnic model of the nation provides for a 
more intimate connection between ethnicity and nation than the civic model. In a 
multiethnic state, the promotion of an ethnic model of the nation is therefore 
problematic for ethnic integration. But, as I will show, it can also be problematic to 
promote a civic model of the nation if the characteristics of this nation draw primarily 
on those of one ethnic group.  
Gellner (1983) noted that it is not nations that create nationalism, but 
nationalism that creates nations. The ideas of nationalism have indeed been used by 
states to legitimise their existence, as well as by non-state liberation movements 
pushing for the establishment of nation-states. Gellner, Anderson and Smith represent 
three perspectives on the emergence of nationalism. For Gellner (1983), nationalism is 
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a modern phenomenon. The economic and social changes brought about by the 
transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society and the emphasis on 
education in modern societies together lead to cultural uniformisation within the state. 
The model for the emergence of nationalism is Europe, while in Asia, this process 
was triggered by colonisation.  
Anderson (1983) shared the view that nationalism is modern, but not the 
assertion that nationalism arises as a necessary consequence of industrialisation. 
Instead, Anderson coined the concept of “imagined communities”: The nation is 
constituted of individuals who have come to regard themselves and each other as 
members of the same community. For Anderson, the print media played a key role in 
forging these “imagined communities”, and in the emergence of nationalism. The 
development of a script fixed languages, which in some cases became associated with 
the state, i.e. a pre-existing administrative unit, as the language-of-the state. Neither 
Gellner, nor Anderson was centrally concerned with the nexus between democracy, 
state and nationalism (Anderson 1963; Gellner 1983; Linz and Stepan 1996: p.24).  
Anthony Smith (1991: p.39, pp. 41-42) represents a third approach to nationalism. 
He argued that nations  - in Western as well as Third World countries - typically 
develop on the basis of an ethnic core, and that the aspiring nations that are most 
likely to succeed are those that can build upon such an ethnic core. Nation is a 
modern concept, but a nation draws on a pre-modern core for its development.  
In chapter four, I will trace the emergence of nationalism in Burma as a result of 
colonialism, and its impact on ethnic fragmentation. I will examine Burmese 
nationhood as well as how a nationalist movement emerged, first as an anticolonial 
and anti-state force during the colonial era, then as its role shifted to that of a state 
actor in 1948. I will argue that this shift from a position of calling for change to a 
position of defending what had been achieved posed some specific challenges in 
terms of how to address ethnic fragmentation.   
2.2.3 Ethnic identity 
 
An analysis of how democratisation affects ethnic identity is based on the 
presupposition that ethnic identities are fluid and can be affected by political change. 
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This presupposition rests on an instrumentalist perspective of ethnicity. The 
arguments about how ethnic identity emerges and becomes politicised can be located 
along a continuum with the primordialist and the instrumentalist perspectives at each 
end of the spectrum. The instrumentalist position holds that ethnic identities are fluid 
and malleable and therefore affected by the circumstances within which they are 
expressed. Conflicts that arise between ethnic groups often have non-ethnic causes. 
They are rooted in the characteristics of a specific situation, such as the nature of a 
political regime or a change of regime. The instrumentalist view argues that ethnic 
identity is a dynamic variable that may change during the course of democratisation.  
The counterpoint to this view is the primordialist position that ethnic identity is 
given, and that it is a structural variable for democratisation. Ties of religion, blood, 
language and custom that unite members of an ethnic group persist across time and 
have an “ineffable quality” (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: p. 8). As a result, conflicts between 
ethnic groups are often seen as given. Little can be done to avoid them or solve them.  
Both the primordialist and the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity have been 
criticised. Primordialist views have been criticised for overestimating the role of 
ethnicity for individuals and communities, while neglecting that most identities are 
fluid. Instrumentalist views have been criticised for underestimating the role of 
ethnicity by defining ethnic identity as a mere instrument to serve other interests. 
Instrumentalist approaches do not account for why certain issues come to be regarded 
as ethnic while other issues are not. Nor do they explain the relative resilience of 
ethnicity beyond its immediate usefulness in securing access to desirable resources. 
Today, most scholars seek to combine the two approaches, based on the realisation 
that the specific aspects of an ethnic identity are open to change, but that the 
relevance of ethnic identity per se persists. Ethnic identity may be fluid and malleable 
at the level of the individual, without changing the relevance of ethnic identity at the 
level of the community. This is the perspective that I will apply. I will not examine 
changes in ethnic identity at the level of the individual, but I will argue that ethnicity 
plays a key role at the collective level in shaping collective political identities. 
Furthermore, I will argue that ethnicity should be treated as a quasi-structural variable 
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for democratisation, but also that democratisation may change the content and 
meaning of this variable.  
2.3 The state and ethnic identity 
 
In chapter one, I introduced Brown’s argument that ethnic conflicts are the result of 
activities by the state. Brown’s argument reflects an instrumentalist perspective of 
ethnicity. Both Brown (1989, 1994) and Brass (1991) have examined the role of the state 
in ethnic identity formation in Asia. For Brown (1994: chap. 1), ethnicity is a result of 
characteristics of the state, but the state does not determine which form ethnic 
consciousness will assume. The state engages in society in order to influence the 
attitude and behaviour of its citizens, but its success depends on its capabilities. If the 
state is weak, it will not be able to control the impact of its intervention in the 
periphery and reactions may follow, including ethnic conflicts. In particular, Brown 
(1989) argues that the state influences the shape and content of ethnic consciousness 
by defining or ruling out roles for ethnic groups in the public arena, by reacting to 
expressions of ethnic identity and by promoting national identity.  
 Brass does not focus on the same political and social structures as Brown, but 
he shares the instrumentalist view of ethnicity. Instead, Brass analyses the role of 
political elites, i.e. those segments of society with the capability of engaging in 
political decisions. For Brass (1991: p. 254), the state’s policies towards ethnic groups 
matter less for the emergence of ethnic consciousness than the relationship of the 
state to the elite within ethnic groups and the competition between elites. Brass (1991: 
p. 243) argues that a state’s activities hinge on an alliance between the state and the 
elites of various segments in the population. In postcolonial and developing states, 
these segments are often ethnically defined because of the state’s propensity to 
distinguish between and classify population groups, for instance through the census. 
As time passes, the activities of the state change and the need for new alliances arises. 
As a result, the state’s relationship with the elites, and the relationship among the 
elites change. In particular, Brass (1991: p. 244) stresses changes that occur ”during 
transfers of power from colonial to postcolonial states, during succession struggles, 
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and at times when the central power appears to be weakening or the balance in 
centre-periphery relations appears to be changing”. These situations were 
characteristic of Burma in 1948.  
The state is a resource coveted by the elites in their competition for political 
power, economic benefits and social status. The elites therefore mobilise ethnic 
groups against rival elites, thus setting in motion the politicisation of ethnic identity. 
Their eventual success in this process depends on several factors, including which 
issues are used to mobilise ethnic communities, the level of organisation of these 
communities, the response from the state and the general political context (Brass 1991: 
p.41). Brass (1991: p. 15) states that “the cultural forms, values and practices of ethnic 
groups become political resources for elites in competition for political power and 
economic advantage”.  
 Competition also arises for control over the periphery in the state. This 
competition arises because the state threatens local elites as it extends its influence 
over the periphery. These local elites were formerly able to act as autonomous agents 
of the state. The result is a competition between central and local elites for control 
over the periphery. These two struggles – at the centre and in the periphery -  “take on 
an added significance when elites in competition are from different groups and/or use 
different languages”(Brass 1991: pp.272-274). 
 By drawing our attention to the role of the state and elites at various levels, 
Brass and Brown bring the state and stage agents back into the debate about ethnicity. 
At the same time, their insights need to be complemented by a discussion of the 
relationship between state and regime because the manner in which power and 
authority are organised and dispersed in the state is a result of the nature of the 
political regime. The nature of this regime determines the manner in which elites are 
selected, acquire or loose political power, as well as how decisions are made and 
implemented. The organisation and functioning of a regime determines the public 
role of various interest groups as well as which public policies will be decided upon 
and implemented in a variety of fields.  
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2.4 Democratisation and ethnic relations 
 
For Linz and Stepan (1996: p. 5), a democracy is consolidated when it becomes ”the 
only game in town”. While the transition to democracy establishes the formal 
trappings of the democratic regime, the two scholars argue that a consolidated 
democracy meets three conditions. Democracy consolidation has taken place when 
the authority of the regime is firmly established throughout the state, when attitudes 
in the population are overwhelmingly in favour of democratic procedures and when 
political groups no longer act in a manner that does not conform to democracy. The 
existence of ethnically based armed secessionist movements can therefore be 
construed as an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy.  
 In the present section, I will examine under what conditions the consolidation 
of democracy may succeed. As I will show in chapter four, the population in Burma 
did not share a common national identity when the transition to democracy began in 
1945. I will therefore begin by an examination of the relationship between democracy 
and national identity in order to establish whether a shared national identity is a 
premise for democratic consolidation in a multiethnic state.  
For Butenschøn (1998: p.249), the question of democracy and national identity is 
essentially a question of how to address two orders of problems. The first order is 
concerned with the constitution of the demos; the second order deals with the 
constitution of the political regime. Butenschøn points out that it is a common 
assumption that problems of the first order need to be addressed before problems of 
the second order, and that the solutions that are found affect the second order. He 
further argues that problems of the first order appear to be logically prior to problems 
of the second order, but that it is not necessarily the case. Below, I will present some 
of the arguments from this debate. I will then examine the transition to democratic 
rule and I will discuss the relationship between the transition and ethnicity. I will 
discuss how ethnicity can be addressed during the transition and how a democratic 
political structure may affect ethnic relations. Finally, I will examine some nationality 
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policy strategies that are put into use in democracies and how these may affect the 
democratic order.   
2.4.1 Democracy, national identity and ethnic conflicts 
 
The question of democracy and ethnic conflicts is closely linked to that of democracy 
and national identity (Butenschøn 1998: pp.248-249). While shared nationhood in a 
multiethnic state facilitates democratisation (Miller 1995: pp. 81-89), a complex pattern of 
ethnic relations creates challenges for democratisation (Linz and Stepan 1996: pp.25-26) and 
increases the risks of ethnic conflicts.  
Rustow represents a school of thought that argues that national unity is 
necessary in a democracy. For Rustow (1970), the establishment of national unity – the 
constitution of the demos - must precede all other phases in a process of 
democratisation. Lijphart (1977: pp. 1-3) represents an alternative school. He argues that 
democracy is sustainable in a non-nation-state if certain conditions are met. These 
conditions include power-sharing arrangements that are devised between the different 
ethnic communities in the state and an agreement among the leaders of the various 
ethnic segments. 
Baogang He (2001) argues that Rustow’s model begs a number of questions. In 
particular, Baogang He argues that Rustow’s model treats national identity as a 
structural variable for democratisation. Instead, Baogang He argues that national 
identity is a dynamic variable whose value changes during democratisation. 
Furthermore, Baogang He criticises Rustow for narrowing his analysis to the 
potential negative impact of national identity formation for democracy. Instead, He 
argues that democracy may play a constructive role for the development of national 
identity because it provides a procedure for solving conflicts that may arise during a 
process of national identity formation. For Baogang He, Rustow’s article reflects a 
bias against democracy that developed in scholarly literature during the 1960s and 
1970s. Instead, Baogang He points to the democratisation in Spain after 1975 and the 
Philippines after 1986 as examples showing that democratisation and problems of 
national identity can be addressed simultaneously. According to Baogang He (2001: p. 
 30 
107), “there has been a fundamental change in the judgement of the capacity for 
democratic management to deal with issues of national identity” since the 1970s.  
Rustow’s model can also be criticised for not addressing the question of how 
national identity is formed. Rustow states that national identity arises at different 
points in time, and from a variety of reasons, but that it takes place prior to 
democratisation. Rustow thus appears to suggest that the formation of national 
identity requires the structures of an authoritarian state.  
Linz and Stepan (1996: p.24) argue that there is no given answer as to how 
democracy-building and nation-building affect each other. Efforts to forge a common 
national identity in a multiethnic society and to build democracy can be mutual 
beneficiary, but also at odds. The consolidation of democracy may improve ethnic 
relations, but it may also create tensions between ethnic groups. The promotion of 
national identity may strengthen or weaken democracy. Democracy- building and 
nation- building follow logics that can be both complementary and conflicting. 
Instead, Linz and Stepan (1996: p.410) argue that: 
“(t)he key questions for a democratic multinational state are whether the minorities 
are or not are open to multiple and complementary political identities and loyalties, 
and, if so, whether they will be given citizenship”.  
The concept that national unity is required for democratisation is based on the 
assumption that people possess one type of identity and one set of loyalties. Instead, 
Linz and Stepan argue that people frequently move between different and 
complementary identities and loyalties. Such identities may also change over time. 
The key to democratisation in multiethnic societies is therefore whether the 
population is willing to move between various identities and whether the democratic 
state is able to make room for different identities.  
In this thesis, I will examine whether the case of Burma supports the position 
adopted by Lijphart, Baogang He, Linz and Stepan that democracy can be crafted to 
take into account “the particular mix of nations, cultures, and awaked political 
identities present in the territory” Linz and Stepan (1996: p.35) 4. I will also argue that 
the existence or absence of national identity is not the only challenge for democracy 
                                              
4 Linz and Stepan do not distinguish between nations and ethnic groups in their study of democratisation.  
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in a multiethnic state. Challenges may also arise from how national identity is defined 
and what strategies are selected to promote a common identity (Bakke 1996).  
2.4.2  Transition and ethnic relations 
 
Linz and Stepan (1996: p. 3) argued that:  
 “ a democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political 
procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new 
policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial powers generated by the new democracy 
does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.” 
This definition of a democratic transition has much in common with the one proposed 
by Gunther et al. (see chapter two, 2.1). Both definitions emphasise that institutional 
change is a key to the transition to democracy. But Linz and Stepan’s definition is 
better suited for an analysis of the transition process because it provides an 
identifiable set of criteria for the fulfilment of the transition. These criteria are the 
organisation of elections, the establishment of an elected government, and the extent 
to which the elected government plays a meaningful role in decision-making and 
implementation.  
The transition is a phase of uncertainty. Political roles from the old regime 
have to be redefined. Institutions have to be recreated. Norms and practices have to 
be reinvented. Such events may affect ethnic relations if the contending elites use 
ethnicity in their attempt to control the transition and its outcome, as Brass argued 
that they would be prone to do.  
Nevers (1993: pp.61-62) has examined the impact of the transition for ethnic 
relations. She argues that key factors for the understanding of how the transition 
influences ethnic relations include the number of ethnic groups in the state, their 
relative size and the existence of similar ethnic groups in neighbouring countries (as 
potential external allies). These are factors that we may look upon as structural in the 
sense that they will not be changed by democratisation. Other relevant factors include 
the level of tension between the groups prior to the transition and their relative power, 
as well as the ethnic composition and ethno-political views of the regime, the 
opposition and other key actors in the transition. The manner in which these factors 
come into play during the transition depends on the manner in which the transition 
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proceeds – whether it is controlled by the regime, by the opposition or is the result of 
a pact between the two sides. This is particularly significant if the regime and the 
opposition represent distinct ethnic groups or have sharply diverging views on 
appropriate responses to ethnic demands or on the relevance of ethnic demands for 
the transition. According to Nevers (1993: chap. 4; p.61), peaceful ethnic relations can 
develop as a result of the transition if the forces pushing for democracy recognise 
ethnic differences and take ethnic interests into account at an early stage. In addition, 
they need to accommodate those interests in a manner that is considered fair and 
even-handed by all parties. In chapter five, I will examine whether this was the case 
in Burma after 1945.   
2.4.3 The constitution of a democratic political order and ethnic relations 
Legislative – executive relationship, the legislature and the electoral system  
 
The transition to democracy ends with the constitution of a democratic political order 
and the establishment of a democratically elected government. The transition thereby 
creates a framework for ethnic relations. The relationship between legislative and 
executive power, the nature of the legislature and the electoral system are of 
particular significance in this regard. In addition, the party system plays a key role in 
modern democracies.   
 The relationship between legislative and executive power establishes the focal 
point(s) in a given political system. In presidential systems, the two powers are 
clearly separated and the executive power is independent from the legislature. The 
head of government is a president who is elected by the population. The main 
cleavage in the political system distinguishes between the two powers. In a 
parliamentary system, the two powers are fused so that the executive is dependent on 
the legislature. The head of government is a Prime Minister who is selected by the 
legislature and who leads a collegial body. The main cleavage runs between the 
government and the governing party in the legislature on the one hand and the 
opposition in the legislature on the other hand.  
 A number of scholars of democracy and democratisation have argued that 
parliamentary rule “provides a more flexible and adaptable institutional context for 
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the establishment and consolidation of democracy” (Linz in Lijphart 1992: p. 126), 
particularly in developing countries in the Third World (Lijphart 1992: pp. 23-25). Farrell 
(1997: p. 156) finds that parliamentary rule allows for a smoother transfer of power from 
one government to another with less abrupt and dramatic changes in policy. Other 
scholars argue that presidential rule contributes positively to democracy. Presidential 
rule is said to promote stability in the executive power, limited government and 
popular accountability through the election of the executive (Lijphart 1992).  
Parliamentary rule is also said to ensure better representation of interests 
groups and encourage coalition-building, and therefore to provide a better 
environment for solving ethnic conflicts (Stepan 1998: p. 227). It is furthermore regarded 
as more flexible than presidential systems. For instance, it allows for changes to place 
in the political system during the period between two elections (Linz in Lijphart 1992: 
p.122). Presidential rule, on the other hand, is said to produce rigidity in the political 
system and increase the risk of deadlocks between the legislature and the executive 
power (Linz in Lijphart 1992: p.120). Presidentialism is described as a winner-take all 
system that may contribute to fuel conflicts. Winning or loosing elections for the 
executive becomes a zero-sum game because power is centred in one person (Linz in 
Lijphart 1992: p.123). 
  The relationship between legislative and executive powers is one factor 
affecting ethnic relations. The composition of the legislature and the manner in which 
the legislators are selected are a second factor. Most modern legislatures are 
unicameral or bicameral. Historically, the two chambers have representing different 
interests. For instance, the upper chamber may represent a particular social class, 
such as the nobility in the British parliament. However, the upper chamber may also 
represent regional and political subdivisions in a federal system such as in the 
German parliament. Furthermore, Horowitz (1985: p. 628) has argued that the electoral 
system plays a key role for the development of ethnic conflicts. One reason is that the 
nature of the electoral system influences the proportionality of the voter outcome, i.e. 
the relationship between the number of votes that a political party receives and the 
number of seats that it will control in the legislature.  Evidence suggests that a high 
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degree of proportionality tends to improve the representation of minorities (Farrell 1997: 
pp. 150-153).  
 The choice of electoral system is often presented as a choice between 
proportionality and stability. It is assumed that when the electoral system provides for 
a high degree of proportionality, the stability of the political system will be low and 
vice versa. Farrell (1997: chap.7) does not find support for this assumption, although he 
acknowledges that a high degree of proportionality increases the chances for small 
and extremist parties to gain representation, thus potentially reducing stability. 
However, Farrell’s conclusions may not be valid for a postcolonial state like Burma. 
Farrell draws his conclusions on the basis of case studies from Western Europe. His 
findings may therefore result from other factors present in these countries, such as 
moderation in cleavages in the population. 
Four dimensions of the electoral system may play a role in shaping ethnic 
relations: The electoral formula, the structure of the ballot, the delimitation of the 
constituencies, and the number of representatives per constituency (Horowitz 1985: p. 
628). The electoral formula and the structure of the ballot affect the proportionality of 
the electoral system, given that proportionality is generally higher when electoral 
formulas are based on proportional representation than semi-proportional and 
majoritarian representation. The threshold-level necessary for parties to gain seats 
affects proportionality by influencing the extent to which smaller parties can be 
represented in parliament. In addition, disparities in the degree of proportionality 
between constituencies can also significantly affect the representation of ethnic 
minorities, as they will result in some constituencies being over-represented in the 
legislature compared to others. This could be significant in situations where the 
delimitation of constituencies follows ethnic boundaries. Indeed, the manipulation of 
the boundaries of constituencies is a known mechanism to favour certain electoral 
outcomes (cf. the concept of gerrymandering). 
I will argue that while the structure of the political system played a role for 
ethnic relations in Burma, it cannot be seen in isolation from other key aspects of 
political activity in the country. I will thus argue that there is an interacting effect 
between various elements within the political structure. For instance, the Burmese 
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political system was a variety of parliamentary rule – which ought to allow for greater 
representation of minority interests – but it was combined with an electoral 
majoritarian formula, which I will argue had a winner-take-all aspect. In a multiethnic 
and severely divided constituency, the election of one representative per constituency 
may give rise to conflict if the population in the constituencies in question is 
ethnically divided. In Burma, this was topical in constituencies in Kachin State with a 
combined Burman-Kachin population, for instance. In addition, the effect of the 
political structure cannot be established without taking into account the dynamics of 
day-to-day politics, for instance how citizens vote during elections, how political 
parties are organised and how civil society organisations seek to influence political 
decision-making and implementation. In other words, an analysis of the structure of 
the political system needs to be accompanied by an examination of the dynamics of 
everyday politics.  
2.4.4 Party structure 
 
In established democracies, the party system plays a key role in democratic processes, 
especially during elections, and political parties are regarded as legitimate and 
important political actors. They are a fairly stable and structured organisation that 
possesses material as well as human resources, and that plays a key political role as 
channels for political ideas and as providers of political leadership. Interparty 
relations as well as relations between the electorate and the various parties are fairly 
stable. However, this is not always the case in emerging democracies where the party 
system is poorly institutionalised, as Mainwaring (1998: pp. 67- 81) has observed in the 
case of the “third wave” of democratisation. Instead, he found that interparty 
competition tended to be volatile with numerous voters shifting party between 
elections and that legitimacy of political parties was questioned more frequently. The 
party organisations were poorer, with few resources and a greater reliance on 
individual leaders.  
Party systems also play a role for the politicisation of ethnic identity in 
multiethnic societies. Horowitz (1985: p. 291) emphasises that societies with deep ethnic 
cleavages tend to produce a party system that exacerbates those cleavages. Ethnicity 
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often forms a basis for social organisation in divided societies, for political parties as 
well as for organisations in civil society. The result is a system of ethnically based 
political parties, i.e. parties that are supported principally by one identifiable ethnic 
group, and that cater for the interest of that group. Once ethnic parties are established, 
they tend to foster further polarisation and gradually push away political parties that 
result from cleavages that are not based on ethnicity. This situation may have serious 
repercussions. Horowitz (1985: p.305) finds that the existence of ethnic parties is an 
important reason for the decline of party politics and the collapse of democracy. 
 A poorly institutionalised party system and an ethnically based party structure 
affect the manner in which democracy operates and is conceived. Democracy is often 
seen as a political system in which the will of the majority of the citizens is decisive 
for political decisions (majoritarian democracy), possibly within limits set by a 
constitution (constitutional democracy) (Rasch 2000: p. 22). This is a perception that can 
be difficult to sustain in situations were the will of the majority is channelled through 
political parties that are not deeply rooted in society. Instead, individual party leaders 
play a greater role.   
It can be argued that in societies that are not severely divided, the boundaries 
between majority and minority are fluid and shift from one issue to another. No group 
is permanently without influence. In severely divided societies, the borderline 
between the majority and the minority is not fluid. An ethnically based party system 
may thus turn some groups into permanent majorities or minorities (Horowitz 1985: 
pp.293-298). In such a situation, Horowitz (1985: p. 86) concludes: 
 “if we ask what went wrong with this election, there are at first plausible grounds 
for saying that nothing went wrong. The election was democratically conducted. The 
results are in conformity with the principle of majority rule. But that is the sticking 
point. Majority rule in perpetuity is not what we mean by majority rule”.  
This is a situation that we will recognise in Burma.  
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2.5 Democracy and nationality policy 
 
After a democratic political order has been established, policies to promote the 
consolidation of the regime are the logical next step. In a multiethnic state, this step 
may include attempts to address ethnic demands – i.e. the formulation of a nationality 
policy. Strategies targeting ethnic diversity may affect the democratic regime to 
varying extent. Strategies such as partition or secession entail major reforms as they 
redraw international borders. Cantonisation and federalisation are also major reforms 
that recreate boundaries within the state and change the manner in which political 
power is divided between political subdivisions. Other strategies may create a 
framework of rules and regulations that affect the workings of democratic 
institutions, for instance by granting various forms of collective rights to ethnic 
groups. Finally, some strategies, such as policies of assimilation or acculturation, do 
not change the democratic order, but may affect popular attitudes toward democracy 
and behavioural compliance with democratic rules. The selection of strategy is the 
outcome of several factors: 
2.5.1 Five factors determining the choice of strategy  
Goals 
 
McGarry and O’Leary (1993: chapt.1) distinguish between strategies aimed at 
eliminating and strategies aimed at managing ethnic diversity. Both goals are 
compatible with democracy: Butenschøn (1998: p.250) argues that a democratic 
political order can be established to overlook ethnic differences - through the 
application of principles of majority rule - or to institutionalise such differences - by 
providing guarantees for the representation of minority groups. In Burma, a third set 
of goals needs to be included to understand the choice of choice of strategy. These are 
goals that were linked to the decolonisation process – such as achieving a speedy 
independence from colonial rule – because the transition to democracy after 1945 
occurred within the context of decolonisation.  
 38 
Actors 
 
Bakke (1996: p.13) argues that the choice of strategies is the outcome of a dynamic 
relationship between the state and the ethnic groups who formulate demands, as well 
as of the interaction between ethnic groups. In the case of Burma, we may add a third 
actor to this relationship. In addition to the relationship between ethnic groups and the 
British colonial state, we need to include the anticolonial movement, the AFPFL, 
which negotiated the terms of independence with Great Britain and took over the 
government after 1948.  
Type of demands 
 
Bakke (1996: pp.3-7) distinguishes between political, economic and cultural demands, 
as well as between symbolic and practical demands. Bakke’s analytical categories 
allow us to grasp divergences within the state’s overall nationality policy. Indeed, the 
state may rely on similar strategies to face all kinds of ethnic demands, but it may 
also choose different strategies to address different demands. In addition, the 
application of one strategy for one set of demands may influence the liberty later to 
choose strategies vis-à-vis similar or other demands. The distinction between the 
various forms of demands forms the basis for the division of the analysis into three 
separate chapters for democratic consolidation in the political, cultural and economic 
arenas in Burma after 1948. 
Nature of strategies 
 
 Some strategies may require extensive institutional reforms, such as constitutional 
reforms, while others may be applicable within the existing constitutional framework. 
Horowitz (1985: chap. 15&16) thus operates with a useful distinction between strategies 
that aim at changing the structure within which ethnic groups interact and strategies 
that affect the distribution of resources between ethnic groups within a given 
structure. One hypothesis is that major institutional reforms in the political order are 
more likely to take place during the transition to democracy that later. The reasoning 
is that major reforms are easier to achieve when the political order is open for 
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reconsideration or that they may a necessary component in the transition. The 
alternative hypothesis is that major reforms are more easily achieved after the 
transition to democracy has occurred. A transition is a difficult process. If such 
difficulties are compounded by controversial reforms, the demands for reforms may 
end up aborting the transition. Proponents of the first hypothesis would probably 
support de Nevers’ assessment that ethnic demands should be taken into account at an 
early stage in the transition, while proponents of the second hypothesis would 
probably hold that democracy needs to be achieved before certain ethnic demands can 
be addressed. The case of Burma will show the validity of either hypothesis.  
Combination of strategies 
 
 Horowitz’ (1985) study of ethnic groups in conflict reveals that the nature of ethnic 
relations is the outcome of several interacting strategies. For instance, the impact for 
ethnic relations of measures such as federalisation, cantonisation or various forms of 
power-sharing can be reinforced by reforms in the electoral system and party system. 
Horowitz (in Lijphart 1992: p. 22) suggests that a parliamentary system combined with 
elections by proportional representation, a multiparty system and coalition cabinets 
can reduce tensions in a divided society. Powell (quoted in Lijphart 1992: p.24) argues that 
public order is better maintained in political systems that combine parliamentary rule 
and an election system with proportional representation.  Linz and Stepan (1996:pp. 33-
34) and Kymlicka (1995) recommend a combination of individual human rights and 
collective rights in order to protect minorities in multiethnic states. Linz and Stepan 
(1996: p. 33) also recommend that countries with several ethnic groups explore a 
combination of “non-majoritarian, non-plebiscitarian formulas” to reduce tensions. 
But not all combinations of strategies have a positive impact on ethnic relations. 
Brass (1991: p.342) argues that strategies of consociationalism and group rights are 
incompatible because consociational models do not recognise ethnic groups that 
develop as political entities after the power-sharing structure has been established. 
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2.5.2 Five strategies compatible with democracy  
 
Bakke (1996: p. 16) argues that it is more difficult to deal with ethnic conflicts in 
democracies than authoritarian regimes because democracies have access to fewer 
strategies (in particular strategies of elimination) and because the legitimacy of 
democracies rests on popular consent – including in the choice of strategy. In 
addition, the availability of types of strategies differs in the two regimes. According 
to Bakke, authoritarian regimes have more options when it comes to eliminating 
ethnic differences, while democracies have more options when it comes to managing 
ethnic differences.  
McGarry and O’Leary (1993) have created a typology of eight strategies for 
dealing with ethnic conflicts. They find that three of these are not compatible with 
democratic norms. They include the physical elimination of one or more ethnic 
groups (genocide); changes in the ethnic composition of the population through 
massive forced population transfer and the creation of a system of coercive or 
cooptive rule that prevents ethnic groups from challenging the authority of the state 
(hegemonic control). Five strategies are compatible with democratic standards: 1) 
partition/secession; (2) cantonisation/ federalisation; (3) consociation/power-sharing; 
(4) assimilation/integration; (5) group rights. I will examine advantages and 
drawbacks for each below.  
Partition/secession 
 
Partition and secession are strategies closely associated with the principle of self-
determination. They are typical strategies for dealing with political demands by 
minority groups, and require formalisation, for instance in a country’s constitution. 
McGarry and O’Leary argue that these strategies appear to be simple ways to ensure 
self-determination, but that they raise a number of questions. The two scholars (1993: 
p. 13) argue in particular that: 
 “(…) exercising the principle of self-determination is only straightforward where 
there is no large or disgruntled minority within the relevant region affected by the 
proposed secession and when the seceding area includes the great majority of those 
who wish to leave”.   
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Horowitz (1985: pp. 588-592) regards partition as a possible solution only after other 
attempts to reach accommodation fail. He argues that partition is unlikely to create 
ethnic homogeneity because few secessionist regions and few rump states are 
ethnically homogenous. Furthermore, ethnic identity among minorities in the 
secessionist region may become politicised as a result of the partition. Partition may 
thus exacerbate ethnic conflicts rather than becoming a solution. 
Cantonisation/federalisation 
 
These are strategies to address political demands that require formalisation in a 
constitution. A strategy such as federalisation aims at dealing with ethnic differences 
through state reforms and the diffusion of power. For Elazar (1987: p.11), federalism 
offers a solution for several political problems in modern states, including ethnic 
conflicts. Elazar (1987: p.12) argues that the diffusion of power in a federal state 
follows a polycentric model that ensures “self-rule plus shared rule”. In unitary states 
power is concentrated at the centre, and the main matrix is a centre-periphery 
relationship (Elazar 1987: pp.5-6). Federalism, on the other hand, is polycentric by design. 
However, federal arrangements require certain conditions in order to succeed. One 
condition is a territorially concentrated population. Federalism may be seen as an 
alternative to secession, but more often, it is looked upon as the first step towards 
secession (Horowitz 1985: p. 624). Unless a federal state is properly crafted, it can 
therefore aggravate problems of multiethnicity instead of attenuating them (Stepan 1998: 
p. 227). Horowitz (1985: pp. 621-622) also points out that there are costs associated with 
the upkeep of a federal arrangement that duplicates all political structures.  
Consociation/power-sharing 
 
Consocioational models are strategies that address political demands by ethnic 
groups. They are characterised by four conditions. They are (1) “government by a 
coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society”;  (2) 
mutual veto powers for all segments; (3) proportionality in all aspects of political 
representation and (4) a high degree of internal autonomy in each segment (Lijphart 
1977: p. 25). The manner in which power is shared between the segments may be more 
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or less formalised. While Lijphart defended the advantages of the consocioational 
model, Horowitz (1985: pp. 570-571) argues that the consequences of consociational rule 
are not well known, and that the model is developed on the basis of the experience of 
European states characterised by moderate and fluid cleavages. Many societies in 
Asia and Africa face serious cleavages that may adversely affect the opportunity of 
the leaders of the various segments to develop a consociational power-sharing 
system. Brass dismisses the consociational model as a solution to ethnic conflicts. He 
(1991: pp. 337-338) argues that proponents of consociational models base their arguments 
on assumptions about ethnicity and stability in plural societies that distract attention 
away from more important issues, in particular the relationship between state, social 
class and ethnicity. Instead, Brass (1991: p. 342) argues that consociationalism increases 
conflicts because it “is a model for freezing existing divisions and conflicts and 
reducing the art of political accommodation to formulas that can work only as long as 
processes of social, economic and political change do not upset them”.   
Group rights 
 
For Brass (1991: p. 342), group rights is an alternative strategy to consociational models. 
It is a strategy that protects minority groups without requiring reforms in the power-
sharing arrangement. However, group rights are not only strategies to address 
political demands by minority groups. Group rights can also be used to address 
cultural and economic demands. Kymlicka (1995: p. 4-5) has found that there is a 
gradual realisation that minority rights are not a subcategory of human rights and that 
traditional human rights standards cannot solve important and controversial questions 
concerning language issues, internal boundaries, decentralisation and representation. 
For Kymlicka (1995: p. 5), “ to resolve these questions fairly, we need to supplement 
traditional human rights principles with a theory of minority rights”. But Kymlicka’s 
support for collective rights is conditional: Liberal democracies cannot support a 
system of rights that allows groups to impose internal restrictions on their members, 
or that allows one group to exploit other groups. Kymlicka thus argues for a 
combination of individual rights and collective rights to ensure individual freedom 
within minority groups and equality between minority and majority groups.  
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Assimilation/integration 
 
Strategies of assimilation are closely associated with the ideal of the nation-state and 
nation-building activities. They are strategies to deal with cultural differences 
between ethnic groups and seek the gradual absorption of cultural minorities into the 
national culture with the concomitant disappearance of separate cultural 
characteristics. With a strong strategy of assimilation, the government promotes 
national cultural traits while actively seeking to eliminate the minority cultures, for 
instance by prohibiting the use of minority languages. A weak strategy of 
assimilation seeks to promote the national culture while neglecting minority cultures. 
Assimilation has frequently been carried out within the authoritarian structures of 
predemocratic states. As a result, Stepan (1998: pp. 224-225) argues that assimilation has 
become a difficult and time-consuming process that is likely to lead to reactions and 
conflicts, in particular in democracies. Indeed, Lijphart (in Hutchinson and Smith 1994: p. 
261) observes that “in Third World countries, the process of democratisation and the 
encouragement of mass participation have undoubtedly strengthened ethnic feelings 
and demands”. The conditions for assimilation have thus become more difficult. 
Instead, Linz and Stepan (1996 p.417) suggest that the concept of identity should be 
reconsidered. They point out that: 
 “the logic of the nation-state produces a political language and a set of descriptive 
terms whose discursive effect is to create polar identities and to work against the 
multiple complementary identities that make possible democratic life in a de facto 
multinational state”.  
2.6 Summing up 
 
In the present chapter, I have explored three aspects of the democratisation process 
that affect ethnic relations. Firstly, I have argued that there is a close link between 
democracy, national identity and ethnic conflicts. I have discussed whether a 
common national identity is required for democracy and how democratisation can be 
supported in multiethnic states. I have also examined how the transition to democracy 
affects ethnic relations and the consequences for ethnic relations of various 
democratic institutional arrangements. Finally, I have explored the opportunities and 
 44 
constraints inherent in the formulation of a nationality policy in democratic regimes. 
These three aspects of the democratisation process will be examined in relation to 
Burma in the next several chapters. In chapter four, I will explore the constitution of a 
national identity in Burma, and I will argue that a common national identity that 
spanned across ethnic cleavages had not emerged by the time the transition to 
democracy began in 1945. In chapter seven, I will explore the consequences of this 
situation as I analyse the nationality policies of the post-independence government in 
the cultural arena. In chapter five, I will explore how the transition to democracy 
occurred in Burma between 1945 and 1948. In particular, I will look into whether 
representatives of the various ethnic groups in the country were able to influence the 
transition process and if the interests of ethnic groups were taken into account during 
the transition.  I will also analyse the constitutional order that emerged in 1948. In 
chapter six, I then seek to grasp how the post-independence government sought to 
consolidate democracy and make up for the lacunas of the transition. In chapter eight, 
I will explore how democratic consolidation is also linked to a country’s social and 
economic situation.  
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3. Chapter three: Research methodology and 
source material 
 
I began working on my thesis as a result of an interest in Burma and in questions 
related to democracy and democratisation. From the onset, I have worked on one unit 
of research – Burma - and a large number of variables. The questions formulated in 
chapter one, the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, the research method 
put into use in the analytical chapters and the empirical data available together have 
determined the research strategy. In the present chapter, I will provide the reasons for 
the choices that I have made when it comes to each of these four elements and point 
to some consequences for the analysis. 
Yin (1994: p.1) defines a case study as the examination of a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real life framework (as opposed to an experiment carried out in 
a laboratory). Andersen (1990: pp. 122-123) argues that a case study may also be 
concerned with historical events. I have chosen to combine a case study of Burma 
with a historical research method. My case study is historical in terms of its topic - 
the period between 1948 and 1962 - and its reliance on historical data. The main 
factor guiding my choice of research strategy was the nature of the questions asked in 
chapter one. As Yin (1994:p.9, p.21) points out, case studies are well suited to explore 
questions that deal with the exploration of processes and causal relationships (“how” 
and “why”-questions), and when the investigator has little control over events. 
Andersen (1990: loc.cit.) argues that case studies are applicable when the borderlines 
between the phenomenon that is being examined and its context are blurred. For these 
reasons, I find the case study to be a suitable strategy for exploring a complex 
phenomenon such as democratisation, which also frequently interacts with 
international affairs, economics, social conditions and culture. Case studies are also 
well suited when several sources of information are used to explore the same 
phenomenon. As I will show, using multiple sources is a central component of my 
thesis. In section five, I thus describe and discuss the data material that constitutes the 
basis for my analysis.  
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3.1 Why choose a case study: Strengths and weaknesses of 
case studies 
 
According to Mathisen (1998), a good case study ought to be significant both at a 
theoretical and an empirical level. I will argue that my case study is of empirical 
interest for two reasons. The first reason concerns the role that history plays in the 
present political conflict in Burma. The second reason stems from the relevance that 
the nexus between democracy and ethnic relations continues to have in Burma.  
3.1.1 History as a political tool 
 
The current political situation in Burma is characterised by serious political conflict 
and a wide array of human rights violations after large-scale anti-government 
demonstrations took place in 1988 and a general election was conducted in 1990. The 
nexus between democracy and ethnicity remains of paramount importance today. In 
addition to the ongoing struggle between the military and the democracy movement 
over the role of the military and the introduction of democracy, Burma is suffering 
the consequences of widespread disagreement over strategies for dealing with 
ethnicity.  The three main parties in the conflict – the military, the democracy 
movement and the ethnically based movement – diverge in their opinions of how the 
two conflicts are related to each other. Ethnic organisations tend to argue that the 
question of democracy and the question of ethnic demands cannot be dealt with 
separately. Instead, they see the two issues as part of the same problem that ought to 
be addressed simultaneously (ENSCC 2002: p.5). Since 1994, annual resolutions by the 
United Nations General Assembly have also spelt out the need for a tripartite 
dialogue - the military, the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the ethnic 
groups - to address the political crisis in Burma.  
Knowledge about Burma’s past contributes to a better understanding of the 
present. Indeed, history comes into play in the ongoing crisis in several ways and 
serves to justify the position of key actors on various issues. The democracy 
movement and the military authorities have diverging and in part conflicting views of 
what happened during Burma’s first era of parliamentary democracy. According to 
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the military authorities, a high level of conflict among the politicians, which 
culminated in a split in the AFPFL in 1958, marked the first fourteen years of civilian 
rule. The military authorities accuse the politicians of having failed in their duties 
towards the country, thus forcing the military to step in. Furthermore, the military 
argues that the armed forces have played a central role in keeping the country 
together since 1948, and that without the intervention of the armed forces, Burma 
would have become “a new Yugoslavia”, wrecked by internal conflict and civil war 
(Golden Land). This view is used to justify the military’s current hold on power and 
legitimise the present authoritarian regime as well as to argue for a prominent 
political role for the military in the future.  
 Many democracy activists, on the other hand, point to the failures of 
authoritarian rule since 1962, while arguing, in retrospect, that the period before 1962 
was “a golden era” for Burma (Aung San Suu Kyi 1995: p.169; Khin Maung Kyi et al. 2000: p. 2). 
The democratic opposition accuses the military of having let the country and the 
people down and holds the military responsible for tensions between ethnic groups 
and for the civil war. They regard the presence of the armed forces as part of the 
problem rather than the solution when it comes to achieving national reconciliation 
(ENSCC 2002: p.5). Finally, a section of the ethnic insurgent movement argues that the 
conflict in Burma is essentially a constitutional problem that can be solved through 
the judicious crafting of a proper constitutional arrangement to address the 
relationship between the country’s various ethnic groups. This is thought to bring 
ethnically based violence to an end (ENSCC 2002: pp.5-8) 
 Caught between these viewpoints are younger people who have grown up after 
1962 and who combine a keen awareness of the importance of learning from history 
with a lack of confidence in their knowledge of their country’s past. They argue that 
history as they were taught in school has been manipulated for political purposes, and 
that they have not been given a proper chance to learn about their own past. For many 
students who left Burma after the anti-government uprising in 1988, life in the 
country’s border areas and in exile have changed their views towards what they were 
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taught in school, particularly when it came to ethnic relations5. There is thus a clear 
need for the re-examination of Burma’s modern history.  
 The importance attached to history by key political actors in Burma today is 
apparent in the establishment of an official historical commission by a government 
decree in 1989, following the suggestion of Senior General Saw Maung, then 
chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the main 
government body in Burma. The purpose of establishing this commission was said to 
compile “the authentic facts of Myanmar history” by recording those facts from 
individuals who have personally been involved in the country’s anticolonial 
movement, and thus be able to learn from past mistakes. The work carried out by the 
commission covered the period of the colonial administration and the promulgation 
of the 1947 constitution. It resulted in a two-volume analysis of the 1947 constitution 
and the nationalities that was published in Burmese in 1991 and translated into 
English in 1999 (UHRC 1999: introduction).  
3.1.2 History as a model 
 
In addition to serving as a justification for the position held by various actors, history 
is also present in terms of the strategies that are proposed to address the present crisis. 
Such strategies frequently draw on strategies that have already been applied in the 
past. The Panglong Agreement and the ”Spirit of Panglong” from 1947 continue to 
provide a model for ethnic relations. Constitutional drafts proposed by the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) and the National Council of the Union of Burma 
(NCUB) are based on the 1947 constitution (ENSCC 2002, NLD Interim Constitution, NCUB 
1997).  
The use of past experiences as a basis for future solutions is not unique to 
Burma. As Linz and Stepan (1996: p.83) point out, the restoration of a previous 
democratic constitution is a strategy often selected by a country undergoing a crisis 
because it allows for a speedy solution and the avoidance of further conflict. 
However, the resurrection of past constitutional arrangements presupposes that these 
                                              
5 These are arguments that I have heard during numerous discussions over the past nine years with young Burmese dissidents.  
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arrangements are not somehow responsible for the present crisis and that they have 
not been made irrelevant by changes that have taken place since they were first in 
use. Such assumptions do not necessarily hold up to further scrutiny. Therefore, 
engaging in an examination of history can contribute to avoid a repeat of past errors.    
3.1.3 An extension in time and space 
 
It has been said that case studies are of limited theoretical interest because they do not 
permit generalisation. According to Yin (1994: pp.30-32), such criticism fails to grasp 
the analytical nature of case studies. This thesis seeks to extend a theoretical 
framework dealing with democratisation in time and space, thus exploring its 
validity. Although I introduced some theoretical approaches in chapter two that 
derive from Asia and Africa (Brass 1991, Brown 1989, Brown 1994, Horowitz 1985), the overall 
theoretical framework applied in the thesis draws primarily on case studies from 
Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. I then 
apply this framework on a process of democratisation in a postcolonial state in Asia 
after 1948. This attempt, however, warrants a few caveats.  
Firstly, the application of theories developed to account for processes that took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s on a case from the 1940s and 1950s presupposes that 
there is a constant relationship between variables. As Hovi and Rasch (1996: chap.3) 
show, however, this is not necessarily the case in social sciences. Instead, it has been 
argued that the manner in which issues are acted upon depend on the manner in 
which they are perceived and interpreted. This raises the question of whether we 
should interpret events within the context of their time – and whether this can be done 
once this context has expired – or whether we can hold them up to a theoretical model 
that transcends time and place. Interpretations may change over time and lead to a 
new conception of the subject that is being studied, a process described by Kuhn 
(quoted by Nordby 1998) as a change of paradigm. They may thus lead to novel ways of 
addressing certain issues.   
Linz and Stepan (1996: pp. 74-76) show that the process of democratisation is 
facilitated or hampered by the prevailing zeitgeist at any point in time, i.e. whether 
the “spirit of times” is supportive or negative towards democracy. Indeed, there are 
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significant differences in the zeitgeist of the 1940s-1950s and of the 1970s-1980s that 
needs to be taken into account when applying a contemporary framework in order to 
examine past events. This was Baogang He’s point when he criticised Rustow for 
being caught up by the mood of the 1960s and 1970s in his criticism of the prospects 
of democracy. Democracy was introduced in Burma at a time of optimism for the 
future of newly independent postcolonial states. But it was also at a time when the 
Cold War was about to shape international relations, and issues of national security 
and alliance- building were beginning to take on a key role in many countries’ foreign 
policy. In contrast, democratisation in Eastern Europe after 1989 was the result of the 
collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. It occurred at a time when a 
number of countries came to support democracy and human rights as a key 
component of their foreign policy.  
 Secondly, a recurrent dilemma in development studies is the question of 
whether it is possible to extend theoretical frameworks based on case studies from 
Europe and Latin America to postcolonial states in Asia and Africa. In the present 
thesis, I use definitions and concepts – such as nationalism and democracy - 
developed in the West. Indeed, one of the points that I make in chapter four on the 
historical background for the democratisation process in Burma after 1948 is that the 
modern state in Burma evolved from a precolonial indigenously Asian concept of the 
state in combination with a European model of the state.  
How do I justify that I apply a Western theoretical framework such as the one I 
introduced in chapter two? One reason is that the introduction and development of 
democracy in Burma was the result of Western influence – particularly from the 
British colonial era - and the form of democracy that was sought in Burma was based 
on Western political thinking. Political leaders in Burma in the 1940s and 1950s 
spoke of the need to adapt the political system in the country to local conditions, but 
their arguments were based on Western political theories. To the extent that I can 
identify an indigenous concept of democracy, of national identity and so forth, it did 
not exist separately from the “corresponding” “Western” concept but in symbiosis.   
Furthermore, it would be unfruitful to seek general knowledge in the social 
sciences if it were not feasible to extend theoretical frameworks from one 
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geographical area to another. I seek to determine whether knowledge that has 
emerged from case studies in one part of the world can be generalised to other 
geographical regions. By using insight gained from the examination of case studies 
from the 1990s, I hope to be able to look at the postcolonial states with fresh eyes, 
and improve our understanding of the political history of these countries. A re-
examination of older cases may enable us to gain new insight that can complement 
and extend the knowledge that studies of contemporary cases give us. 
3.2 Collecting the data 
 
Before I began the search for data, I decided to include only material produced before 
1962 in order to avoid the pitfalls associated with using historical works written 
within the present political context. In addition, I decided to look for work by 
Burmese scholars due to their access a wider array of source (including in Burmese 
language) and in order to include a greater variety of perspectives than if I had 
limited myself to Western scholarship. However, significant limitations came to 
change my selection of sources, in particular the availability and reliability of 
material.  
Availability was one reason. Academic scholarship on Burma is sparse, and 
material on Burma is not readily available. Burma is a closed country and it is 
difficult for scholars to get access to the country as well as for scholars in the country 
to carry out with their work. Engaging with Burma also poses some ethical dilemmas 
that I will address shortly. In addition, my access to information is limited to material 
available in English, French, German or a Scandinavian language.  
Lack of data and unreliable data came to put significant limitations as to what 
data could be used as a basis for the thesis. This is particularly significant when it 
comes to quantitative data, such as statistics, which are frequently either erroneous or 
completely lacking for Burma. For instance, no countrywide population census has 
taken place since 1931. A national census was planned during 1953-1955, but was 
never completed due to the civil war (Maung 1979: p.96). As a result, most population 
counts that I refer to are estimates. However, the use of estimates, particularly over a 
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large number of years, opens for significant errors. For instance, it was estimated in 
1979 (Maung 1979: p.98) that the population in Burma by 2001 would comprise 63,2 
million people. Recent estimates by the United Nations suggest that the population in 
Burma by mid-2002 was only 50 million (United Nations Population Division).  
Furthermore, estimates are frequently subject to disagreements, often of a 
political character. This has happened with estimates of the size of various ethnic 
groups, such as the Karen. The present military authorities estimate that are about 2,5 
million Karen in Burma, while the Karen National Union (KNU) – the main Karen 
opposition group – argues that there are more than seven million Karen. 
Anthropologists assess the number of Karen at about four million, of which 200,000 
live in Thailand (M. Smith 1994: p.42). It is thus difficult to determine the accuracy of 
such data.  
The limitations posed by erroneous data also extend to other forms of 
quantitative data. For instance, Thet Tun (1960), director of the Central Statistical and 
Economics Department of the Burmese government, complained that inadequate 
statistics formed the basis for much of Burma’s economic planning, and 
acknowledged that knowledge of the country’s private sector remained “very scanty”.  
Much quantitative data that would have been useful for my thesis is lacking. 
For instance, I examined the UN annual statistical yearbooks for the period 1948-
1962, but much of the data on Burma was missing. It also turned out to be difficult to 
find desaggregated social or economic data in order to compare the situation between 
ethnic groups for chapter eight. In chapter eight, I will therefore focus on regional 
disparities instead. This is possible because ethnic relations in Burma can also be seen 
as centre-periphery relations, with the Burman majority living in the lowlands and 
various ethnic groups inhabiting the hill areas. However, such an approach does not 
enable me to examine the conditions for various ethnic groups within Central-Burma 
or within the border areas, and I have to accept that this will be one limitation for the 
analysis. 
 One consequence of the lack of reliability of much quantitative data is a 
greater reliance on qualitative data. In addition, I have used more recent material than 
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I expected, as can be gauged from the bibliography. I have also not been able to rely 
as much on Burmese scholarship as I would have wished.  
3.3 Validity of conclusions 
 
I rely on a number of strategies to check the validity of my conclusions. Firstly, as I 
show in my introductory chapter, a number of scholars have identified ethnicity as an 
important factor in Burmese politics and pointed to the nexus between state/state 
institutions and interethnic tensions in Burma. My findings are thus supported by the 
findings of other scholars. Furthermore, my conclusions draw on experiences that 
have been acquired over the past eight-nine years, as I have engaged in numerous 
discussions with individuals involved in Burmese politics - Burmese and foreign 
scholars of Burma. These discussions have contributed to shape my opinion on a 
variety of topics, including those presented in the thesis. During my work with the 
thesis, I was also able to engage in oral and written discussions concerning specific 
topics addressed in the thesis, such as the Panglong Agreement, by email and other 
forms of contacts. Finally, I participated in the conference “Burma-Myanma(r) 
Research and its Future: Implications for Scholars and Policymakers”, which took 
place in Gothenburg, Sweden, in September 2002, and I presented the main 
conclusions from the thesis at one panel. 
3.4 Research and politics in a Burmese context 
 
The case of Burma poses some ethical challenges for scholars and students due to the 
present political situation in the country. In recent years, a debate has thus taken place 
over the ethics of academic engagement in Burma. Government reactions against 
those who write critically about Burma - such as refusing entry visas and the 
imposition of a strict system of public censorship - are some reasons why scholars 
feel reticent about engaging with the regime. For Houtman (2000), the manipulation 
by oppressive regimes of academic work for political purposes should make scholars 
wary of dealing with such regimes. Other scholars argue that academia ought to 
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engage with Burma. For instance, Reynolds (2000) argues that academics have a duty 
to engage with Burma in order to extend the space available in the country for 
conducting research and presenting research findings. Reynolds recognises that 
scholars may thus find themselves complicit with an authoritarian regime, but 
emphasises that they also have a responsibility towards those who are seeking to 
conduct academic work in Burma within the confines permitted by the authorities.  
The debate has centred on one discipline in particular – archaeology. It has 
been triggered by attempts by the Burmese government to draw on findings from the 
Pondaung primate fossils archaeological project to promote a sense of national pride 
and legitimise military rule. However, caution is also warranted when it comes to 
scholarship that deals with other topics. Indeed, ethnic relations in modern Burma are 
a politically sensitive topic in Burma. For instance, the military government has 
founded a large number of museums and historical monuments during the 1990s, in 
particularly in the non-Burman states. Houtman (1999) argues that these efforts are 
part of a process of “Myanmafication” of Burma than began when the country’s 
official name was changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. Houtman sees these 
efforts as an attempt to reduce the importance of Aung San as Burma’s paramount 
figure of national unity as a result of the affiliation between him and Aung San Suu 
Kyi (who is his daughter) and replace him with other historical symbols. History-
writing and re-writing thus plays directly into the ongoing political struggle in 
Burma, and history plays a central role in the regime’s attempts to forge a legitimate 
basis for its rule.  
Given that the work on this thesis has taken place outside Burma, the ethical 
dilemma of engaging with Burma has been of less direct significance. However, such 
concerns have played a role in the choice of source material.  
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4. Chapter four: The question of national identity 
 
In chapter two, I argued that a common national identity is posited as a premise for 
the consolidation of democracy. In this chapter, I will trace the development of 
nationalism in Burma during the colonial era. I trace the emergence of a national 
movement among Christian Karen in the Irrawaddy Delta and among Buddhists 
Burmese in Burma Proper. I will show that these two national movements failed to 
promote a common identity that spanned ethnic and religious cleavages, and thereby 
to bridge the gap between Burma’s various ethnic and religious groups. Instead, the 
emerging Burman-dominated anticolonial movement promoted cultural attributes 
associated with the main ethnic groups in Burma Proper - Buddhism and Burmese 
language and culture. While no major national movements emerged among ethnic 
minorities in the Frontier Areas before World War II, tensions between various ethnic 
groups escalated during the war. The question of national solidarity was therefore 
topical for the consolidation of democracy after 1948.  
4.1 Development of a modern state 
 
The precolonial state in Burma was a galactic polity6 (also described by historians as 
a set of concentric circles, mandalas) whose realm stretched from the Himalayas to 
the Andaman Sea, from Siam to East Bengal. In practice, the Burman king governed 
the Irrawaddy plains, where the majority of the population was living. Arakanese and 
Mon rulers controlled Lower Burma, while Shan and Karenni princes ruled in the 
eastern hills. The Burman king maintained a tributary relationship with these lesser 
rulers, but by the time of the British colonisation, the Burman kings were in the 
process of acquiring control throughout the Irrawaddy valley. The realm of the 
Burman kings thus came to constitute the core of the modern state (Hall 1964: p.140; 
Taylor 1987: p.5; pp.20-25; Thant 2001: pp. 24-25). 
                                              
6 The term galactic polity is borrowed from Tambiah’s (1976) analysis of the pre-modern state in Thailand. Tambiah argues that his model 
is valid for other countries as well, including Burma (Tambiah 1986). 
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 The power of the king rested on his control over the army, his relationship 
with the Buddhist Sangha and his position at the apex of patron-client relations that 
permeated society. Society was divided into kinship and social status groups, which 
determined an individual’s role in society and his/her position in relation to others 
and to political authority (Hall 1964: p.247; Taylor 1987: p.15, p. 25; Thant 2001: pp. 27-34; Wolters 
1999: chap.2). According to Thant (2001: p. 3), colonisation brought “nothing less than the 
total dismantling of existing institutions of political authority and the undermining of 
many established institutions of social organisation”.  
During the 19th century attempts were made to improve public administration, 
but no countrywide central administration developed (Taylor 1987: p.52; Thant 2001: chap.5; 
Hall 1964: p.599). After the British conquest in 1885, the precolonial state was replaced 
by a legal-rational state with authority emanating from its administrative capabilities 
and control over the army and the police (Hall 1964: p.692¸ Taylor 1987: pp. 82-86). 
The economy of the precolonial state was a subsistence economy. After 1885, 
it became export-oriented and based on the rapid development of agriculture, 
especially rice production in the Irrawaddy Delta, which developed into the backbone 
of the colonial economy. Natural resources such as forestry, rubber and metals were 
exploited in the Frontier Areas, and petroleum was exploited in the plains. 
Infrastructure for communication and transport was built in Central-Burma for the 
purpose of export and internal security (Adas 1974: pp.3-11; Hall 1964: pp.736-740; Taylor 1987: 
p. 76; pp. 106-110).  
4.2 Ethnic relations in colonial Burma  
 
In the precolonial era relations between ethnic groups had fluctuated. During the 18th 
century, the Burman king acquired Assam, Arakan and Tenasserim and brought 
Arakanese, Karen and Mon into his realm (Thant 2001: chap. 1). Ethnic groups in the hills 
– such as Kachin, Chin and Karenni - did not share the polity of the Burman rulers, 
but maintained a relationship with the valley dominated by trade and the security 
concerns of the Burman polity (Taylor 1987: p.23). The British conquest brought ethnic 
groups in the valley and the hills into closer contact as areas inhabited by ethnic 
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groups that had been tributaries to the Burman kings were included within the borders 
of the colonial state (Taylor 1987: p. 79; Thant 2001: pp. 220-221). New economic 
opportunities encouraged the immigration of Europeans, Indians and Chinese, thus 
bringing “new” ethnic groups into the country.  
The economic and administrative policies of the colonial era created new 
classes and class relations that developed ethnic characteristics (Adas 1974: chap.5). 
Burma turned into a three-tiered society with Europeans and Eurasians at the top of 
the social ladder. Traders, civil servants and professionals made up the middle class. 
Many members of immigrant communities such as the Chinese and the Indians 
entered these middle class professions, which were frequently a result of the new 
economic and political order. Indians – in particular the money-lending Chettyar 
caste – played a central role in the development of the colonial economy. Farmers 
and workers – mostly from indigenous ethnic groups - were at the bottom of the 
social ladder. Many non-Burman indigenous groups, such as Kachin, Karen and 
Chin, were recruited to the colonial army where ethnically segregated units were 
established (Adas 1974: chap.5; Taylor 1987: p. 101).   
 British administration separated the plains of the Irrawaddy river (Burma 
Proper) from the hills (the Frontier Areas), and discouraged interaction between the 
two areas. Burma Proper was brought under direct British rule, while a protectorate 
under traditional leaders persisted among Shan, Kachin and Chin in the Frontier 
Areas. The Karenni area was ruled as a separate entity under the Karenni princes. The 
introduction of the apparatus of a modern state was more rapid in Burma Proper than 
in the Frontier Areas and Karenni states (Taylor 1987: p. 88, p. 92, p. 95). In practice, 
Kachin, Karenni, Chin and Shan rulers replaced one tributary relation with another 
(Scott 1901: pp. 1-8; pp. 14-15¸Taylor 1987: p. 79). In addition, British policies strengthened the 
traditional Shan rulers, the saohpas, by reducing their dependence on the local 
population for positions of political authority (Taylor 1987: pp. 95-96).  
In Burma Proper, a process of assimilation of Arakanese and Mon into the 
dominant Burman culture that had begun prior to 1884 intensified under the British, 
but a similar process did not occur among the Karen (Fistié 1985: chap.2). In the Frontier 
Areas, the spread of Christianity during the 19th century – particularly among Chin, 
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Karen, Karenni and Kachin – created a gap between the Buddhist majority in the 
valley and the various non-Burman hill peoples. Christianity came to play a key role 
in the political identity of many ethnic minorities. In the precolonial era, ethnic 
identity was fluid, but colonial policies such as the census and the codification of 
legal codes contributed to cement ethnic identities (Leach 1970: pp. 42-44; Thant 2001: p. 243; 
Taylor 1987: p. 150). 
 The various ethnic groups in Burma responded differently to colonisation. 
Many ethnic groups such as Arakanese, Mon and Karen, supported British rule, while 
anticolonial resistance first emerged among Burmans. For many non-Burmans, their 
support for the colonial authorities were a result of past animosities between these 
ethnic groups and the Burmans (Taylor 1987: 154-155). There was also resistance to 
British authority in Upper Burma, among Kachin, Chin and Wa who had never before 
been brought under a common polity with the valley, but by the first decade of the 
20th century, this resistance had largely ceased (Woodman 1962: chaps. 15-16).  
4.3 The development of nationalism 
 
A national movement led by a Western-educated elite first emerged in Burma Proper 
in reaction to colonialism. The Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) founded 
in 1906 on the model of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) is 
considered Burma’s first nationalist organisation (Maung Maung 1980: p. 1¸ Taylor 1987: p. 
13). The YMBA sought to protect and promote Burman indigenous culture and 
particularly Buddhism. Maung Maung (1980: p. 230) argues that this movement was a 
by-product of a religious revival from the 19th century that emerged when the 
traditional bound between the monarchy and the Sangha was broken up in 1885-
1886. But Burmese nationalism in the early 20th century also had precolonial roots, 
and drew on a proto-national identity that was emerging in the Irrawaddy valley 
during the 18th-19th centuries (Smith 1965: pp.81-85; Taylor 1987: p. 7, p. 150; Thant 2001: p. 88). 
According to Thant (2001: p. 88), this identity was based on a common Burmese 
language, Buddhism, common legal and political norms and institutions as well as a 
shared written history and literature. After colonisation, this proto-identity gradually 
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evolved into a full-fledged national identity that defined itself in opposition to non-
Burmans immigrant, in particular Indians and Europeans7.  
The culturally oriented YMBA movement was politicised after a British 
decision in 1917 to prepare India for Home Rule, while excluding Burma from the 
same reforms, although the country was then ruled as a province in India. Many 
Burmese nationalists opposed the separation between Burma and India on the ground 
that Burma ought to progress towards self-rule on a pace equal with India. The 
controversy split the YMBA and led to the birth of a more radical political 
association, the General Council of Buddhist Associations (GCBA) – an umbrella 
organisation of smaller nationalist groups – in 1920, while the original YMBA was 
marginalised. University students organised the first major popular protest against the 
British in 1920 (Maung Maung 1980: pp.21-23). In 1922, Burma was included in the scheme 
for Home Rule, and political reforms were introduced, including elections for a new 
legislative assembly. These reforms played a central role in encouraging the 
formation of indigenous political organisations.  
 During the 1920s, Buddhism continued to play a dominant role in the 
nationalist movement. Former members of the Sangha such as U Ottama became 
prominent nationalist leaders. According to Moscotti (1974: p. 21& p. 39), Buddhist 
monks served as a bridge between the urban elite and ordinary villagers. Issues 
related to religion and education also remained important. In addition, precolonial 
traditions and history inspired the nationalists. A peasant rebellion led by the former 
Buddhist monk Saya San in the Irrawaddy Delta in 1930 is symptomatic of this 
period (Cady 1958: pp.309-314). 
 During the 1930s, the main focus of the nationalist struggle shifted towards the 
students and workers. Two significant events during this decade were the student 
strike in 1936 and the oil workers’ strike in 1938. University students and 
intellectuals, frequently inspired by Marx and other left-wing writers, became the 
main leaders of the national movement during the 1930s8. Aung San and U Nu 
                                              
7 Today the Burmese term for a Western foreigner is “Ingaleik” (“English”). Since the early 19th century, the Burman court of Ava divided 
people into “lu-myo” (“race” or “extended kinship group”). There were five overarching lu-myo categories – Myanma (Burmese), Tayok 
(Chinese and other East Asians), Shan, Mon and Kala (Indians, Europeans and others from overseas) (Thant 2001: p. 88)). 
8 Several of the young nationalists of the 1930s-generation, including Aung San, were involved in the establishment of the Burma 
Communist Party in 1939 (Lintner 1990). 
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achieved prominence as student leaders in this period. Students founded the Thakin9 
movement and the Dobama Asiayone (“We Burman Association”) in 1930. They 
espoused a new outlook, described by Maung Maung (1980: p. 234) as “patently secular 
in concept and activities, deliberately moving away from the Buddhist foundations of 
the earlier nationalist movements”. The movement became increasingly concerned 
with economic issues, partly as a result of its new ideological orientation and partly 
as a result of the economic depression that hit Burma in the 1930s. The movement 
began to single out ethnic groups associated with colonial rule, in particular Indians, 
and several anti-Indian and anti-Chinese riots took place during the 1930s (Adas 1974: 
pp.174-175, pp.204-205). 
 The focus on Buddhism during the 1910s and 1920s had attracted Burmans as 
well as Mon and Arakanese. The membership of the first nationalist movement in 
Burma Proper was initially multiethnic. The first branch of the YMBA was 
established in the Arakan area in 1902, the second in Rangoon in 1906. The YMBA 
leadership included Western-educated Burmans and Mon as well as former 
Arakanese monks. But increasingly, the nationalist and anticolonial movement 
became identified with Burmans due to its focus on Burmese language and culture, 
and because many prominent leaders were Burmans, such as Aung San and U Nu. It 
failed to win the support of ethnic minorities (M. Smith 1991: p.49).  
 Among non-Burmans, national organisations began to emerge, partly in 
reaction to the rapid advances made by the Burman nationalists. The most important 
non-Burman nationalist movement before World War II was Karen. The Karen 
National Association (KNA) was established in 1881 to promote unity within the 
Karen communities and act as a pressure group for the Karen (Taylor 1987: p. 155). 
Karen nationalism was the result of missionary activities during the 19th century 
(Gravers 1996: p.249; Hovemyr 1989: p.88), and Christianity became a key component in 
Karen political identity. Karen identity also developed in opposition to Burmans. For 
instance, the Karen nationalist leader San Po Chit argued in 1946 that “it is a dream 
                                              
9 The word “Thakin” means “master” in Burmese. During the colonial era, it was usually used by Burmese to address the British. The 
students appropriated this title for themselves in defiance of the British to indicate that they were the real masters of the country. (Cady 
1958: pp. 375-376). 
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that Karens and Burmans can ever evolve a common nationality” (quoted in Gravers 1996: 
p.238). Christian Karen became leaders of the Karen nationalist movement. 
 Like the YMBA, the Karen nationalist movement became politicised by the 
British Home Rule decision in 1917, which the KNA also opposed, although for 
reasons different from the YMBA. During the 1920s and 1930s, Karen and Burman 
nationalists frequently split in their view about political reforms. The KNA supported 
British rule and British-initiated reforms, such as the separation between Burma and 
India in 1935-1937, while Burman nationalists frequently opposed them. The KNA 
demanded special representation rights for the Karen in the legislative assembly, 
which were granted in 1922, while the GCBA and other Burman groups opposed 
such measures. In 1928, the demand for a separate state for the Karen was raised for 
the first time. 
 Buddhism proved insufficient to forge a common basis for nationalists of 
Burman, Arakanese and Mon descent. Towards the end of the 1930s, Mon and 
Arakanese national organisations emerged, such as the Ramonnya Mon Association 
in 1937 and the Arakan National Congress (ANC) in 1938. They were concerned 
about protecting Arakanese and Mon language, culture and tradition (M. Smith 1991: p. 
53). The lack of a common sense of history with the Burmans was one factor in this 
development. Mon and Arakanese used the existence of precolonial Mon and 
Arakanese kingdoms to press their demands. But modern style political organisations 
only emerged among Burma’s ethnic minorities after 1945 (M. Smith 1991: pp.52-53). 
Until the end of World War II, the KNA remained the “only well-organised 
indigenous minority party in Ministerial Burma (Burma Proper)” (M. Smith 1991: p. 50).  
In the Frontier Areas, no major organised national movement appeared before the 
war. In the Chin Hills and in the Kachin Hills, the first modern organisations were 
religious. The Chin Baptist Association was established in 1907, while the Kachin 
Baptist Convention was created in 1910 as an umbrella group of the various Kachin 
Baptist Churches. The purpose was to protect and promote religion, and engage in 
missionary activities among other ethnic groups in the Hill Areas. The Chin National 
Unity Organisation (CNUO) was formed in 1933. It demanded political reforms for 
the Chins similar to those in Burma Proper, but it had little influence among the 
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Chins (M. Smith 1991: p.53). Constitutional reforms in 1937 affected the Chin Hills by 
creating an international boundary in the area, but it did not spark strong reactions in 
the Chin community.  
World War II militarised the Burman national movement and polarised ethnic 
relations. In 1941, students from the Dobama Asiayone set up the Burma 
Independence Army (BIA, renamed the Burma National Army, BNA, in 1943) with 
Japanese assistance. The core of the BIA was a group of thirty Thakins, led by Aung 
San and including Ne Win. The BIA entered Burma with the Japanese in 1941-1942, 
but did not engage in active warfare. Instead, it took over local government and 
administration under the Japanese occupation of the country. The war adversely 
affected relations among ethnic groups, especially between Burmans and Karen as 
well as between Burmans and Indians/Muslims (Cady 1958: p. 443). While many Karen 
fought alongside the Allies in the colonial army, the BIA and the war administration 
under the Japanese occupation forces were dominated by Burmans. Communal 
clashes erupted between the Burman-dominated BIA and Karen in the eastern hills 
and in the Irrawaddy Delta (M. Smith 1991: p.62) as well as between Buddhist Arakanese 
and Muslims Rohingya in Arakan (Fleischmann 1981: pp.62-65). More than 400,000 
Indians left Burma during the war (Cady 1958: p.439). In Shan State, the saohpas swore 
allegiance directly to the Japanese occupants rather than to the BIA (M. Smith 1991: 
p.64).  
4.4 Summing up 
 
In Burma, as in other postcolonial states in Asia and Africa, the nature of post-
independence politics cannot be understood without taking into account the changes 
undergone by society in these countries as a result of colonial rule. Colonialism 
changed the nature of the state, the relationship between state and society and the 
relation between ethnic groups. The introduction of a modern state and a modern 
economy during the colonial era increased interaction between ethnic groups as the 
control of the state extended across its realm for the first time. The colonial state 
brought a large number of ethnic groups within its boundaries, but its borders also cut 
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across territories inhabited by ethnic groups and separated them by international 
boundaries. Burma belongs to that group of countries where de Nevers and Linz and 
Stepan predict that democratisation will pose great difficulties due to the presence of 
many ethnic groups and of irredenta groups. 
The development of the nationalist movement in Burma explains why Burmese 
nationalism is founded on two traditions. On the one hand, there is a historically and 
religiously oriented nationalism with close ties to Buddhism. On the other hand, there 
is a modernist and secularly oriented nationalism. Both traditions have fed into 
modern Burmese national identity. But the role of religion and of Burman culture as 
the basis for Burmese identity ensured that the population did not share a common 
national identity as the transition to democracy began after World War II. Instead, the 
Burman-Buddhist nationalist movement in Burma Proper became the dominant 
component in the anticolonial movement and later in the post-independence 
government. The experience of World War II polarised the relationship between 
Burmans and other ethnic groups, in particular groups associated with the colonial 
regime. As such, World War II became a watershed in ethnic relations in Burma. 
Finally, World War II brought a new political awakening among ethnic groups in the 
Frontier Areas, such as the Kachin. While only the Karen had developed a significant 
national movement before World War II, several ethnically based organisations were 
established after 1945. This situation further complicated the transition to democracy 
after 1945.  
 64 
5. Chapter five: The transition to democracy 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I argued that the introduction of democracy in Burma occurred in two 
phases separated by World War II. The first phase of the introduction of democracy 
raised a number of issues that continued to be relevant in 1945. In this chapter, I will 
briefly trace the origins of democracy in Burma since the 1920s. I will record some of 
the main legacies of the pre-war era, namely a general emphasis on democratisation 
as a process that evolves through institution-building, a tradition of parliamentary rule 
and communal representation for ethnic groups. I will also provide an answer to the 
first question asked in chapter one – what characterised the democratic regime that 
was established in Burma in 1948 – and I will analyse the democratic political order 
that emerged during the transition in 1945-1948. 
5.2 The introduction of democracy, 1922-1940 
5.2.1 Preparing for self-government 
 
After the British seized Mandalay and sent Burma’s last king into exile to India in 
1885, a political and administrative system was established in Burma Proper similar 
to the colonial government in British India. Burma became a province ruled from 
India, under a local British governor-general (renamed governor in 1923) assisted by 
a council and British officials. The powers of the governor’s council were limited. 
The council represented primarily the interests of the foreign business community in 
Burma (Moscotti 1974: p.9). It gradually increased in size, but its members remained 
appointed until 1922. The turning point for the introduction of elected representatives 
and institutions of greater self-government came in 1920, after Great Britain decided 
to prepare India for Home Rule and to extend these reforms to Burma. A new 
legislative assembly with increased powers replaced the governor’s council. It was to 
be composed equally of elected representatives and appointed administrators 
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(dyarchy). In addition, communal seats were reserved for Indians, Anglo-Indians, 
Europeans and Karen. The concept that the building of political institutions is the key 
to political progress in Burma dates from this period (Moscotti 1974: p. 69). But the new 
dyarchy failed to pacify the emerging nationalist movement, who demanded more 
radical reforms and greater Burmese participation in the government of the country. 
The concept of representation rights for ethnic groups also remained controversial.  
 Constitutional reforms in 1935-1937 paved the way for a second round of 
political reforms. In 1937, Burma was separated from India and became a colony in 
its own right. The dyarchy system was eliminated, but the communal seats were 
maintained. A “parliamentary” system of government was formed whereby the 
Burma government was made dependent on the legislative assembly (Taylor 1987: p. 
123). The governor was given wider powers, but he was expected to delegate these to 
his Council of Ministers, which was composed of members who had the support of 
the majority of the representatives in the elected legislature. The governor retained 
control over defence, external affairs, monetary policy and Anglican ecclesiastical 
affairs (Moscotti 1974: chap. 4). Except for the period of World War II, Burma has thus 
been governed under a parliamentary form of rule. 
 Until the end of World War II, political reforms were confined to Burma 
Proper – mostly to urban areas, while the Frontier Areas remained under the authority 
of the governor (Taylor 1996: pp. 168-171). In 1922 a federation was carved from the 
principalities in Shan States to facilitate the maintenance of the political and 
administrative distinction between Burma Proper and Shan States and avoid that the 
political reforms in Burma Proper be extended to the Frontier Areas (Taylor 1987: p. 96). 
5.2.2 Introducing elections 
 
Burma first experienced local elections for urban councils in the 19th century, but 
franchise was then limited to the country’s European residents. The first major 
election – with a franchise that gave one in six Burmese the right to participate in the 
election - took place in 1922 (Moscotti 1974: p.138). Throughout the 1920s, the question 
of whether to join or boycott elections organised by the colonial rulers was one of the 
main controversies within the nationalist movement. Less than seven percent of the 
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electorate joined the first election in 1922, but participation increased gradually 
during the 1920s (Taylor 1987: p.165).  
The 1930s were a period of consolidation of the electoral process. According to 
Taylor (1987: p. 167), the election in 1932 became a turning point because it “posed a 
substantive policy question of the kind expected in democratic politics”. Plans were 
then underway to separate Burma from India, and the dominant issue during the 
electoral campaign was whether Burma ought to be separated from India (Taylor 1996: 
pp. 167-168; Moscotti 1974: p. 89). Constitutional reforms in 1935-1937 also paved the way 
for more substantial Burmese participation in the political process, both as voters, as 
representatives in the elected legislature and as government ministers. However, 
power remained in British hands. The last regular election under British rule occurred 
in 1936. The 1941 election was postponed as a result of the war; the 1947 election 
was a step in the transition to independence.  
5.2.3 The emergence of political parties 
 
The introduction of elections in Burma Proper and the Home Rule controversy during 
the 1920s stimulated the development of political parties. Many Burmese first 
became active in politics through the YMBA and the GCBA. The first political 
parties were mainly urban with a small and elite-based leadership, but during the 
1920s and 1930s, popular support increased. By 1935, many political parties had 
acquired a mass base and a unified leadership. The ideological basis of the parties 
also changed. Many parties began with the aim of securing as much self-government 
as possible for Burma and gradually developed a platform for broader economic and 
political reforms. During the 1930s, several parties became openly anticolonial and 
anti-imperialist (Taylor 1987: pp. 174-188). 
5.2.4 Interruption: World War II 
 
Cady (1958: p. 427) argues that the Japanese conquest and occupation from 1941 to 
1945 had an impact on Burma comparable to the colonial take-over in 1885. The 
political system of the pre-war era collapsed and authoritarian rule was imposed. In 
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1943, Burma was declared independent within the Japanese sphere of interest (Taylor 
1987: p. 217). The British defeat ended Burma’s economic dependence on Great Britain 
and India. The Indian Chettyars were eliminated as a landholding class and a mass 
exodus of Indians from Burma followed. In 1945, Great Britain sought to restore the 
political and economic structure of the pre-war era, but was unable to recover its hold 
over the Burmese economy (Cady 1958: p. 428). The Thakin student movement became 
the leading force in the anticolonial movement and new political organisations were 
formed, while pre-war political leaders and political parties were marginalised. 
Although the Thakins initially allied themselves with Japan and supported the 
Japanese occupation of Burma, opposition within Burma to the Japanese occupation 
increased steadily. In 1944, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) was 
established as an underground force to prepare for the resistance against Japan. 
Leading figures in the AFPFL movement were Thakins who were then serving in the 
Japanese war cabinet, including Aung San. The AFPFL resumed contact with the 
Karen resistance and with allied forces in India in 1944-1945. The league led a large-
scale uprising against the occupation in March 1945, and in May 1945, allied forces 
re-entered Rangoon.  
5.3 The transition to independence, 1945-1948 
5.3.1 Political actors 
 The AFPFL 
 
After the war, the AFPFL acquired a position of virtual monopoly in Burmese politics 
This role was largely the result of the dominant role played by the Thakins during the 
war, first as allies of Japan, and then as leaders of the resistance against the Japanese 
occupation. The AFPFL also developed into a multiethnic organisation. After March 
1945, the AFPFL expanded to include “representatives from virtually every 
indigenous political group in Burma, including the minority people” (Cady 1958: p. 519). 
The AFPFL included all major political forces in the country; the Socialist and 
Communist parties, the BNA (renamed the Patriotic Burmese Forces, PBF), the All 
Burma Youth League (an umbrella group of Indian, Karen, Mon, Shan and Burman 
 68 
youth), the Karen Central Organisation and the Maha Sangha (organised the Buddhist 
monkhood). The league also included representatives from pre-war political parties 
(Tinker 1957: PP.65-67). The AFPFL’s mass following came from its control of farmers’ 
and workers’ organisations under Communist and Socialist sponsorship. An 
organisation loyal to Aung San – the People’s Volunteer Organisation (PVO) – was 
set up with war veterans and affiliated with the AFPFL (Cady 1958: pp. 478-484; pp. 519-520; 
Taylor 1987: p. 235; Tinker 1957: p. 17). Cady (1958: p.428) argues that the AFPFL “alone 
acquired the essential internal cohesion, the mass following, and the capabilities of 
physical resistance needed to champion the nationalist cause”.  
The leadership of the AFPFL, on the other hand, was centralised under “a 
closely knit cadre of Thakins, long united by personal acquaintance” (Cady 1958: p. 519-
520) and by common experiences acquired during the war.  The main leaders were 
Aung San and U Nu as well as Than Tun (leader of the Communist Party, and Aung 
San’s brother-in-law) and Mya (leader of the Socialist Party and of the farmers’ 
union). Aung San was in a unique position.  According to Silverstein (1993b: p. 1), “for 
two short years, 1945-1947, he completely dominated politics in Burma”. The 
assassination of Aung San and several Cabinet ministers in the interim government in 
July 1947 was therefore a serious blow to the anticolonial movement.  
 Aung San played a key role in holding the AFPFL together when rifts began to 
develop between Communist party members and other members of the league after 
1945 (Taylor 1987: p. 235). The prospects of decolonisation had increased tensions within 
the AFPFL between the CPB and the main body of the league as the two sides 
disagreed on the strategy to pursue to secure independence. While the main AFPFL 
favoured negotiations and participation in elections, the CPB relied on strategies such 
as a “no rents no taxes”-campaign and strikes and called for a boycott of the 1947 
election. In February 1946, these disagreements led to the expulsion from the AFPFL 
of one of the Communist leaders, Thakin Soe. Thakin Soe established a “Red Flag” 
Communist Party10, which went underground to wage guerrilla warfare. It was later 
                                              
10 The flags were used to distinguish between various Communist factions. The Communist Party of Burma was known as the “White 
Flag” Communist Party. For further information on the Communist Party, see Lintner 1990.  
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outlawed. Although the “Red Flag” Communist faction remained a relatively small 
group, it continued to be active when the civil war erupted after 1948.  In May 1946, 
the remaining “White Flag” faction of the Communist Party (CPB) led by Than Tun 
was also expelled from the AFPFL. In addition, activities defined as Communist were 
forbidden in the rural branches of the league (Cady 1958: pp. 527-552; U Aung San’s 
Explanation 1946). Instead, the Socialist party became the leading ideological force in the 
AFPFL (Silverstein 1964: p.122).  
 The British government was initially reluctant to negotiate with the AFPFL 
over independence for Burma. There were several reasons for this reluctance. Partly, 
it was due to the role played by many AFPFL leaders, including Aung San, as allies 
of Japan during the war. In addition, there were disagreements within the British 
government over the future of the Burmese exile government, which had been based 
in Simla, India, during the war years. Finally, the British government initially sought 
to promote the economic reconstruction of Burma over political reforms. These plans 
were outlined in a White Paper in 1945 (Cady 1958: pp.505-506). Due to the reluctance of 
the government to deal with the AFPFL, the league was first recognised as a military 
organisation by Lord Mountbatten, the supreme allied commander for Southeast Asia. 
In September 1945, Lord Mountbatten and Aung San entered an agreement at Kandy, 
Ceylon, for the amalgamation of the colonial army and the Patriotic Burmese Forces 
(PBF). It was decided that the new Burma army should be composed equally of 
forces from the former colonial army and the PBF. The new army would also retain 
the British system of ethnically segregated units. War veterans who were not included 
in the new army were recruited into the PVO. The agreement created a bass for a 
clear distinction between military and political affairs. After the signature of the 
Kandy agreement, Aung San resigned from his position as leader of the PBF in order 
to become leader of the AFPFL (Defence agreeement 1947; Exchange of Letters 1945; Kandy 
Agreement 1945; Letter from Aung San 1945; Memorandum 1945) 
The British governor returned to Burma in October 1945. Relations with the 
AFPFL became strained when the governor first refused to accept a majority of 
AFPFL representatives in the Council of Ministers. After a change of governor in 
August 1946, the transition to independence proceeded quickly (Cady 1958: pp. 530-538).  
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Ethnically based political organisations 
 
The effect of the war on ethnic relations was net after 1945. Three sets of 
consequences can be identified. Firstly, there was a mushrooming of ethnically based 
political organisations among ethnic groups that had not been politically organised 
before the war in 1945-1947. Secondly, co-ordination between organisations 
representing the same ethnic groups improved. Finally, tensions between several 
ethnic groups escalated, and became manifest in the emergence of armed wings for 
several ethnically based organisations during 1947-1948.  
Examples of new ethnically based organisations created after 1945 can be found in 
Arakan and Mon areas. The Mon Freedom League (MFL, later known as Mon United 
Front) was established under the leadership of the nationalist leader Nai Shwe Kyin 
in 1947. The organisation also established an armed wing, the Mon National Defence 
Organisation (MNDO) the same year. Together with the United Mon Association, the 
MFL reached an agreement for a common set of demands for the establishment of 
Mon State (M. Smith 1991: p.86). In Arakan, the Arakan People’s Liberation Party 
(APLP) led by the former monk U Seinda, split off from the pre-war Arakan National 
Congress (ANC) in 1945. The main ANC was dissolved into the AFPFL (M. Smith 
1991: pp.80-81). Nationalist organisations also appeared among Rohingya in Arakan. In 
December 1947, a Mujahid Party was set up by Rohingya nationalists in Arakan 
region in order to fight for an Islamic state and push for parts of Arakan to be 
included in the newly created East Pakistan (M. Smith 1991: p.87).  
Among the Karen, who had organised nationalist organisations since the 1880s, 
various smaller organisations came together in a large front. In 1947, the various 
Karen organisations – the Karen National Association (KNA), the Buddhist Karen 
National Association (BKNA), the Karen Central Organisation (KCO) and the Karen 
Youth Organisation (KYO) – came together to set up the Karen National Union. 
Under the leadership of the Karen nationalist leader Saw Ba U Gyi, the KNU pressed 
the demand for the establishment of a separate Karen state. However, the conflict 
between Burmans and Karen that had developed during the war quickly escalated as 
the KNU’s demand went unheard. In July 1947, the KNU established an armed wing, 
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the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) to protect Karen communities in 
the ethnically mixed Irrawaddy Delta. The KNDO also began to take over local 
administration in villages inhabited by Karen.  
Relations between the AFPFL and ethnically based political organisations  
 
Two viewpoints have dominated the AFPFL’s position towards ethnic demands 
(Silverstein 1980: chap. 6). Aung San was the leading representative of the first viewpoint. 
He sought to promote national unity through strategies to accept and manage ethnic 
differences. Ahead of the Constituent Assembly in 1947, Aung San proposed the 
creation of a union that would secure cultural, religious and political rights for ethnic 
minorities. This proposal reflected Aung San’s conception of the nation as a 
community of will that arises not from sharing a common religion or language, but 
from common experiences (Aung San 1946; The Fourteen Points, 1947). It was embodied in 
his slogan of “unity in diversity”. Aung San’s views strongly influenced the 
constitution that was adopted in 1947. U Nu, who succeeded Aung San at the helm of 
the AFPFL, opted for measures to ignore or eliminate ethnic differences. For U Nu 
(1955: pp.113-120), the ideal model for a nation was the United Kingdom where English, 
Scots and Welsh coexisted as cultural communities within an overarching British 
national identity. U Nu (1951: p.65-71; Silverstein 1980: p.149) argued that the development 
of national unity was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the union and further 
democracy. Although U Nu did accept a degree of cultural autonomy for ethnic 
minorities, he and other leaders in the AFPFL sought to establish that in most 
circumstances and for most purposes, the people in Burma shared the same culture 
(Tinker 1957: p.165). For U Nu, cultural rights could be granted as a means to encourage 
national solidarity and strengthen the “Union spirit”, but they were not a goal. 
Instead, Silverstein (1980: p.151) argues that U Nu favoured policies of assimilation. U 
Nu’s thinking laid the basis for the policies that were followed after 1948.  
 Relations between the AFPFL and ethnically based organisations also 
followed two patterns after 1945. On the one hand, relations improved after AFPFL 
included a number of non-Burman organisations. The AFPFL first sought to forge an 
understanding with young non-Burman nationalists over the question of 
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independence, but gradually, it also began to seek out traditional leaders among 
ethnic groups, particularly in the hill areas (Taylor 1983: pp.21-22). In 1946, a tour of the 
hill areas by AFPFL leaders led to the formation of the Supreme Council of the 
United Hills Peoples (SCUHP) under the leadership of the Shan saohpa of 
Yawnghwe, Sao Shwe Thaike (M. Smith 1991: p.74).  But in Lower Burma, relations 
deteriorated with several Karen, Arakanese and Mon organisations. 
5.3.2 The transition to democracy, 1945-1948 
 
The transition to independence in Burma was the result of negotiations that led to the 
signature of an agreement between Aung San and the British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee in January 1947. The Aung San-Attlee agreement marked a turning point in the 
democratisation process. Before January 1947, key decisions regarding Burmese 
politics were taken in Great Britain. After the signature of the agreement, attention 
shifted to the Burmese domestic arena (Taylor 1987: p.218). The main political issues 
became the country’s future political system and the future of ethnic relations. 
The Aung San-Attlee agreement outlined the procedure for the transfer of power 
and, by the same token, the introduction of democracy. An interim administration that 
included two representatives from the Frontier Areas was set down in February; an 
election was conducted in June for the Constituent Assembly; and a new constitution 
was drafted between June and September. The specific institutional arrangements for 
democracy in Burma, however, were the result of a domestic process. Aung San 
played a key role in ensuring that the AFPFL, rather than the British, were able to 
determine the speed and modalities of the transition (Tinker 1957: p.28).  
During the first phase of the transition, the AFPFL, and particularly Aung San, 
became the dominant political force in Burma at the expense of the CPB and 
ethnically based organisations. The British made few attempts to meet ethnic 
demands and recognise non-Burman leaders until 1947. During negotiations for the 
Aung San-Attlee agreement, British authorities asked for guarantees that the interests 
of the minority people would be respected, but both sides agreed that Burma Proper 
and the Frontier Areas should be joined in a common state.  
 73
Ethnic relations were primarily seen as a domestic Burmese issue. The Burmese 
delegation that negotiated the Aung San-Attlee agreement included several members 
of the Governor’s Executive Council, but not its Karen members. Demands by Karen, 
Arakanese and Mon organisations for separate states went unanswered, and the 
British government did not officially receive a Karen Goodwill Mission that sought to 
present the “Case for the Karens” in London in 1946 (Gravers 1996). In 1946, a telegram 
by Kachin and Shan leaders stating that the AFPFL delegation negotiating the Aung 
San-Attlee agreement did not represent the Shan and the Kachin went unheeded. 
British neglect of these initiatives went counter to the expectations among many 
Karen and other ethnic minority nationalists that they would be rewarded for their 
support for the Allies during the war (Gravers 1999: pp.49-50). 
The question of ethnic relations was addressed after the signature of the Aung San-
Attlee agreement. In February 1947, an agreement was signed between Aung San and 
leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin regarding the future relationship between 
Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas. This agreement, signed at Panglong in Shan 
States, guaranteed full democratic rights for the citizens of the Frontier Areas as well 
as full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas. In addition, a 
Frontier Area Commission of Enquiry (FACE 1947) was set down in March to receive 
testimonies from representatives of the ethnic groups in the Frontier Areas regarding 
a future union with Burma. 
 One consequence of the transition was that ethnic minorities were poorly 
represented in the preparations for independence, which were dominated by the 
AFPFL. This is apparent in the 1947 election result. The 255 seats in the Constituent 
Assembly were divided between 210 from Burma proper (of which 24 were reserved 
for Karen representatives and four for Anglo-Burmans) and 45 seats from the Frontier 
Areas and Karenni State. The AFPFL won all but 10 of the non-communal seats. 
Independent candidates, the majority of who had close links to the CPB, won the 
remaining non-communal seats. The majority of the Karen seats were taken by KYO, 
which was affiliated to the AFPFL. Leading opposition parties to the AFPFL - the 
CPB and the KNU - boycotted the election (Cady 1958: p.55; Silverstein 1964: p.86; Silverstein 
1980: p.172; Taylor 1996: p.171; Tinker 1957: p.26). In addition, the debate in the Constituent 
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Assembly was based on a draft constitution developed by the AFPFL at its 
convention in May 1947.  
Aung San was crucial to the agreements that were reached between the AFPFL 
and non-Burman leaders in 1947. The understanding that developed between the 
AFPFL and non-Burman leaders was dealt a serious blow when Aung San was killed 
as no other AFPFL leader commanded the same level of confidence among non-
Burman representatives. Aung San’s death also hastened the preparations for 
independence and the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly. Ethnic concerns 
were postponed. The AFPFL sought to reach the autumn 1947 parliamentary session 
in London and fulfil Aung San’s vision of independence within 1948. As a result, a 
number of critical issues – and most significantly, a number of issues concerning 
ethnic relations - had not been solved by the time independence was declared.  
5.4 The nature of democracy in Burma  
5.4.1 The concept of democracy in Burmese elite political thinking 
 
Aung San (1946) argued that a democratic state depends on popular consent and 
identifies itself with the interests of the people. For Aung San, there was a close link 
between politics and economics; genuine democracy could not develop under 
capitalism. U Nu (1955: pp. 45-62) argued that in a democracy, representatives were 
elected by the people to a non-oppressive government. In democracies, problems 
were solved through dialogue. For U Nu, the use of violence by either the 
government or the opposition was incompatible with democracy. For U Nu as well as 
for the AFPFL government (Nu 1951:pp. 12-27; Burma and the Insurrections 1949: pp.32-33), the 
communist and ethnic insurgents in the country were therefore primarily enemies of 
the union. 
In 1947, Aung San had argued that only democracy could secure the nation’s 
progress, but that true democracy could not exist only in the political arena. He had 
proposed a political system with constitutional rule and elected representatives 
accountable to the people combined with a mixed economy. Aung San (1946) called 
this concept New Democracy. After 1948, the AFPFL continued to emphasise the 
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link between economics and politics as the league developed a political platform 
based on Aung San’s thinking (Tinker 1963: p.27). The long-term goal of the AFPFL was 
a socialist welfare state, to be known as Pyidawtha, the “happy land”, where people 
no longer suffered from hunger and diseases. The development towards a socialist 
state was to take place gradually rather than through a revolution (Aung San 1946). It 
was to be achieved in a democratic political system and with an economy that mixed 
private ownership by Burmese citizens and public ownership (Nu 1951: pp.82-94; Tinker 
1957: p.112).  
A different concept of democracy prevailed among leading non-Burman 
politicians. Many non-Burman nationalists saw politics, economics and culture as 
closely connected, albeit in a manner different from the AFPFL. For them, 
democracy was closely associated with the idea of autonomy. The Panglong 
agreement had linked the introduction of democracy to Burma with political 
autonomy in the hill areas and economic equality between Burmans and non-
Burmans. For a number of non-Burman nationalists, democracy also entailed respect 
for minority cultures. For instance, the Karen nationalist leader San Po Chit 
concluded in 1947 that democracy would be impossible to achieve in Burma as long 
as several nations co-existed under Burman domination. The KNU’s demand for a 
separate Karen State sprang out of concern for the political and economic future of 
the Karen, but also from the view that autonomy was necessary for the Karen to be 
able to develop their culture (M. Smith 1991: p.114). For the Mon Freedom League (MFL) 
as well, cultural rights were considered part of democracy. Nai Ba Lwin (1951), the 
president of the MFL, pointed to Switzerland in 1951 as a “truly democratic” country 
because the four ethnic groups were granted both autonomy and language rights.  
5.4.2 Democratic institutions in Burma 
The Panglong Agreement and the Frontier Area Commission of Enquiry 
 
In today’s Burma, the Panglong agreement and the “Spirit of Panglong” are seen as 
models for ethnic relations. A proper understanding of the agreement, however, 
requires that it be understood within the context of the time, which was that of 
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decolonisation and the need to address issue linked to the transition from British rule. 
In fact, the Panglong agreement dealt with the relationship between Burma Proper on 
the one hand and Shan, Chin and Kachin in the Frontier Areas on the other hand. It 
provided for a representative of the Frontier Areas to be included in the Burmese 
interim government. In addition it secured political autonomy in internal 
administration within a democratic framework for the peoples in the hill areas in 
independent Burma. Finally, the agreement included a promise of financial support 
for the hills and a promise of economic equality between Burmans and non-Burmans. 
During the negotiations, Aung San had told the participants that “if Burma receives 
one kyat, you (i.e. the ethnic minorities, my addition) will also get one kyat” (M. Smith 1991: 
p.78). Cultural issues were not addressed.  
The Panglong agreement did not provide general principles for relations 
between ethnic groups in an independent Burma and there were several lacunas to the 
agreement. Firstly, many ethnic groups were neither present for the discussion at 
Panglong, nor were they signatories to the agreement. Significantly, this was the case 
of the Mon and Arakanese. The Karen were only present as observers. In April 1947, 
a Frontier Area Commission of Enquiry warned that the adherence to the Panglong 
agreement of many ethnic groups could not be taken for granted (FACE 1947). In 
addition, some provisions in the agreement were vague. For instance, the Panglong 
agreement did not specify how to solve disputes that may arise over interpretations of 
the agreement or how to define the relationship between autonomy in the hills and 
democracy.  
The report of the Frontier Area Commission of Enquiry (FACE) revealed that 
there were significant disparities in the opinions of Burma’s ethnic groups regarding a 
future union with Burma. For instance, the Karenni representatives who testified to 
the commission agreed to join the Constituent Assembly, but refused to commit the 
Karenni states to join the union, while representatives from two areas in Shan State 
asked to be incorporated into Burma Proper. One Wa representative argued that his 
people were not competent enough to form an independent opinion (Cady 1958: pp. 547-
551; FACE 1947; M. Smith 1991: pp.84-86). As for the Karen, Martin Smith (1991: p. 85) 
concludes that “even today a reading of the Karen testimony at the FACE gives a 
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clear warning of the growing racial antipathy and inter-communal violence about to 
break out”.  
The findings of the FACE were significant in spite of weaknesses in the 
manner in which the FACE’s work was carried out. The mandate of the FACE was to 
find ways of associating the Frontier Areas with Burma Proper. It therefore did not 
address communal tensions in Burma Proper, particularly how to respond to Karen 
demands. In addition, the work of the commission was carried out after the Aung 
San-Attlee agreement and the Panglong agreement had already been signed. There 
were therefore de facto limits on which scenarios could be discussed by the 
commission, as basic principles such as the amalgamation of the two areas and 
internal autonomy had already been agreed upon. For instance, the option of 
independence for non-Burman states had been ruled out in the Aung San-Attlee 
agreement. Finally, it turned out that many of the testimonies heard by the FACE 
were not representative for the ethnic groups they were said to represent (M. Smith 1991: 
p.84).   
The 1947 Constitution 
Citizenship 
 
The new union was carved from Burma proper, the Frontier Areas and Karenni State. 
Citizenship in the union was granted to descendants of a parent or grandparent from 
an indigenous ethnic group in Burma. In addition, a person born in a British dominion 
and resident in Burma was eligible for citizenship. Citizenship was thus granted both 
on the basis of ius sanguini and ius soli. The Union Citizenship Act from 1948 
(amended in 1954) dealt with questions of naturalisation and dual citizenship. 
Naturalisation was made possible for applicants residing in Burma and who spoke an 
indigenous language. Dual citizenship was rejected.  
It is sometimes argued that the principle of ius sanguini reflects a conception 
of the nation as a closed ethnic community, while the principle of ius soli is thought 
to reveal an open and culture-based view of the nation (the difference between the 
ethnic and the civic model of the nation). The case of Burma shows that there is no 
such simple parallel. There were several reasons why both principles were adopted. 
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According to Maung Maung (1961: p.92), the decision to apply both principles was a 
liberalisation of the proposal of the AFPFL in May 1947. The AFPFL first suggested 
that citizenship should be granted only to those born in the Union, while others would 
have to apply for naturalisation. The decision to include ius sanguini was the outcome 
of specific circumstances in Burma in 1947 rather than the victory of a narrow ethnic 
conception of the Burmese nation. Burmese nationalists sought to define citizenship 
in a manner that would distinguish Burmese citizens from other British subjects. 
Individuals temporarily resident in Burma as a result of colonial rule were excluded 
while individuals with a claim to be Burmese and not resident in the union were 
included. The rules of citizenship did not distinguish between indigenous ethnic 
groups, but between indigenous and migrant groups. The ban on dual citizenship 
adversely affected the mainly immigrant Chinese community because of the use by 
the People’s Republic of China of ius sanguini to define a Chinese citizen (Maung 
Maung 1961: p.94) and the Anglo-Burmans, who had to give up their British citizenship 
(Tinker 1957: p.187) 
The executive-legislative relationship and the union legislature 
 
The constitution created a system of parliamentary rule with executive power vested 
in a president elected by the parliament. He could not simultaneously be a Member of 
Parliament. The president signed and promulgated laws passed by the parliament and 
granted pardons. The main executive power was the government appointed by the 
president and composed of Members of Parliament.  
The parliament was divided into two chambers, with a more powerful lower 
chamber. The government was only answerable to the lower chamber. In addition, 
legislation followed a navette system. Except for money bills, all laws were regarded 
as passed once they had been passed by one chamber and approved by the second. 
Only the lower chamber could initiate money bills, while the upper chamber was 
entitled to make recommendations, which the lower chamber was not obliged to 
follow. The dissolution of the lower chamber automatically brought the dissolution of 
the upper chamber.  
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The 125-member upper Chamber of Nationalities represented the various 
political subdivisions in Burma. Some representatives in this chamber were 
appointed, while others were elected. The lower chamber was the 250-seat Chamber 
of Deputies.  
In both chambers, elections proceeded under a system of simple plurality votes 
in single member districts, but deputies to the lower chamber did not necessarily 
come from the same constituencies as the representatives in the upper chamber. We 
do not possess sufficient information about the delimitation of constituencies and the 
number of representatives per constituency. However, the constitution provided for a 
ratio of one representative per 30,000- 100,000 inhabitants in the chamber of 
deputies. A breakdown by divisions and states (table 5.1) suggests that the share of 
representatives from Burma Proper (i.e. the divisions) in the lower chamber was 
fairly similar to this area’s share of the total population. On the other hand, the states 
were represented by a share of the deputies in the Chamber of Nationalities that was 
larger than their share of the total population. Ethnic minority areas were thus “over-
represented” in the less powerful upper chamber, but not in the lower chamber.  
Union-state relations  
 
There were five main political subdivisions: Burma proper, Shan State, Kachin State, 
Karenni State and Chin Special Region. In addition, provisions were made for the 
future creation of Karen State. The Shan and Karenni States were granted the right to 
secession after ten years. The subdivisions were represented in the Chamber of 
Nationalities, where 62 seats represented Burma proper and 48 seats represented the 
former Frontier Areas and Karenni State. In the Chamber of Deputies, the seats were 
divided between 203 deputies from Burma proper and 42 from the former Frontier 
Areas and Karenni State. In addition, the Karen were granted 24 seats (reduced to 15 
by a constitutional amendment in 1951 when Karen State was established) in the 
upper chamber and seven seats in the lower chamber. (Table 5.1). The largest ethnic 
minority areas – the hills, Karenni State and Karen areas – controlled a majority of 
the seats in the upper chamber. In the more influential lower chamber, however, the 
majority of the deputies came from Burma proper.  
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A system of informal power sharing where the main political and military 
positions were not held simultaneously by individuals from the same ethnic group 
was also established. The cabinet also included representatives from various ethnic 
groups11. In the armed forces, a Karen was appointed commander of the army (Lt. Gen. 
Smith Dun) and of the air force (Saw Shi Sho) in 1948, but these commanders were 
removed when the Karen rebellion broke out in 1949 and Karen officers were purged 
from the military.  
The state legislatures consisted of a council of state composed of the Members 
of Parliament from each state from both chambers, except in the Chin special division 
where there was a Council for Chin Affairs. State executive power was vested in a 
head of state with a council of ministers selected by and among the members of the 
council of state to advice him. The head of state was selected by the union’s Prime 
Minister and appointed by the union president. He was also a minister in the union 
government, and thus mainly accountable to the Prime Minister and the lower 
Chamber of Deputies. There were no particular provisions for a government for 
Burma proper. The union government and the union parliament served both as union 
bodies and local bodies in Burma proper. The result was that elected representatives 
from the states were involved in decisions regarding Burma proper (Silverstein 1980: 
p.203). 
There were several rules as to who could stand as a candidate for the states in 
the Chamber of Nationalities and, thus, exercise state legislative and executive 
authority. In Shan State, the 25 representatives were elected by and among the 33 
saohpas. No saohpa could be a deputy in the lower chamber. However, the saohpas 
retained influence over the electoral process in the lower chamber during the 1950s 
(Taylor 1987: p.269). The three seats for Karenni State were reserved for the Karenni 
saohpyas. The 12 seats from Kachin State were divided equally between 
representatives for the Kachin and representatives for the non-Kachin in the state, due 
to the existence of Burman enclaves near Myitkyina and Bhamo, which had been part 
of Burma proper under British rule. In Kachin State, the head of state could not reach 
                                              
11 Presidents until 1962 were Sao Shwe Thaike (1948-1952, Shan), U Ba U (1952-1957, Burman) and Mahn Win Maung (1959-1962, 
Karen). The Prime Ministers were all Burmans (U Nu, 1848-1956; 1957-1958; 1960-1962; Ba Swe, 1956-1957, Ne Win, 1958-1960).  
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decisions in areas where the majority of the population was non-Kachin without 
consulting their representatives in parliament. 
The legislative domain of the councils of State and the union parliament was 
outlined in the constitution. State legislation had to conform to union legislation and 
be approved by the president. Sources of revenue for the states and the union were 
divided in a union revenue list and a state revenue list. Sources of revenue that were 
not mentioned in the constitution automatically belonged to the union.  
The constitution provided for a mixed economy and guarantees of basic social 
and economic rights for workers and farmers. Land and natural resources – including 
minerals and timber in the states – were nationalised and turned into union property. 
The union government had to consult with the head of the state for decisions 
regarding the exploration of natural resources – forests, mines and oil fields – in a 
state, but the states did not own their own natural resources. Nor did they have a veto 
right over decisions regarding natural resources by the union government. 
Minority rights  
 
Burma’s ethnic diversity was apparent in the choice of national symbols. The national 
flag in red, blue and white depicted a large white star surrounded by five smaller 
stars. The smaller stars represented each of Burma’s main ethnic groups while the 
largest star symbolised the union (Maung Maung 1961: p.203).  
The main strategy for dealing with ethnic demands was the creation of 
constituent states. Special representation rights that did not hinge on the existence of 
a state were granted to the Karen until Karen State was established in 1951. There 
were no provisions to protect economic rights for ethnic minorities. Minority cultures 
were protected to the extent that basic civil and political rights such as freedom of 
speech, assembly and organisation were granted to all citizens, but not in terms of 
collective rights. The discrimination of religious, racial or linguistic minorities in 
admission to state educational institutions was made illegal, and there was a 
guarantee against the imposition of compulsory religious instruction on religious 
minorities.  
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Several provisions regarding the national culture drew mostly on Burman 
culture. Burmese became the official language, while none of the other languages 
spoken in Burma had an official status. The use of English was permitted, but as 
Silverstein (1980: p.220) points out, this was not regarded a viable alternative for many 
non-Burman nationalists because English was associated with the colonial regime. 
The constitution itself was promulgated in Burmese and English, with both versions 
having equal status. The constitution did not create a state religion – although a 
proposal to proclaim Buddhism state religion was discussed. The constitution 
furthermore guaranteed freedom of worship to all citizens, while recognising that 
Buddhism was the religion professed by most citizens, and that other religions – 
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Animism – were also professed in the Union. The 
use of religion for political purposes was forbidden.  
Analysis 
 
In chapter two, partition was discussed as one possible strategy to address ethnic 
demands. In Burma, neither immediate partition nor secession was seen as possible 
solutions to the country’s ethnic diversity. Both the Karen and the Mujahid Party 
failed in their attempts to secure separate statehood. However, a right to secession 
was granted to Shan and Karenni after a ten-year trial period.  
Instead, federal rule was envisaged as the main strategy to deal with ethnic 
differences, although the term “federal” is not mentioned in the constitution (Silverstein, 
quoted in M. Smith 1991: p.79). Separate states were constituted in the former Frontier 
Areas and Karenni State. They were granted significant internal autonomy. However, 
a number of features associated with a fully federal state were absent. There were no 
separate election for the state legislatures independently of the election to the union 
legislature and the distinction between state and union government was blurred. 
Minority cultures were protected through basic civil and political rights, but as 
Kymlicka (1995: pp.4-5) argues, individual rights are a necessary but insufficient 
condition to protect minority cultures in democracies. Minority cultures were also 
protected as a result of some collective cultural rights and as a consequence of the 
political autonomy granted to the constituent states, but overall, there were few 
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provisions in the constitution that dealt with Burma’s cultural diversity and none that 
addressed economic rights for minority groups.  
Martin Smith (1991: p.79, p.83) describes the constitution as riddled with 
inconsistencies and “a recipe for disaster” because of the inconsistency with which 
demands by different ethnic groups were met. He argues that the rights granted to 
various ethnic groups seemed to reflect more the individual bargaining powers of 
these groups and the legacy of British rule than genuine national aspirations by the 
constitution-makers. Martin Smith also casts doubt over whether a nationality policy 
had been formulated by the AFPFL before 1948. We may argue that the league’s 
policies were reactive when faced with in the ethnic demands rather than pro-active.  
The federal structure of the union was more nominal than real, according to 
Silverstein (1964: p.1179), and the difficulties in establishing the true nature of the state 
soon became apparent. In the mid-fifties, a Burmese Supreme Court Judge, U Chan 
Htoon argued that “our constitution, though in theory federal is in practice unitary” 
(Tinker 1956: p.340). A series of trials in the Supreme Court during the 1950s to test the 
relationship between the union and the states further strengthened the union. The lack 
of separation between federal government bodies and state government bodies is the 
chief reason why the structure of the union was not federal. Instead, the state 
governments depended on federal institutions. The constitution thus did not fill 
Elazar’s description of federalism as “self-rule plus shared rule”. In addition, a 
number of provisions seemed to prioritise the union over the states. For instance, 
sources of revenues for the states were limited to those outlined in the constitution 
and state legislation had to conform, not only to the constitution, but also to union 
legislation.  
The power-sharing arrangement that was agreed upon in 1948 has some 
features in common with consociotional democracies. For instance, the constitution 
of the union government ensured that ethnic groups in the hill areas were represented 
in the government.  The distribution of political and military positions to members of 
different ethnic groups in 1948 is also an example. However, it was not a 
consociotional arrangement that fulfilled the four criteria described in chapter two. In 
addition the system broke down rapidly after the outbreak of the civil war.  
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Table 5.1: Population by political subdivision, 1966; distribution of seats by political subdivision, 1948-1962 
Political subdivision Population Percentage Seats, Chamber of 
Deputies 
Seats, Chamber of 
Nationalities 
Divisions                                                                                                                                  203                                            62 
Arakan 1,602,000 7,57   
Irrawaddy 3,499,300 16,53   
Magwe 2,137,000 10,09   
Mandalay 2,543,400 12,01   
Pegu 4,650,300 21,96   
Sagaing 2,346,400 11,08   
Tenasserim 1,543,400 7,29   
States  
Kachin 502,100 2,37 7 12 
Karen   7 24 (15) 
Kayah 103,300 0,49 2 3 
Shan 1,972,900 9,32 25 25 
Special division 
Chin Hills 271,200 1,29 6 8 
TOTAL 21,171,500 100 250 125 
Sources: Encyclopaedia Britannica 1966, Dassé 1976: pp. 135-136. 
5.5 Summing up 
 
I have dealt with how the transition to democracy and the constitution of a democratic 
political order created a basis for ethnic relations in Burma. I have shown that some 
aspects of the Burmese political system were a legacy from the first phase of 
democratisation before the war. Furthermore, I have shown that ethnically based 
political organisations did not play a leading role in shaping the first stages of the 
transition to democracy after 1945 and that ethnic demands were largely postponed 
until after an agreement on independence had been reached between the British 
government and the AFPFL, except for the future relationship between Burma Proper 
and the former Frontier Areas. I pointed out that the AFPFL included several 
ethnically based organisations after the expansion in 1945, but I also demonstrated 
that the league remained to a great extent identified with the Burman ethnic majority.  
The key features of the democratic order created in the 1947 constitution were 
parliamentary rule, a bicameral legislature and elections based on majority vote in 
single-member districts. The constitution paved the way for several strategies to deal 
with ethnic differences, but the dominating strategy was federalisation. The 
constitution thus appeared to create a precedent for the management of ethnic 
demands. The appointment of personnel to man key government and military 
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positions in 1948 had some features in common with a strategy of consocionalisation, 
which is also a strategy for institutionalising and managing ethnic demands. 
However, such rules of appointment were not part of the constitutional order. It is 
therefore necessary to examine what happened to this practice after 1948 and the 
outbreak of the civil war in order to assess its significance. Indeed, the system 
collapsed. The constitution failed in establishing a consistent set of strategies to 
address similar demands by different groups. After 1948, diverging viewpoints 
appeared over the significance of constitutional provisions, particularly in order to 
address critical issues that had been postponed until after independence, such as 
demands for separate statehood by Arakanese and Mon and the establishment of 
Karen State. In the next three chapters, I will explore the consequences of these 
lacunas for the consolidation of democracy after 1948. I will thereby answer the 
second and third questions that I asked in chapter one.  
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6. Chapter six: Efforts of democratic consolidation 
in the political arena 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter five, I found that the constitution established a democratic regime in 
Burma that institutionalised some ethnic demands and ignored others. After 1948 a 
broad set of political, economic and cultural activities were initiated to extend the 
authority of the democratic regime and influence popular attitudes and behaviour 
towards democracy. The extent to which these activities succeeded were linked to the 
opportunities and constraints of the constitution, but also to how the democratic 
government was able to meet popular expectations.  
In the present chapter, I will assess the significance of ethnicity for the elections 
that took place in 1951, 1956 and 1960 and for the formation of political parties and 
societal organisations. After having demonstrated the relevance of ethnicity for 
political behaviour in Burma, I will proceed to study the consequences of a border 
agreement between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Burma that was signed 
in 1961. I have chosen to analyse the circumstances under which the agreement was 
signed because it provides a good example of how an issue that was not initially 
conceived as “ethnic” by the government and that was addressed through regular 
democratic channels had ethnopolitical implications and changed relations between 
Burmans and Kachin.  
In Burma, one challenge for the consolidation of democracy was the manner in 
which ethnic demands that had not been addressed during the transition and that had 
been ignored in the 1947 constitution were met after 1948. I will look into how the 
movement dealt with the demands for statehood by Arakanese, Mon and Karen and 
with ambiguities in the relationship between the union and the states. In addition new 
demands arose after 1948. I will look into how the government dealt with two new 
issues, namely demands for federal reforms among non-Burman groups in the late 
fifties and efforts to promote political reforms in Shan State.  
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6.2 Elections and political parties in multiethnic democracies 
6.2.1 Elections and party system 
 
The organisation of free and fair elections at regular intervals is held out as a basic 
characteristic of democracy. In Burma elections were conducted regularly after 1951. 
Increasing electoral turnout during the 1950s is an indication that the legitimacy of 
democratic rule was increasing in the electorate in this period. While about 20 percent 
of the electorate participated in the polls in 1951, turnout was twice as high in 1956 
and 65 percent higher in 1960 than in 1956 (Taylor 1996: pp.173-174).  
In spite of the civil war, the security situation at election time improved during 
the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, the conditions under which elections took place 
improved. In 1951 the polls were conducted in three stages. Still, 11 of 250 
constituencies for the Chamber of Deputies could not be contested because of the 
civil war. In 1956 this figure had been reduced to nine constituencies where polls 
were postponed until 1958 for security reasons. In 1960 polls could not be held in six 
constituencies, also for security reasons, and in a further five constituencies for other 
reasons. In addition to the impact for the organisation of elections, improved security 
combined with a higher electoral turnout can be interpreted as an indication of a more 
powerful state and of enhanced legitimacy in the population for democratic rule, i.e. 
of a process of democratic consolidation that was underway. This is consistent with 
the findings of Silverstein (1964: pp. 128-131), Butwell and Mehrden (1960: p.145) and 
Dupuy (1961: p.432), who argue that a process of democratic consolidation was taking 
place after 1948.  
According to Silverstein (1964: p.139), Butwell and Mehrden (1960: p.150), the 
elections were conducted relatively freely and fairly. However, a critical examination 
of the circumstances under which the elections were organised reveals that 
institutional guarantees necessary for a working democracy, including Dahl’s eight 
institutional guarantees, were also broken. Scores of political opponents to the 
AFPFL government were arrested under the 1947 Public Order Preservation, which 
allowed for the long-term detention of a suspect without going to trial (Callahan 1998b: 
pp.54-55; Silverstein 1964: p.120). Incidences of politically motivated violence and 
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intimidation occurred during both elections (Maung Maung, quoted in Taylor 1996: p.174). 
Scholars have cited the impact of corruption, patronage networks and abuse of power 
during and between elections (Cady 1958: pp.601-602). Finally, the civil war effectively 
limited the geographical scope of the authority of the elected government. According 
to Fairbairn (1957: p.301), there were claims during the 1950s that politically motivated 
violence for which the AFPFL was responsible was particularly widespread in ethnic 
minority areas. Taylor (1996: p.175) and Tinker (1957: p.89) argue that force was more 
important than persuasion in winning elections in the 1950s and 1960.  
According to Callahan (1998a: p.25, p.33), abuse of power was criticised by 
opposition parties, media and even the AFPFL as early as 1948, but the AFPFL 
government was largely unable to deal with the abuses as long as the league 
controlled a majority of the seats in parliament. Callahan argues that the emergence 
of a larger opposition bench in parliament after the election in 1956 was significant in 
providing the government with the means to address abuses and crack down on 
criminal activities among supporters of the AFPFL. Callahan’s (1998a: p.19) 
conclusions are based on data from Lower and Upper Burma, not from the state or the 
Arakan and Chin regions. We can therefore not conclude whether the 1956 election 
had a similar impact in ethnic minority areas.  
6.2.2 Political parties in Burma 
 
Although data is not available to determine the significance of ethnicity for electoral 
behaviour after 1948 – this would require data on individual voting behaviour or 
broken down by ethnic group – we can assess the impact of ethnicity on political 
behaviour by other means. There is a close relationship between electoral system and 
party system in modern democracies, and we can therefore seek an alternative 
approach to this issue. Horowitz’s analysis of party systems in multiethnic countries 
can be helpful in this regard. Indeed, Horowitz showed that in democracies where the 
population is severely divided along ethnic cleavages, people tend to vote for 
ethnically based parties and an ethnically based party system is likely to emerge.   
In Burma, two main types of political parties developed before 1962. Some 
parties received countrywide support in elections; others had their main support in 
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one of Burma’s regions. Such locally based parties tended to promote local issues and 
local leaders. They were frequently based on ethnicity, although there were also non-
ethnically based regional parties, such as the Justice Party founded by former 
Supreme Court judge U E Maung. In addition, a number of parties coalesced around 
individual non-Burman leaders, such as the party of the Arakanese nationalists Paw 
Tun and Kyaw Win. A number of candidates also got elected as independents – both 
on an ethnic basis and on other bases.  
Regional and ethnically based parties  
 
Regional parties were found in Burma Proper as well as in the former Frontier Areas 
and Karenni State. The conservative Burma Nationalist Bloc from Burma Proper 
represented a non-ethnically based type of regional party, but most regional parties 
identified themselves with one or several ethnic groups. The main ethnically based 
parties during the 1950s were Arakanese, Kachin, Chin, Pao and Shan. Between 1951 
and 1956, the largest ethnically based party in parliament was the Independent 
Arakan Parliamentary Group (IAPG). Examples of ethnically based parties in 
parliament after 1956 included AFPFL affiliates such as the All-Shan States’ 
Organisation, as well as opposition parties such as the Arakan National Unity 
Organisation (ANUO, formerly IAPG) and the Union National Pa-O Organisation. In 
1960, ethnically based parties in parliament also included the Chin National 
Organisation (CNO), the Kayah National United League and the Kayah Democratic 
League (Fairbairn 1956: p.214; Butwell and Mehrden 1960: p.151; Taylor 1985: pp.106-154). The 
majority of the parties that gained seats in 1956 and 1960 were parties that claimed to 
represent one or several ethnic groups, and that drew their support from that group – 
in other words, they fulfilled Horowitz’ (1985: p.291) two criteria of an ethnically based 
party. 
Countrywide parties  
 
The AFPFL was the only properly organised countrywide party before 1962. Other 
parties with countrywide aspirations included the Burma Workers and Peasants’ Party 
(BWPP), which was established to contest the 1951 election. In 1956, a countrywide 
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electoral alliance, the National Unity Front (NUF), was formed by the BWPP and 
other opposition parties to challenge the AFPFL in the election.  
From 1948 to 1951, the AFPFL dominated the temporary legislature, the 
Constituent Assembly from 1947. After the 1951 election, when the AFPFL received 
about 60 percent of the vote, the league continued to control a majority of the seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies. Together with its affiliates, the AFPFL in 1951 controlled 
147 of 250 seats. The BWPP and other opposition parties gained 30 seats, while the 
rest went to independents (Silverstein 1964: p. 129)12. In 1956, the share of votes for the 
AFPFL dropped to 48 percent, but together with affiliates, it still controlled 173 of 
250 seats. The NUF and other opposition parties got 43 seats, while the ANUO got 
six seats (Silverstein 1964: p.129). The AFPFL was also the dominant party in the 
Chamber of Nationalities, where the league controlled 85 of 125 seats in 195613. 
The organisational structure of the AFPFL was a legacy of the anticolonial 
struggle. The party programme was based on Socialism (Silverstein 1964: pp.121-122). The 
AFPFL was therefore not an ethnically based party, but due to its historical origins, 
the league was closely associated with the Burman ethnic group. For instance, the 
local AFPFL government in the Arakan area during the 1950s was perceived locally 
as an example of Burman dominance (Fairbairn 1957: p.304-306). Decision-making in the 
AFPFL was centralised and dominated by the top leaders. There was neither a clear 
chain of command from the top to the bottom, nor a proper career path from the 
bottom to the top. Most senior figures in the AFPFL had joined the leadership of the 
league before 1948, and were in majority Burmans (Callahan 1998a: p.36; Silverstein 1964: 
p.124).  
The organisational structure of the AFPFL indicates that ethnicity and religion 
played a key role as a basis for political organisation. Several ethnically and 
religiously based parties, such as the Anglo-Burmese Association, the Burma Muslim 
Congress, the Kachin National Congress, the Union Karen League, the Chin 
Congress and the United Hill People’s Congress remained affiliated to the AFPFL 
                                              
12 Information is not available on the election result in 1951 for the Chamber of Nationalities.. 
13 I have found several compilations of election results, none of which tally exactly. These figures date from June 3, 1957, and are taken 
from Fairbairn 1957. They were confirmed to Fairbairn at the time by the Burmese embassy in London. 
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after 1948 (Taylor 1985: p.111). However, an institutional distinction between the main 
AFPFL body and these affiliates was maintained.  
A split in the AFPFL in 1958 had a significant impact on the influence of 
ethnically based parties in the union parliament. The split followed years of personal 
rivalries in the AFPFL leadership (Sein Win 1989; Silverstein 1964: pp.125-126). The faction 
led by Prime Minister U Nu was renamed the Clean AFPFL, while the faction led by 
the Socialist leaders Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein became known as the Stable AFPFL. 
As a result of the split the U Nu government lost its majority in parliament and came 
to depend on the NUF and the ANUO in order to get its political programme passed 
in parliament. In 1958, five ministers from ANUO were therefore brought into 
government (Taylor 1985: p.115). In addition, the government agreed to a proposal to 
establish Arakan and Mon States (M. Smith 1991: p.176). In addition, new ethnically 
based parties emerged as former AFPFL affiliates split. For instance, Kayah 
(Karenni) politicians split into the Kayah National United League allied with the 
Clean AFPFL, and the Kayah Democratic League allied with the Stable AFPFL 
(Taylor 1985: pp.137-138). Both parties gained seats in 1960. 
The 1960 election did not lead to changes in the parliament that had been 
expected after the split in the AFPFL, and it did not change the dominant role of the 
league. The Clean AFPFL – now renamed the Pyidaungsu Party - and the Stable 
AFPFL were again the main contestants. More than half of the votes in 1960 went to 
the Pyidaungsu Party of U Nu. Together with its allies, the Pyidaungsu Party gained 
168 of 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Stable AFPFL got about 1/3 of the 
votes and only 41 seats. The third main countrywide party, the NUF, was reduced to 
less than six percent of the votes and to four seats (Silverstein 1964: p.130). Ethnically 
based parties were marginalised. As the two factions of the AFPFL assumed rival 
positions on a number of issues, they further limited the scope of activity for other 
parties (Silverstein 1964: p.102).  
These observations indicate that ethnicity played a central role in politics 
between 1948 and 1962, but in spite of the number of regional parties in parliament, 
the AFPFL remained the dominant party. Indeed, Silverstein (1964: p.121) has argued 
that the dominant role played by the AFPFL curtailed the development of a 
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multiparty system in Burma. The party system in place in Burma before 1962 can be 
described as a one-party dominant regime where a single party “dominate(s) the 
electorate, other political parties, the formation of government, and the public policy 
agenda” (Pempel 1990: p.4). The case of Burma thus does not support Horowitz’ 
prediction that ethnically based parties will gradually displace other kinds of parties 
in an ethnically based party system. 
In addition to the dominant role played by the AFPFL, there were other several 
aspects to the electoral system and the party system in Burma that affected the 
representation of ethnic minorities. The electoral system was not constituted to 
promote the representation of smaller interest groups. As Horowitz argued, electoral 
formulas play a significant role in multiethnic societies. In 1948, Burma adopted the 
same electoral system as the United Kingdom, with single member districts and a 
simple majority vote (Khin Maung Win & Smith 1998: p.121; Silverstein 1964: p.128). No 
information is readily available on district magnitudes and the delimitation of the 
constituencies. I interpret this lack of information as an indication that there were no 
major controversies in these matters. There is insufficient information to gauge the 
full impact of the choice of electoral formula in Burma, but one consequence is 
apparent. The electoral formula gave rise to significant discrepancies between the 
number of votes that have been cast and the number of seats in parliament. For 
instance, the party which gained the third largest number of votes in Burma Proper in 
1956 fail to win a single seat, while the Burma Nationalist Bloc got one seat with 
40.000 votes less (Silverstein 1964: p. 129). The electoral formula thus appeared to favour 
parties with strong local support rather than parties with support spread evenly across 
the country. This system ought to have worked to the advantage of ethnically based 
parties from areas where these groups were territorially concentrated and to the 
detriment of ethnic groups spread over several constituencies. Indeed, during the 
1950s, the main ethnically based parties represented primarily territorially 
concentrated ethnic groups such as the Arakanese, Kachin, Chin, Pao and Shan.  
The impact of ethnicity in the elections should not be exaggerated. The extent 
of support for the AFPFL – 60 percent of the votes in 1951 –suggests that there were 
many reasons why the voters cast their vote. However, as Taylor (1996: p.173) points 
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out, the extent of support in the population for the AFPFL was actually much lower 
than 60 percent, given the low electoral turnout. In 1956, the number of votes cast for 
the AFPFL slipped further. Taylor (1996: loc.cit.) suggests that this may be because the 
opposition was better organised or because of a higher turnout, which favoured other 
parties as well. Fairbairn (1956: p.211; 1957: p.300-302) adds that the government’s 
inability to live up to the initial optimism from 1948 and that increased violence, 
including violence committed by government forces, were reasons why support for 
the AFPFL slipped. These reasons were manifest in Burma Proper as well as in ethnic 
minority areas.  
6.2.3 Other ethnically-based organisations 
 
The role of ethnicity in social and political organisation in Burma is confirmed if we 
examine the nature of other organisations in the country after 1948. Due to the 
AFPFL’s dominance in parliament, much of the opposition to the league was 
expressed in forums outside parliament before 1962. The main opposition forces at 
the time were the insurgent organisations– particularly communist and ethnically 
based organisations (Silverstein 1964: p.103; Tinker 1957: p.67). Indeed, the civil war 
overshadowed much of the activity that was taking place in parliament and in other 
public arenas. In addition key actors included the media, student organisations and 
the Buddhist monks. Farmers’ and workers’ associations played a minor role 
(Silverstein 1964: pp.99-108).  
An examination of students’ and monks’ organisations also reveals the impact 
of ethnicity. The main student bodies in the country after 1948 were the national 
student unions, such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU, 
founded by Aung San and other nationalist student leaders in 1936), and in particular 
the Rangoon University Students Union (RUSU) branch. Like the AFPFL, the 
ABFSU had been a leading force in the anticolonial movement of the 1930s. But 
ethnically based student organisations also emerged during the 1950s, such as the 
Shan State Students Association and the Shan Literary Society. Student associations 
were set up at the Rangoon University campus for Kachin, Karen, Arakanese, Pao, 
Karenni and Chin students. In 1961, these came together and formed the Nationalities 
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Students United Front (NSUF) (Yawnghwe 1987: p.7, note 18 p.35). In Shan State, links 
developed between Shan youth organisations and underground armed groups. In 
Kachin State, the Kachin youth movement played a similar role as the Shan 
movement in galvanising opposition to Rangoon during the 1950s (M. Smith 1991: p.192).  
A comparable pattern of ethnically based organisations can be observed in the 
Buddhist monkhood. In addition to leading countrywide Sangha organisations such as 
the Young Monks’ Association (YMA) and the Presiding Sayadaw’s Association 
(KSA), Buddhist monks were organised in ethnically based associations that sought 
to promote nationalist goals, particularly in the case of the Mon and the Arakanese. In 
1953, the Arakanese Thawtuzana Sangha Association was established to promote 
“the racial and religious uplift of the Arakanese”. The Mon Sangha Association has 
played a major role in preserving the linguistic and cultural heritage of the Mon, and 
supported demands for a separate Mon State (Mendelson 1975: p.338; Smith 1965: p.198). 
6.3 The Sino-Burmese border agreement and Burman-Kachin 
relations 
 
The border demarcation between China and Burma in 1961 had repercussions on 
ethnic relations in Burma, particularly on the relationship between the central 
government and the Kachin and was one factor that triggered the outbreak of armed 
rebellion in Kachin State in 1961. For the central government, the relationship with 
China was a key foreign policy issue after 1948. During the colonial era, the border 
demarcation between the two countries had been the subject of several disputes. A 
commission from the League of Nations had drawn a temporary boundary, which was 
later repudiated by China. After 1949 Burma’s relationship with China was affected 
by the communist take-over in China. Forces from the Chinese nationalist 
Kuomintang entered Shan State as they were fleeing from the new government. The 
KMT invasion was the first international crisis in which Burma was involved and led 
Burma to appeal for support from the United Nations in 1953 (M. Smith 1991: p.120).  
However, a border settlement between the two countries did not become a 
major public issue in Burma until 1956 when Burmese media inaccurately reported 
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on the intrusion of Chinese government forces in Wa territory in Burma (Woodman 
1962: p. 526; Silverstein 1980: pp. 208-210). The border demarcation came to play an 
important role in forging a common sense of nationhood across ethnic cleavages, 
except in Kachin areas bordering China. The U Nu government came under severe 
domestic pressure to defend Burma’s sovereignty and resumed negotiations with 
China. Although the elected leadership of Kachin State was involved as advisors in 
the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Cabinet, they did not join the negotiations 
(Woodman 1962: p.528). The border agreement was finalised under the military caretaker 
government in 1960, and signed in 1961.  
The main source of disagreement between Burma and China until 1961 was 
the future of the Namwan Assigned Tract near Bhamo in Burma. The most 
contentious question in Burma was the future of three Kachin villages on the 
Burmese side of the border. The Burmese central government proposed to cede these 
villages to China in exchange for the Namwan Assigned Tract. The proposal was 
“hotly debated” in Rangoon and Kachin State (Woodman 1962: p. 530) and rose 
widespread discontent in Kachin State. In Rangoon the AFPFL was divided between 
supporters of U Nu, who had agreed to cede the three villages, and the Kyaw Nyein-
Ba Swe faction, who opposed the cession. For both factions however, the question of 
whether to cede the three villages was assessed more in terms of its impact on Sino-
Burmese relations than on account of Kachin opposition, in particular in the three 
villages concerned (Woodman 1962: p.531).  
In Kachin State, traditional leaders, elected members of the Kachin State 
government and representatives from Kachin State in the union parliament were 
divided between opponents and supporters of the proposal. According to Woodman 
(1962: pp. 528-537), the issue split the two leading traditional Kachin leaders (duwa): The 
Sima Duwa Sinwa Nawng from Myitkyina as well as a minor duwa, Zau Rip, 
supported U Nu’s position while the Duwa Zau Lawn from Bhamo opposed it. Partly, 
this division reflected existing political cleavages. The Sima Duwa Sinwa Nawng was 
a Buddhist, who had served with the Japanese during the war, assumed a Burmese 
name and married a Burmese lady. He was close to the AFPFL and was appointed the 
first head of Kachin State in U Nu’s government in 1948. The Duwa Zau Lawn was a 
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Christian, a former headmaster of the American Baptist Mission School in Bhamo 
and had fought with the allies. He had served as head of Kachin State in the 
government after 1953 (Tinker 1956: p.342).  
The issue also divided elected representatives from Kachin State in the 
parliament. As long as the negotiations between China and Burma were taking place, 
several leading Kachin representatives criticised the cession of the villages. They 
included U Zan Hta Sin (Member of Parliament for the constituency in which the three villages were 
located and appointed Kachin State minister in 1956), and Duwa Zau Lawn (Kachin State minister in 
1961). Before the agreement was signed in 1961, it was debated and voted over in the 
union parliament. Three of six Kachin representatives in the Chamber of Nationalities 
as well as several representatives in the Chamber of Deputies spoke up against the 
agreement. They challenged the legitimacy of the Chinese claim to the territory in 
question as well as the legality of the agreement. Some representatives argued that the 
union parliament did not have the competence to make decisions that concerned 
border agreements. The question of the competence of the parliament was taken to 
the Supreme Court, which ruled that the parliament did have such authority. In spite 
of the opposition expressed during the debate, the vote in favour of the agreement in 
parliament was overwhelming, with only one vote cast against it in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Woodman 1962: p.537). 
Opinions in the question of the Sino-Burma border agreement ran along ethnic 
lines in the sense that opposition to the cession of the three villages was much 
stronger among Kachin than among the Burman majority. After 1956, the issue 
gradually evolved at the national level and became defined as an issue of national 
interest to the detriment of local concerns. In Rangoon, the border agreement was 
seen as an international issue between Burma and China and a matter of foreign 
policy. In Kachin State, it was regarded as a case in which Burmans imposed their 
will over the Kachin. Opponents of the agreement were put under severe pressure to 
yield in an issue that had become defined as a matter of national interests (Maung Maung 
1961: p.199). In addition to the impact of the agreement on public opinion in Burma 
Proper and Kachin State, the ruling of the Supreme Court also resulted in a precision 
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of the division of competence and authority between the union and the states and a 
strengthening of the union.  
6.4 Nationality policy in the political arena 
6.4.1 Redefining internal boundaries and creating states 
 
Karenni, Kachin and Shan States and the Chin Special Region were established as a 
result of the constitution. The constitution also provided for the future creation of 
Karen State, but left the details to be worked out after independence. No provisions 
addressed demands for self-determination by Arakanese, Mon and other groups. The 
constitution opened for the use of federalisation to address ethnic demands for 
autonomy, but it can also be argued that the outcome in 1947 was a result of the 
bargaining power of individual ethnic groups (M. Smith 1991: p.83). The circumstances of 
the creation of Karen State in 1951 and the decision to create Arakan and Mon States 
in 1958 are therefore central to an understanding of federalism as a nationality policy 
strategy in Burma. The debate that accompanied the creation of these states reveals 
diverging viewpoints among key political actors in Burma regarding means to ensure 
national unity. It also reflects some of the challenges for a durable nationality policy 
in a complex multiethnic society such as Burma. 
The creation of four states in 1947 indicated an initial willingness to reach an 
accommodation with non-Burman groups consistent with Aung San’s thinking, but 
this accommodation was only reached with ethnic groups that had signed the 
Panglong agreement. After 1948, the line of accommodation was not maintained 
towards other ethnic groups. For U Nu, the establishment of states in 1947 did not set 
a precedent for dealing with demands for autonomy; rather it was the result of 
historical circumstances. For U Nu, the states were a necessary instrument to unify 
two administrative territories from the colonial era and secure support from non-
Burman leaders in the anticolonial struggle (Maung Maung 1961: pp. 190-191). They 
therefore did not commit the AFPFL government to pursue the line of federalisation 
after 1948.  
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Setting up Karen State: Burman-Karen relations 
 
U Nu’s opposition to the creation of states did not affect the creation of Karen State, 
which had been agreed upon in the constitution. The constitution also created some 
temporary measures while awaiting the establishment of Karen State. A Karen 
Special Region was established and administered by a Karen Affairs Council. A 
minister for Karen affairs was appointed to the union government, and special 
representation rights were granted to the Karen in the union parliament. However, 
these measures fell short of what many Karen had expected, and of the Karen demand 
for separate statehood from 1928. Martin Smith (1991: p. 82) argues that by and large, 
issues concerned with the Karen remained unsolved by 1948.  
After 1948 the issue of Karen-Burman relations and the future of Karen State 
quickly became an important topic for the new government, which sought to prevent 
the outbreak of an armed rebellion among Karen and other ethnic groups. Conflicts 
arose over the demarcation of the borders of the new state, within the Karen 
community as well as between Karen organisations and the government. The Karen 
are the second largest ethnic group in Burma and can be found across Lower Burma. 
Various subgroups of the Karen dominate the hill areas along the Thai-Burma border 
south of Taunggyi. They also make a significant number of people in the Irrawaddy 
Delta, in Pegu and in Tenasserim, where they mingle with other ethnic groups, such 
as the Burmans and the Mon. The Karen National Union (KNU), which had 
boycotted the elections for the Constituent Assembly, did not accept the borders for 
Karen State outlined in the constitution. Instead, the KNU asked for Karen State to 
Karen areas in Eastern Burma as well as Karen-majority areas in the Irrawaddy Delta. 
The KNU also suggested that a combined Karen-Mon state be created in areas with a 
mixed population in Tenasserim. The Karen Youth Organisation (KYO), which had 
been affiliated to the AFPFL before 1948, asked for a combination of Karen State to 
be carved out of Eastern Burma and group rights to protect Karen culture and identity 
in the Delta.  
In 1949, the government set down a Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission 
(RAEC) to examine the issue. The proposal of the RAEC was presented after the 
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Karen insurrection had broken out in 1949. On the basis of this proposal, the AFPFL 
government decided in 1951 to constitute Karen State from the Salween district and 
adjoining Karen majority areas in Eastern Burma and to rescind Karen representation 
rights in the union parliament. The number of reserved seats was halved in 1951, and 
fully abolished in 1956. The solution that was decided upon in 1951 turned out to be 
unsatisfactory for all the parties involved and did little in bringing the armed conflict 
to a halt. Karen State in 1951 encompassed less than a quarter of the Karen 
population (M. Smith 1991: p.146).  
The controversies over the boundaries of Karen State were compounded by a 
debate over the constitution of Karenni State. The Karenni are a Karen subgroup 
distinguished by their political organisation, which is similar to the system of saohpa 
rule in Shan States. In 1948, many Karen nationalists had opposed the creation of a 
separate Karenni State. Instead, they had argued that one common state should be 
created for all Karen, and that Karen and Karenni were essentially the same ethnic 
group. After the outbreak of the Karenni insurrection in August 1948 and of the 
Karen insurrection in 1949, the AFPFL government became concerned that an 
alliance should not develop between Karen and Karenni nationalists. During the 
1950s, government measures to prevent the development of a joint Karen-Karenni 
force included attempts to gradually define the Karenni as a separate ethnic group. It 
became important to the government to draw an ethnic distinction between Karen and 
Karenni. Karenni State was renamed Kayah State in connection with the 
establishment of Karen State in 1951. According to Martin Smith (1991: p.145), the 
change of name enabled the government both to get rid of a name associated with the 
struggle for Karenni independence and to create a distinct Karenni ethnic identity. In 
the early 1960s, the American anthropologist F.K. Lehman (1967: p. 14) was asked by 
the Burmese government to conduct fieldwork in Kayah State. The government 
sought evidence to support its claim that Karenni and Karen were distinct ethnic 
groups, and that Kayah State and Karen State therefore should remain distinct 
political units. 
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1958: The decision on Arakan and Mon States 
 
The question of statehood for Arakanese and Mon provide a second example of an 
issue that had remained unadressed during the transition. Indeed, Martin Smith (1991: 
p.82) remarks that the AFPFL remained ambiguous in its response to Arakanese 
demands before 1948. While Aung San accepted that separate states should 
eventually be created during negotiations with the Arakanese community, he also 
argued that the issue could not be addressed before independence. After 1948 U Nu 
openly opposed the idea of creating separate states for Mon and the Arakanese on 
several occasions (Silverstein 1980: pp.150-151), including in comments on the work of the 
Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission, which proposed the creation of separate 
states in 1949. Demands of autonomy had by Arakanese and Mon nationalists had 
some basis in the historical existence of Arakanese and Mon kingdoms in Lower 
Burma. But it was also argued that Mon and Arakanese should be treated on an equal 
basis as the Shan, Kachin and Karenni, who were granted states in the constitution.  
Separate statehood for the Arakanese remained an on and off issue throughout 
the 1950s (M. Smith 1991: p.124) until the split in the AFPFL. The parliamentary crisis 
caused by the split in 1958 turned the tables because U Nu became dependent on 
support from the ANUO in the parliament. The decision to establish Mon State was 
reached the same year to entice recruits from the insurgent Mon Freedom League 
(MFL) to surrender to government forces under an Arms-for-Democracy programme. 
The plans for state creation for Arakanese and Mon were overcome, however, by the 
political crisis that first brought a military-led caretaker government to power in 1958 
and then led to the military coup d’état in March 1962. They were not carried out 
until a constitutional reform in 1974.   
The question of state creation revealed several challenges connected to the use 
of federalisation to accommodate ethnic demands. Firstly, the settlement pattern of 
ethnic groups seldom follows neat geographical boundaries. While Burmans are in 
majority in Central Burma, the region is also populated by Karen, Arakanese, Mon, 
Indians, Chinese and numerous other non-Burman groups. Arakanese areas are found 
mainly in western Burma, along the borders of present-day Bangladesh, where the 
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Muslim Rohingya also live. Mon areas stretch from the Irrawaddy Delta, to Pegu 
north of Rangoon to northern Tenasserim and Karen State. The KNU proposal in 
1949 to create a common Mon-Karen was the first acknowledgement by the KNU 
that territories demanded by Karen nationalists were not inhabited solely by Karen. In 
the four states carved out in 1947, the population is largely non-Burman, but it still 
includes a wide array of ethnic groups. None of the political subdivisions created in 
1947 were thus ethnically “pure”. Kachin State has a significant Burman community 
around Bhamo as well as a large number of smaller ethnic groups. The population in 
Shan States is ethnically speaking highly diversified. In addition, many of the ethnic 
groups for which states were created also lived outside these states. For instance there 
are Shan in Kachin State, Kachin in Shan State, Karen in Karenni State and Karenni 
in Karen State. The question of federalisation further revealed the problem of 
applying different nationality policy strategies to address similar demands by 
different ethnic groups. The decision to postpone the creation of Karen State led to 
great difficulties after 1948, while the decision to create four states and to ignore 
other demands was one factor that encouraged Arakanese and Mon demands for 
separate statehood.  
6.4.2 Redefining the relationship between union and state governments 
 
In chapter two I argued that there was a fusion of power between union and state 
government and that the fact that the legislatures at both levels were not elected 
separately weakened the autonomy of the states. During the 1950s, several events 
contributed to strengthen the union over the states and curtail the development of a 
federal government. A number of trials were conducted in the Supreme Court during 
the 1950s over issues that tested the relationship between union and states. The Sino-
Burmese border agreement was one such issue. In several key cases the verdicts came 
out in favour of the union.   
In addition, the constitution had ensured that the appointment of heads of 
state/state ministers in the union government did not depend on election result in that 
state or on the composition of the state councils. Instead, the union Prime Minister 
appointed the various heads of state. In several cases, U Nu selected ministers for the 
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Cabinet from the states more as a result of their links with the AFPFL than because 
they commanded a majority in the state councils (Tinker 1956: pp.76-77). This happened 
in Karenni and Kachin State (Silverstein 1980: p.211). The split in the AFPFL exposed the 
significance of this precedent as some state leaders resigned due to their support for 
the Stable AFPFL. State leaders loyal to U Nu’s faction of the AFPFL replaced them 
(Silverstein 1964: p.118). The authority of the union’s Prime Minister to appoint state 
ministers who did not command the support of the state legislative council was one of 
several grievances behind demands for secession in Shan State in the late 1950s (Htoon 
Myint 1957a).  
The location of state governments also contributed to strengthen the union. 
Most state governments were located in Rangoon, except some of the departments of 
the Shan State government (located in Taunggyi) and some of the offices of the Karen 
State government (located in Moulmein). Most state council meetings were held in 
Rangoon. For instance, the Shan State Council only held one of its annual meetings in 
Taunggyi. Finally, the civil war further weakened the states as the power of local 
authorities was curtailed in regions under martial administration (Yawnghwe 1987: p.115).  
6.4.3 Promoting democracy in an ethnic minority area: Political reforms in Shan 
State 
 
The constitution had established that there were two sources of political authority in 
Burma. Political leaders were to be appointed in connection with an electoral process, 
but the constitution also recognised the traditional hereditary authority of Shan and 
Karenni leaders. The 25 seats for Shan State and the three seats for Karenni State in 
the Chamber of Nationalities were thus reserved for Shan saohpas and Karenni 
saohpyas. The Shan State Council was composed equally of saohpas and elected 
deputies, but positions in the state executive were limited to the saohpas (Fairbairn 1957: 
p. 307). The constitution did not recognise traditional leaders such as the Kachin duwas 
and the Chin headmen. After 1948 the political status of the duwas and the Chin 
headmen came to depend on winning elections as for other deputies.  
Shortly after independence, the Shan saohpas began a process to cede their 
authority partly to the union government and partly to the Shan State government. 
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The saohpa of Yawnghwe – Burma’s first president from 1948 to 1951 – played a 
central role in these reforms, which first affected the judiciary authority of the 
saohpas. The constitution had initially defined the court system below the Supreme 
Court and High Court level as a matter of state competence. In 1953 Shan, Kachin, 
Karenni and Karen States passed a resolution that transferred the competence to the 
union in order to create a uniform judiciary system in the states.  
Negotiations also began between the Shan saohpas and the union government 
to introduce an elected government in the state. It was decided that the transfer of 
power would take place gradually, first by creating administrative districts, then by 
passing from a bureaucratic to an elected government (Tinker 1957: pp.162-163). The 
process was completed in 1959, under the caretaker government. First, the Shan 
saohpas and the Karenni saophyas lost their rights to a seat in the Chamber of 
Nationalities by a constitutional amendment that replaced them by elected 
representatives. Then power was transferred to the Shan State government under a 
ceremony in Taunggyi, the Shan State capital. In return, the saohpas were granted a 
compensation package (Taylor 1987: p.269). 
In addition to the formal loss of power in 1959, the saohpas lost influence in 
other ways during the 1950s. One reason was the declaration of martial rule in Shan 
State following the invasion of the Chinese Kuomintang (Hall 1964: pp.849-850). Military 
administration undermined the authority of the saohpas, who were unable to deal 
with the abuses committed by the Burma Army (Htoon Myint 1957a; Taylor 1987: pp.268-269; 
Yawnghwe 1987: p.115). For many Shan, the Army represented their main contact with 
Burmans and the behaviour of the Burma Army in the state fuelled anti-Burman 
feelings (Yawnghwe 1987: p.112). In 1957 a Shan nationalist leader, Htoon Myint (1957a), 
accused the AFPFL government of deliberately orchestrating a weakening of the 
Shan State government by bringing in the army. The changes in the political authority 
of the saohpas had repercussions for Shan ethnic and political identity. As Wiant 
(1984: pp. 85-88) demonstrates, the role of the saohpa was fundamental for the 
organisation of Shan society and without the saohpas at the apex of Shan society, one 
key for maintaining a distinctive Shan identity was lost.  
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The population in Shan State reacted differently to the loss of power of the 
saohpas. Opposition to the transfer of power was expressed by leading figures such 
as the Mahadevi of Yawnghwe, the wife of the saohpa of Yawnghwe and Member of 
Parliament for the Union Hill People’s Congress (UHPC) during 1956-1960. But a 
movement of “anti-feudalists” also emerged to support the reforms. Taylor notes that 
several minor parties emerged in Shan State during the 1950s in a sign of growing 
disaffection with the rule of the saohpas (Taylor 1985: p. 149). The loss of power by the 
saohpas opened a lid that triggered the Pao rebellion in the early 1950s14. The 
rebellion developed in reaction to the extension of the authority of the union 
government as well as in protest against Shan saohpa dominance (M. Smith 1991: p.47, 
p.146). The Pao National Organisation (PNO) grew rapidly during the 1950s into one 
of Burma’s largest insurgent forces, with 5.000 recruits in four military zones in Shan 
State (M. Smith 1991: p.168). The majority of its members surrendered in 1958. 
Reputedly, the PNO was promised a separate state together with the Mon and 
Arakanese, but the promise never materialised (M. Smith 1991: pp.168-169).  
It has been argued that the reforms that led up to the transfer of power in 1959 
were the outcome of a struggle to promote democracy in Shan State (Maung Maung 1969: 
p.263). Taylor (1987: p. 227-228) argues that the power granted to the saohpas in the 
constitution was inconsistent with the democratic agenda of the AFPFL and a 
compromise that the AFPFL had been compelled to accept in order to ensure their 
support in the anticolonial struggle. According to Tinker (1957: p.159), the AFPFL 
regarded the power of the Shan saohpas as an anachronism from Burma’s feudal past. 
In 1946 Aung San had criticised saohpa rule as being “out of date” (Silverstein 1993b: 
p.10). Indeed, reforms to push for democratisation in Shan State were initiated shortly 
after 1948 (Burma and the Insurrections 1949: p.44). The Shan politician Htoon Myint (1957a) 
argued that the constitutional arrangements that allowed the saohpas to retain power 
in parliament were a breach of two key democratic principles – the right to vote and 
the right to be elected. They did not grant full freedom for people in Shan State to 
elect their parliamentary representatives and prevented the saohpas from running for 
election in the lower chamber of parliament.  
                                              
14  The Pao are a subgroup of the Karen living in Southern Shan State. 
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In addition, the reforms were also seen as part of a political struggle between 
conservative and progressive forces in Burma representing different political 
ideologies. In this view, the traditional Shan saohpas were a conservative force, while 
the AFPFL represented a progressive and socialist force (Fairbairn 1957: p.309). Finally, a 
third interpretation of the struggle is that it was an ethnic conflict between Shan and 
Burmans. For many Shan, the AFPFL government in Rangoon was primarily seen as 
a Burman government. Attempts by the union government to reduce the power of the 
saohpas were perceived as a matter of Burman influence in internal Shan affairs. 
According to Martin Smith (1991: pp.193-194), few people in Shan State would have 
defended the saohpas’ rights as such, but the transfer of power developed into an 
ethnic issue because it was pushed through from Rangoon, and by largely Burman 
politicians. It thus threatened the balance of forces that had been created at Panglong 
in 1947. Indeed, several contemporary observers noted that they were uncertain 
whether the anti-feudalist movement that opposed the power of the saohpas was an 
indigenous Shan movement or whether it was encouraged by the AFPFL (Tinker 1957: 
p.162). Fairbairn (157: p. 311) points out that there were few political conflicts in Shan 
States before 1957. He thus suggests that this was a conflict driven by outside forces. 
At the same time, the political reforms in Shan State were followed with interest in 
other parts of Burma as well because they were regarded as a model that would 
eventually be applied throughout the union (Cady 1958: p.639).  
Political reforms affecting the power of the Shan saohpas were one of several 
factors that marked politics in Shan State during the 1950s and contributed to shape 
Shan perceptions of the Shan-Burman relationship. In addition, the state was deeply 
affected by the invasion of the KMT, which led to the imposition of a martial 
administration in 1952 and the deployment of forces from the Burma Army. The 
election of the Mahadevi of Yawnghwe to the Chamber of Nationalities in 1956 can 
be interpreted as a polarisation of politics in Shan State during the second half of the 
1950s (Elliott 1999: pp.258-263). After 1956, the Shan State Council was divided almost 
equally between supporters and opponents of political reforms affecting the authority 
of the saohpas.  In 1958 a federal movement emerged in the state to press for political 
reforms in the relationship between the union and the state. Indeed, Shan State had 
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been granted the right to secede from Burma after a ten-year trial period in 1948. This 
clause was up for debate in 1958. But the federal movement also sought to deal with 
deficiencies of the constitution in securing local autonomy since 1948, and to build an 
alliance with other non-Burman forces in the country. It pushed for constitutional 
reforms to create a federal state modelled on the United States of America, with equal 
representation in both houses, more power for the Upper Chamber, a new state 
legislative list and a Burman state in Burma Proper different from the union. In 1961, 
a constitutional conference was organised in Taunggyi that brought together Shan, 
Karen, Kachin and Chin delegates (Yawnghwe 1987: p.119).  
The Shan nationalist leader and scholar Yawnghwe (1987: p.118) argues that 
federalism ought to be interpreted as a legal and constitutional alternative to secession 
as well as to armed struggle, promoted by moderates in Shan society. Indeed, Shan 
students also set up the first Shan armed organisation, the Noom Suk Harn, in 1958. 
The AFPFL government responded to the demands of the federal movement by 
inviting to Shan and other non-Burman leaders to a seminar in Rangoon in March 
1962. This meeting then triggered the coup d’état. 
6.5 Summing up 
 
In this chapter, I have first shown that ethnicity played a central role in Burmese 
politics after 1948, both as a guide for electoral behaviour and as a basis for political 
and social organisation. But the political system in Burma also left room for non-
ethnically based parties. Secondly, I have provided one example of ethnopolitics in 
practice through the analysis of the Sino-Burma border agreement from 1961. I have 
shown how a decision was made on the question of settling the border between the 
two countries through regular democratic procedures and how this decision failed to 
appease ethnic concerns in Kachin State. Instead, the Sino-Burmese border agreement 
had a significant impact on Burman-Kachin relations and contributed to reduce the 
legitimacy of democratic processes among many Kachin as a means to promote their 
concerns.  It became one of the factors leading to the Kachin insurgency that broke 
out in 1961. While strategies of management – chiefly federalisation – were held out 
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in the 1947 constitution- such strategies were not followed consistently after 1948. 
The study of the disagreements surrounding the creation of Karen State in 1951, and 
the decision to establish Arakan and Mon States in 1958, revealed that there were 
considerable disagreements among leading political actors in Burma over appropriate 
strategies to deal with ethnic differences.  The creation of Karen State in 1951 and 
attempts to address the secession issue in Shan State were tests of the ability of the 
government to carry out the provisions from the 1947 constitution and to promote 
constitutional reforms in issue affecting ethnic relations. Both attempts failed. 
Reforms to promote democracy through constitutional reform in Shan State during 
the 1950s, on the other hand, were largely successful.  
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7. Chapter seven: Cultural aspects of efforts at 
democratic consolidation 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter two, I presented three arguments on the relationship between democracy 
and national identity. Rustow’s argument was that democratisation cannot take place 
in a state where the population does not share a common national identity. Lijphart, 
on the other hand, held that democratisation is possible in multiethnic states if power-
sharing arrangements are devised between the leaders of various ethnic groups. This 
is a strategy that I have identified a political, and that I have therefore examined in 
chapter five. Finally, Linz and Stepan argued that democratic consolidation is 
possible in situations where the population is open to multiple and complementary 
identities. There are two cultural-political strategies available to governments to deal 
with minority identities; namely assimilation or a strategy of incorporating minority 
cultures in public life, for instance by granting cultural rights to ethnic groups. In this 
chapter, I will examine which of these strategies were pursued after 1948. 
In chapter four, I identified the Burmese language and Buddhism as the main 
vehicles of Burman culture and an emerging Burmese national identity and as some 
of the cultural traits that distinguished the Burman majority from various ethnic 
minorities. I will therefore focus on language and religious policies in particular. 
7.2 Language policy after 1948 
7.2.1 Language in the political arena  
 
Burmese was the only indigenous language that was granted the status of national 
language in the 1947 constitution. In addition the use of English was permitted. After 
1948, however, Burma pursued a policy of gradually replacing English with Burmese 
as part of a move to get rid off the colonial heritage.  
 109
Both English and Burmese were used in parliament after 1948. After 1951 
however, it was decided to avoid the use of English. In 1956 the Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies warned deputies against sprinkling their speeches with English 
phrases if there was an equivalent Burmese term. Maung Maung (1961:p.204), himself a 
Burman, argued that there was no problem when the parliament decided to use only 
Burmese because “(…) members representing the minority peoples too, speak 
fluently in Burmese in parliament now”. However, examples can also be found that 
the use of Burmese affected non-Burman deputies. For instance, one Arakanese 
representative, U Kyaw Min, who spoke English, was allowed to read from a 
prepared text to make up for his deficiency in Burmese (Maung Maung 1961: loc.cit).   
Burmese was also the leading language in dealings between the union and the 
state, while local languages were used within the states (Silverstein 1980: p.220). In daily 
life, Burmese was used in situations where people had to deal with official matters 
related to union affairs. Legislation that had originally been promulgated in English 
was translated into Burmese, and new legislation was promulgated in Burmese. In 
1948, it was decided that all official correspondence should be done in Burmese. The 
decision was implemented gradually after 1952, especially in the constituent states, 
but Tinker (1957: p.178) notes that by the mid-fifties, the use of Burmese was 
widespread. Other indigenous languages were relegated to home use. 
7.2.2 Education and cultural life  
 
In 1948, education and culture became the legislative domains of the constituent 
states. It was decided to use local languages as the medium of instruction until 4th 
grade for students who did not speak Burmese as a mother tongue and Burmese at 
higher levels. English became a compulsory subject after 5th grade.  
The division of tasks between the union and the states made it possible for the 
state to create an education system to protect and promote the language and culture of 
ethnic minorities. At the same time, it can be said that the education remained 
Burman-centred because the curriculum was chiefly concerned with Burman history 
and culture, and because the Burmese language gradually replaced English in higher 
education, which fell within the competence of the union. It thus became necessary to 
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speak Burmese in order to get higher education. In 1955 it was decided that the 
matriculation exam, which determined access to university, could only be taken in 
Burmese (Tinker 1957: p.179).  
There were several reasons why Burmese was preferred as the medium of 
instruction in higher education. Most institutions of higher learning were located in 
Burman-dominated areas and several Burmese officials argued that Burma could not 
afford to develop all the languages and cultures that existed in the country (Silverstein 
1980: p.220). But it was also a result of the ethnic conflicts in the country. The AFPFL 
government blamed the separatism of Karen and other ethnic groups on the system of 
Christian missionary schools during the colonial era. The government argued that 
these schools had created a segregated system where a common sense of nationhood 
failed to develop (Tinker 1957: p.203).  
The emphasis on Burmese was accompanied by a neglect of other languages 
and cultures. There were no studies of the ethnic groups at Rangoon University while 
Classical Mon and Old Pali were the only indigenous languages apart from Burmese 
to be taught and researched at the university during the 1950s (Tinker 1957: p.179; Burma 
and the Insurrections 1949: pp.35-36). The situation of the Mon is worth mentioning, as the 
existence of the Mon as a separate cultural community was recognised at an early 
stage. One reason could be that Mon are commonly seen as the ethnic group that 
brought Buddhism to Burma, while Mon language is at the origin of the Burmese 
script (Maung Maung 1961: pp.190; U Nu 1955: pp.113-120).   
In addition to the language policy of the government, access to public education 
in ethnic minority areas was also difficult for other reasons, and the old missionary 
schools remained important. In many parts of Burma, the education sector had almost 
completely broken down during the 1950s as a result of World War II and the civil 
war. According to Tinker (1957: pp.195-197), the number of schools and pupils nation-
wide fell after 1948, and did not catch up to the 1947-1948 level again until 1953-
1954.  In rural areas, most schools ceased to function because of the war, and there 
was a shortage of teachers. Tinker does not give a breakdown of the situation in 
various regions of Burma, but given the pattern of the civil war – which most 
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severely affected rural areas and border areas - we can assume that the situation was 
precarious in ethnic minority areas. 
7.3 Religious policies after 1948 
 
Buddhism is the religion of most Burmese. At the same time, religion serves to 
distinguish between ethnic groups because most religious minorities belong to ethnic 
minorities. Most Christians and Animists in Burma are hill people or people of mixed 
ancestry, such as the Anglo-Burmans. In 1931 the census recorded more than 12 
million Buddhists, approximately 85 percent of the population. Most Burmans, Shan, 
Mon and Arakanese as well as a large proportion of the Karen are Buddhists (Table 
1.1). Estimates of the number of Buddhist monks in Burma ranged from 45,000 in 
1958 (Mendelson 1975: p. 336) to 80-120,000 in the 1960s (Smith 1965: p.186). For 
Arakanese, Mon and Burmans, Buddhism constitutes a common cultural heritage. 
Most Burmese acknowledge that Buddhism and the Burmese script originate from 
contact with scholars from the Mon kingdom. Arakanese and Burmans also share a 
common spoken language.  
In Central Burma, Buddhism has been a force of social cohesion since it was 
adopted as state religion by the Burman kings of Pagan during the 11th century (Smith 
1965: p.83). Buddhism is also an important component in the political identity of a 
number of ethnic groups. For Mon, Shan and Arakanese, Buddhism and the 
relationship between the king and the Sangha have been a source of political 
legitimacy for the traditional rulers. Christianity, on the other hand, is a significant 
component in the political identity of Karen and other ethnic groups. After 1948 
Christianity continued to be propagated among non-Burman groups. For instance, the 
proportion of Christians among the Kachin increased from 10 percent in 1931 to 
almost 50 percent in 1962 (Table 1.1; Tegenfeldt 1974: p.181).  
The nature of the relationship between religion and state has been difficult 
since 1948. In 1947, Aung San had argued that an independent Burma should be a 
secular state. For Aung San, politics was a public matter and included freedom of 
worship, while religion was a private matter. Aung San (1946) regarded the idea of 
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mixing religion and politics as something that went against the grain of both religion 
and politics, and that eventually would spoil both religion and politics. But during the 
Constituent Assembly in 1947, conservative leaders pressed for the proclamation of 
Buddhism as state religion (Maung Maung 1961: p. 96). The resulting constitutional 
provisions were a compromise between the two viewpoints.  
U Nu did not share Aung San’s reluctance about linking religion and politics 
after 1948. Instead, the revival of Buddhism played a central role in Burmese politics 
after 1948 (Mendelson 1975: pp.263-264). U Nu and other government ministers sought to 
encourage ties between the state and the Buddhist Sangha and support the 
propagation of Buddhism within Burma as well as internationally. Buddhist teachings 
were used to explain the causes of the civil war and the poor economic situation in 
Burma. For instance, in 1960 finance minister Thakin Tin sought to solve problems 
of profiteering and black-marketing by appealing to businessmen to observe 
Buddha’s teachings (Smith 1965: p.146). In effect, religion can be seen as the moral 
aspect of the AFPFL’s plans for the development of a welfare state, the Pyidawtha 
Plan (Mendelson 1975: p.264). 
After 1948, the AFPFL government sought to resume control over the Sangha 
and to compete with Sri Lanka to make Burma a major international centre of 
Buddhism. A system of ecclesiastical courts was created in 1950 to settle disputes 
within the Sangha, and a programme for monastic schools was established. The 
government also played a key role in interactions with the Buddhist world. In 1950 
Burma received Buddhist relics from Sri Lanka and India in a major public ceremony 
attended by U Nu and other government ministers. In 1954, Burma organised a 
meeting of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, and in 1954-1960, the Sixth Great 
Buddhist Synod was held in Rangoon under U Nu’s leadership to coincide with the 
2500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha (Smith 1965, p.147; Mendelson 1975: pp.271-
283).  
 A Ministry of Religious Affairs was created in Burma in 1950. Its main 
purpose was to strengthen ties between the Buddhist Sangha and the state (Smith 1965: 
p.148). In addition, a Pali University and a Buddha Sasana Council (BSC) were 
established by an act of parliament to promote and propagate Buddhism. Several 
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prominent Burmese were patrons of the BSC, including Prime Minister U Nu and U 
Chan Htoon, a Supreme Court judge who served as secretary of the BSC. 
Government ministers and key public figures also supported Buddhism by attending 
religious events and organising Buddhist ceremonies as part of official ceremonies. 
For instance, the Union Chief Justice and judges and officials from the Supreme 
Court and the High Court celebrated the opening of each new session of the courts 
with a religious ceremony at Burma’s main religious shrine, the Shwedagon Pagoda 
in Rangoon (Smith 1965: pp.166-167). 
The government’s religious activities also included the propagation of 
Buddhism in non-Burman areas, especially in the Karen Hills. Indeed, Karen State 
was the only constituent state to have a Ministry of Religious Affairs, created in 
1953. The propagation of Buddhism was closely associated with attempts to create a 
common national identity by promoting unity between valley and hill peoples 
(Mendelson 1975: p.267). Missionary activities in the hills included the establishment of a 
Frontier Buddhist Mission, sending missionaries, planting sacred bo trees and funding 
monasteries in the hill areas, as well as public celebrations of conversions to 
Buddhism (Smith 1965: p.155; Tinker 1957: p.170).  
The period of the Caretaker Government under general Ne Win marks a 
turning point in linking Buddhism and politics because the Ne Win government 
began to use religion in its fight against the insurgencies. In 1958 the caretaker 
government began setting up billboards and organising mass meetings to denounce 
the Communist insurgency. Pamphlets that depicted Communism as a threat to 
Buddhism were published in Burmese, Mon, Shan and Pao. Similar pamphlets were 
also published about Christianity and Islam, in Burmese, Urdu, Karen, Chin, Kachin 
and English. These were directed against the ethnic insurgencies as well, but the 
strongest effect came from the pamphlet on Buddhism. The use of religion to combat 
Communism marked a complete turnaround in the political discussion in Burma on 
the relationship between Marxism and Buddhism. During the anticolonial struggle, U 
Nu and other nationalist leaders had argued that Marxism and Buddhism 
complemented each other. After the Communist rebellion began in 1948, the 
arguments of the AFPFL leadership changed gradually. Marxism and Buddhism were 
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no longer seen as complementary, but neither were they regarded as incompatible. By 
1958 the two had become regarded as opposed to another (Smith 1965: p.125).  
Mehrden (1960: p.291) notes that the use of religion in fighting against the civil 
war was a carefully conceived plan begun by the Army in 1956 and that it was 
implemented when it would have a maximum impact. At the same time, it served to 
prop up the government because popular support was increasingly directed towards 
political leaders who were seen as preserving religious values. In 1960 religious 
issues had become prominent during the electoral campaign. This is indicated by the 
use of religious symbols used by the candidates - U Nu chose deep yellow, the 
traditional Buddhist colour, as a symbol for the Clean AFPFL - and by U Nu’s 
electoral promise to proclaim Buddhism state religion.  
The state religion issue is indicative of the political influence wielded by the 
Sangha at the end of the 1950. Political parties, Sayadaw associations, monks and 
individuals had pressed the issue before 1960, but in 1960 it became the main issue in 
the competition between the Clean and the Stable AFPFL. The Stable AFPFL argued 
that secularism was a part of democracy and positive for national unity. But once U 
Nu proposed to make Buddhism state religion, it became difficult to oppose him 
because attempts to argue against the introduction of state religion were construed as 
attacks on Buddhism (Smith 1965: chap.7).  
The state religion issue polarised public opinion. Among the main opponents 
were non-Burman religious minorities, especially the Kachin and the Chin, but also 
non-Burman Buddhists objected to this reform, as the imposition of state religion was 
seen as part of the government’s efforts to burmanise the ethnic minorities, i.e. as part 
of an effort of assimilation. A National Religious Minorities Alliance was formed 
with prominent members such as the former president Sao Shwe Thaike to oppose the 
proposal. In 1961, still, the government proclaimed Buddhist the state religion and 
added an amendment to safeguard the rights of religious minorities. The amendment, 
however, was strongly opposed by militant monks.  
The state religion bill was challenged by massive public demonstrations and in 
court (for being anti-constitutional), and was hotly debated in parliament. Supporters 
argued that it represented the will of the vast majority of Buddhists in Burma. 
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Opponents argued that it contravened modern democratic principles and would create 
two classes of citizens, and that it violated the “Spirit of Panglong” from 1947. 
Significantly, the state religion bill did not include a requirement that the head of 
state and other higher officials be Buddhist, something that would have had serious 
political implications for ethnic and religious minorities. The bill was also seen in 
connection with the emerging federal movement among non-Burmans because U Nu 
threatened to revoke his promise for statehood for Arakanese and Mon and to refuse 
to consider the demands for federalism of Shan and Karenni if the bill did not pass 
parliament. The bill finally passed with a large majority in both chambers, but it was 
a key factor in the outbreak of civil war among ethnic groups that had signed the 
Panglong Agreement in 1947, especially the Kachin.  
There were several reasons why the U Nu government encouraged a religious 
revival. Several scholars have examined the nexus between the public promotion of 
Buddhism by the government and U Nu’s private faith (Mendelson 1975: p.262-265; Smith 
1965: p.140-148). Changes within the AFPFL –the split with the Communist Party in 
1947-1948, and with the Kyaw Nyein – Ba Swe faction in 1958 - made it possible for 
U Nu to promote a religious agenda as internal opposition was wiped out. In addition, 
the development of ties between the government and the Sangha can be seen as an 
attempt by the government to build up legitimacy in the population by appealing to 
traditional religious and political symbols. For instance, U Nu was praised as “unique 
among the world’s statesmen, by his unparalleled piety and the embodiment of the 
ideal of the Rajarsi, the ruler who is also a sage” (Smith 1965: p.147). 
To what extent was the promotion of Buddhism an initiative by the 
government, and to what extent did the government respond to public sentiments? 
Smith (1965: p.137) argues that there were elements of both and that the development of 
democracy in Burma “stimulated and sustained the trend towards the identification of 
Buddhism with the state”. Buddhism made it possible to legitimise the democratic 
political system and the political leadership after 1948. Smith argues that Buddhism 
represented an important component in traditional Burmese culture that could also be 
associated with a liberal democratic system. Buddhism thus represented a link 
between an indigenous political tradition centred on the monarchy and a modern 
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political system based on popular rule. At the same time, U Nu’s philosophical and 
religious outlook played a central role in initiating the use of religion in the political 
arena.  
There were several reasons why Buddhism and democracy reinforced each 
other. Firstly, there was the nature of the Burmese electorate. The introduction of 
universal adult suffrage meant that the majority of the electorate was composed of 
farmers with a traditional outlook shaped by Buddhism. As Mendelson (1975: pp.261-
262) observed, many Burmese felt strongly about monastic discipline and supported 
the government’s attempts to control the Sangha during the 1950s, because the 
monasteries were regarded as a major vehicle of Burmese culture.  
The second reason was linked to the public and political role of the Sangha. As 
a result of the anticolonial struggle, it had become accepted for monks to get involved 
in public affairs, although Theravada Buddhism holds that monks should not become 
involved in mundane matters. For instance, members of all religious orders were 
barred from voting or standing for elections (Constitution, article 71.4). Many monks were 
not directly involved in politics, but they were influential leaders in the local 
communities (Smith 1965: p.186) whose support was crucial for candidates during 
elections. The political potential of the Sangha is apparent if we examine the effect of 
the split in the AFPFL on the Sangha after 1958. After 1958, the main Buddhist sect 
in Burma, the Thudamma, was organised in two groups, the Young Monks’ 
Association (YMA) and the Presiding Sayadaw’s Association (KSA). The YBA was 
the oldest organisation, and supported the Stable AFPFL. The KSA was formed as a 
result of the split and was strongly backed by lay politicians connected with the Clean 
AFPFL of U Nu. These two organisations were highly influential in political and 
social life in Burma’s two main cities, Rangoon and Mandalay (Mendelson 1975: pp.318-
334). 
The promotion of Buddhism was accompanied by a certain neglect of other 
religions. Buddhism became central to the government’s efforts to create national 
unity because of its role in the formation of national identity and its dominating 
position in Burmese society. The situation of religious minorities was often difficult. 
Tinker (1957: p.184) notes that Christians were associated with the colonial order and 
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blamed for supporting the British during the anticolonial struggle. Christian Burmans 
came under pressure to rescind a faith that was considered alien and return to 
Buddhism. 
The situation of the Muslims was different, although they too were associated 
with the colonial order. Until World War II, Hinduism and Islam had been the second 
largest religions in Burma after Buddhism. In Arakan area, tensions between 
Buddhist Arakanese and Muslim Rohingya stemmed from the colonial era. The 
immigration of people from Chittagong after Burma and India were separated in 1937 
had adversely affected the economic position of the Arakanese and given rise to 
resentment against Rohingya. There were several incidents in which Muslims were 
assaulted during the 1930s. Such incidents escalated into a riot and a massacre in 
1942, and sparked a mass exodus of Indians from Burma. After 1948, a separatist 
Mujahid movement was formed to demand that Muslim-inhabited areas of Arakan 
become part of East Pakistan (Fleischmann 1981: p.64; M. Smith 1991: p.64). There were also 
tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in other parts of Burma during the 1950s. In 
1961, Buddhist monks occupied a mosque in Rangoon in protest against the number 
of mosques that were erected in the neighbourhood.  The conflict led to a riot, but no 
action was taken against the monks because the government feared the reaction of the 
Sangha (Mendelson 1975: pp.353-354; Smith 1965: pp.278-280).  
The difficulties encountered by various religious minorities were linked to the 
government’s effort to spread Buddhism, but also to a Buddhist revival that was not 
directly sponsored by the government. Indeed, the extent of religious activities 
affected the general mood in the country. By the second half of the 1950s, Tinker 
(1957: p.176) observed that “the climate of opinion now regards religious observance as 
an essential duty”.   
 For instance, a civilian Buddhist movement emerged to promote social and 
religious practices consistent with Buddhism, such as vegetarianism and the non-
killing of animals. Slaughterhouses were put under government control and closed 
during religious festivals, while the sale of beef came to a halt in Lower Burma due to 
restrictions. These measures affected Muslims and Kachin, for whom the killing of 
animals was a part of religious ceremonies. The number of animals sacrificed for 
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Muslim religious festivals thus dropped during the 1950s, and in 1953, U Nu had to 
appeal publicly for Buddhists to show religious tolerance towards Muslims in 
connection with the slaughtering of animals for the Id festivals. The sacrifice of 
buffaloes for the Kachin Manao festival was stopped after 1951 (Nu 1955: pp.42-44; Tinker 
1957: p.171). 
7.4 Summing up 
 
It can be argued that the AFPFL government pursued policies of assimilation in the 
arenas of language and religion. As Silverstein (1980: p.221) observed, the choice of 
Burmese as a language and access to higher education in Burmese often meant that a 
person would be expected to adopt Burman customs and culture. Smith (1965: p.154) 
also find that Buddhist missionary activities organised by the government became an 
important part of the government’s programme of “burmanisation” of ethnic 
minorities. However, I will argue that it was a weak strategy of assimilation. 
Although the AFPFL government actively sought to promote Buddhism and Burmese 
as common elements of the national culture, attempts were not made to restrict 
minority cultures. Instead, the situation of the ethnic minorities can be characterised 
as one of benign neglect. The government sought to promote the use of Burmese, 
while ethnic minority languages and the English language were relegated to home 
use. In terms of religion, Buddhism was given an increasingly prominent position 
throughout the 1950s, but the private exercise of other faiths was accepted. 
The AFPFL government’s cultural policies were a result of the nature of 
democracy in Burma, but sparked discontent among non-Burman ethnic groups by 
providing a sense that minority cultures were being threatened. Cultural and literary 
organisations emerged during the 1950s to promote and protect minority cultures. 
Such organisations included student and youth groups, monks’ associations and 
literary societies. A number of these came to form the backbone of armed 
organisations that were formed in Kachin and Shan State after 1958.  
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8. Chapter eight: Economic aspects of efforts at 
democratic consolidation 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Nationality policy in the economic arena typically addresses the exploitation of 
natural resources in an ethnic minority area. There may be conflict over ownership 
over natural resources in ethnic minority areas, procedures for decision-making 
regarding the exploitation of such resources and the distribution of income derived 
from their exploitation. Such issues are addressed though an economic nationality 
policy. But economic policies that are not formulated specifically to address the 
relationship between ethnic groups may also have ethnopolitical consequences, for 
instance by contributing to increase or reduce economic disparities between ethnic 
groups.  
For the AFPFL government that came to power in Burma in 1948, there was a 
close link between democratisation and economics. As the government sought to 
promote a welfare state and a socialist economy, economic policies were defined as 
one tool to promote and improve the quality of Burmese democracy.  
In the present chapter, I will examine the consequences of the pattern of economic 
and social development in Burma for ethnic relations and outline how the government 
addressed demands by ethnic minority groups in the economic arena.  First, I will 
provide an outline of the economic and social situation in Burma after 1948. I will 
show that the former Frontier Areas played a marginal role in the national economy 
during the colonial era, and that this role was further reduced after 1948. Then, I will 
examine the consequences for ethnic relations of some aspects of the Burmese 
economy. I will discuss the economic relationship between union and states as well as 
the consequences in relation to ethnic relations of national economic planning and of 
policies that were carried out for land nationalisation and land reforms. Finally, I will 
examine economic demands raised by ethnic groups and the government’s response 
to such demands.  
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8.2 Economic and social background 
 
Burma is well endowed with natural resources both in the lowlands and the hills, but 
only a few constitute the core of the national economy: Rice, timber and petroleum. 
Under the British, Burma was the prototype of a colonial economy. The country was 
a producer of agricultural products and raw materials, while industrial development 
was limited to the processing of the country’s natural resources (Steinberg 1981: p.137). 
Economic development was concentrated to Burma Proper. The British developed 
only two major economic enterprises outside Burma Proper, the silver-ore mines at 
Bawdwin-Namtu in Shan States and the Mawchi Mines in Karenni State (Tinker 1957: 
p.283).  
Arteries of communication were built to facilitate the exportation of resources 
and limited to areas where such investments were economically viable. The main 
transport arteries – water, rail and roads – ran north-south and converged on Rangoon 
(Tinker 1957:p.281). No railway lines connected Burma to neighbouring countries. There 
was no railway line and few roads in the Arakan Hills, Chin Hills and Shan State.  
The export of rice constituted the core of the economy. Before 1939, Burma 
was the world’s fourth largest rice producer. More than 60 percent of the population 
in working age were farmers and 90 percent of the population lived in the countryside 
(Chambers 1950: p.697). The main agricultural areas were the lowlands of Upper Burma 
and the Irrawaddy Delta where farmers practice wetland irrigation. In the hills, the 
traditional form of agriculture was slash-and-burn cultivation for subsistence. The 
Frontier Areas and Karenni State have been dependent on rice from the lowlands 
since the early 1900s to feed the local population (Bamforth et al. 2000: p.20).  
The second main export commodity during the colonial era was petrol 
products and mineral resources. Oil fields and refineries were located in Central 
Burma and in Syriam near Rangoon, while the main sources of minerals were located 
in the Frontier Areas, Karenni State and Tenasserim region. In 1939, the Frontier 
Areas and Karenni State accounted for half of Burma’s mineral production. The 
Mawchi mines supplied 10 percent of the world’s wolfram, while the Bawdwin-
Namtu mines were the world’s largest mines of silver and lead (Bamforth et al. 2000: p.24; 
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Chambers 1950: p.698; Crozier 1994: p.4; FEER 1956a&b). Finally, Burma was a major exporter 
of teak and various hardwoods. About 230.000 tons of teak was exported annually 
before 1939. Teak was extracted across the country, except in the Arakan Hills, the 
Irrawaddy Delta and South Tenasserim, but the most important teak forests were 
located in Karenni and Kachin State as well as in the Pegu Yoma hills north of 
Rangoon (FEER 1956a&b). 
World War II and the subsequent civil war brought much of the agricultural 
and industrial production to a standstill. In 1949-1950, government finances were 
close to collapse for lack of revenue. Much of the communication and transport 
infrastructure was damaged (Khin Maung Kyi et al. 2001: p.6). An estimated half of the 
country’s national capital was destroyed (Survey of Burma 1955). No trains could run at 
night until 1950 because of the danger of attacks by armed groups. After 1950, the 
trains ran with armed escort. It took 36 hours to make the 620-kilometre journey 
between Burma’s two main cities, Rangoon and Mandalay (Tinker 1957: p.296). Burma’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) fell between 1948 and 1951. In 1953-1954, GDP 
remained at 84 percent of its pre-war level, and in 1959-1960, it was only seven 
percent above pre-war level in 1938-1939 (Khin Maung Kyi et al. 2000: pp.7-8).  
Efforts of economic development in Burma after 1948 followed a system of 
central planning, and sought to promote socialism and nationalism. The basics of 
economic planning were union ownership of resources, union ownership over 
industrial enterprises and social welfare. After 1956, more room was given to private 
ownership. In 1952, the government announced a Pyidawtha Plan (“Happy country”) 
for the creation of a welfare state, but in 1956, the plan was stalled because of lack of 
funds. There was also a nationalist bias to economic planning that was reflected in the 
desire to eradicate British and Indian control over the economy and encourage 
Burmese-owned enterprises. For the first few years, British and other foreign private 
companies remained active, but gradually, many were nationalised.  
Rice continued to be the single most important item in internal trade and 
exports although agriculture production became more diversified between 1948 and 
1960 (Khin Maung Kyi et al. 2000: p. 8). By the mid-1950, all former export lines had 
become unimportant compared to rice (Tinker 1957: p.266). In 1960, rice exports 
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accounted for 75-80 percent of Burma’s foreign exchange earnings (Tin Tin Shwe 1960: 
p.573). 
Both rice and natural resources such as petroleum, timber and minerals were 
nationalised after 1948, thus bringing the main sources of income in ethnic minority 
areas under the control of the central government in Rangoon. For instance, the main 
resources in Karenni State – one of the smallest ethnic states in Burma – were rice, 
teak and wolfram from the Mawchi mines. When these resources were nationalised, 
decision-making authority as well as revenues from their exploitation accrued to the 
AFPFL government in Rangoon (Tinker 1957: p.95; FEER 1956a&b). Rice was controlled by 
the State Agricultural Marketing Board (SAMB), which was given a monopoly on the 
export of rice in 1950. The State Timber Board controlled teak and other timbers, 
while a Mineral Resources Development Corporation was set down in 1952. During 
the caretaker government from 1958 to 1960, the military also acquired a monopoly 
on fish trade throughout Burma through the economic activities of the Defence 
Services Institute (DSI). By 1960, the DSI had become a major force in the Burmese 
economy, only superseded by the SAMB (FEER 1960: pp.587-589).  
During the first eight years of independence, much of the efforts for economic 
development were concentrated to the Rangoon area due to security and 
transportation problems (Tinker 1957: p. 125). Tinker  (1957: p.125) remarked in the mid-
1950s, that “nine tenth of the development work of the last eight years can be seen in 
a forty-minute drive, going no more than ten miles from the city (Rangoon), in the 
triangle formed by the Hlaing River and the Pegu River”. Much of the industry was 
also located along the railway and road between Rangoon and Mandalay, and along 
the Irrawaddy up to Myitkyina.  
The nationalisation of foreign enterprises in the Frontier Areas adversely 
affected these areas.  For instance, there were seven factories employing about 3.500 
people in Shan States in 1939. These factories were foreign-owned and operated in 
connection with the silver-lead mining industry (Chamber’s 1950). After 1948 they were 
nationalised to the union government. In Karenni State, a British company had 
exploited the Mawchi mines before World War II. After the outbreak of civil war, 
KNDO forces gained control over the mines. In 1953 the union government retrieved 
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control of the mines and established a joint venture with the British company again. 
The Karen State government received no share in the joint venture or from the 
revenues from the mines. Furthermore, local labour was not permitted to work in the 
mines until 1958 due to the outbreak of the war (Crozier 1994: p.68).  
The role of the Frontier Areas was marginal in the national economy after 
1948 for several reasons. The population is sparse in the hills, and there are few large 
towns in ethnic minority areas, except Bassein in the Irrawaddy Delta (an area with 
an ethnically mixed population) and Moulmein in Mon State. None of Burma’s 
largest towns are located in the hills. In addition, the outbreak of the civil war and a 
drop in world rice prices in 1953-1954 prevented a recovery in Burma’s economy. In 
1952-1953, 35 percent of the total current and capital expenditures of the annual 
union budget went to the security and defence forces. Little investment was made in 
the development of new infrastructure. Instead, priority went to the restoration of 
existing infrastructure and industry. These were located predominantly in central 
areas in the lowlands. Still, the civil war also disrupted such efforts at rehabilitation 
(Tinker 1957: p.287).  Insecurity disrupted agricultural production, while natural 
resources in many ethnic minority areas fell under rebel control and could not be 
exploited. For instance, the ferrying of timber logs from the Karen and Karenni hills 
to Rangoon and Moulmein came to a halt because of the war in these areas (Tinker 
1957: p.257).  
8.3 Nationality policy in the economic arena 
8.3.1 Economic relations between the union and the states 
 
In 1947 Shan, Chin and Kachin were promised financial support for the states and 
economic equality between the union and the states. When the constitution was 
drafted, few provisions examined the economic aspect of the relationship between 
union and states and no collective economic rights were granted to ethnic groups. 
Throughout the 1950s the states remained financially dependent on the union 
government, from which they received a share of their annual income. Silverstein 
(1980: pp.201-202, p.213) notes that no effort was made by the union government to 
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increase the income base of the states, and that there was no satisfactory means to 
apportion the annual budget transfers from the union. There was no co-ordination 
between the union and the states to match allocations from the union with state 
expenses. Instead, the union government set aside a sum in the budget that was 
granted according to a fixed ratio to the various states. As a result, problems in the 
union economy quickly affected the economy of the states. For instance, Shan States 
did not get its share of the budget in 1951, and public expenses had to be covered by 
the saohpas (Elliott 1999: p.232). In 1956, Karenni State was only able to meet 1/7 of its 
budget requirements (Silverstein 1980: pp.201-202), In addition, when a public enterprise 
was established in an ethnic minority area, there were complaints that the revenue 
accrued to the central government rather than to the local area (Elliott 1999: p.300). 
8.3.2 Economic demands by ethnic minorities   
 
Lack of control over local resources and the failure to transfer resources from the 
centre to peripheral areas were recurrent complaints by non-Burman groups towards 
the union government. In Kachin State, the state government complained about the 
poor quality of the roads in Kachin State (M. Smith 1991: p.192). Much of the state capital 
Myitkyina was destroyed during World War II, but little of the Japanese war 
compensations were returned to the state for rehabilitation (Lintner 2002). Burma – as 
the first country in Asia – reached an agreement with Japan in 1954 about the 
payment of compensation for damages inflicted during the war. The agreement 
included a provision that Japan would invest in Burma over a period of ten years 
(Tinker 1957: pp.267-268). For the first two years, most of the investment was used for the 
construction of the Baluchaung power plant in Karenni State in order to provide 
towns such as Rangoon, Mandalay and Pegu with electricity to boost industrialisation 
in central parts of the country (Tinker 1957: p.267; p.307).  
In Arakan - which is a major rice growing district - complaints coalesced 
around the region’s share of income from rice cultivation. The various state 
marketing boards, especially the SAMB, developed into a major source of revenue 
for the union government during the 1950s. In 1955, the SAMB provided half of all 
public revenue for the union (FEER 1955). A conflict developed between the IAPG, the 
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main Arakanese nationalist party in the parliament, and the AFPFL government over 
the share that Arakan was receiving from the revenues of the SAMB (Fairbairn 1957: 
p.305). Many Arakanese complained that their region did not receive its fair share of 
this money. 
In Shan State people complained about budget cuts in the transfers from the 
union and demanded a share of the Japanese war reparation money to compensate for 
damages during the war. Demands were also raised that Shan State should receive a 
share of the revenues from the Namtu-Bawdwin Mines as well as taxes accruing from 
the activities at the mines (Htoon Myint 1957a). Discontent also erupted over rumours that 
the central government was ready to give away Shan land for the resettlement of 
European Jews after World War II. In 1956 such issues formed the basis for the 
electoral campaign of the Mahadevi of Yawnghwe (Elliott 1999: p.258; p.266). Discontent 
over economic issues was one of the reasons for Shan demands for federal reforms in 
1959 (Htoon Myint 1957a; Htoon Myint 1957b; Silverstein 1980: p.227).  
There were positive aspects to the economic integration with Burma as well. 
Lehman (1963: chap.9) shows that the integration with Burma after 1948 introduced a 
cash economy and opened up trade and communication routes between Burma and 
the Chin Hills. Government development schemes were put in place to open schools 
and provide a local civil service. However, in 1958 the Chin Affairs Council 
complained that not one high school had been built in the Chin Hills since 1948 (M. 
Smith 1991: p.194). Lehman (1963: p.216) sees demands for the establishment of Chin State 
as a result of the modernisation that took place in the Chin Hills after 1948, while 
Martin Smith (1991: p.194) argues that such demands were a result of dissatisfaction 
with the lack of autonomy of the Chin Affairs Council and of government neglect of 
the Chin Hills. 
8.3.3 Economic planning 
 
The post-independence government in Burma – as many other governments of the 
post-war period – emphasised social engineering and economic planning as the chief 
means to promote social and economic development. Some of the government’s main 
efforts in the economic arena were invested in economic planning. The planning 
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process began in 1951 when an American company, the Knappen-Tibbetts-Abbett 
Engineering Company (KTA), was invited to make a survey of the country’s 
resources. The KTA produced a comprehensive survey of Burma’s economic 
situation and a set of recommendations in collaboration with the union government. 
The report was presented during a Pyidawtha Conference in 1952, which convoked 
“top government leaders, executives, administrators and representatives of the great 
mass political and farm organisations”. The conference approved the economic 
growth and investment goals of the KTA report, and laid the basis for a 
comprehensive development plan that was completed in 1953 (Walinsky 1963: p.29). 
The Pyidawtha report contained a programme for the post-war reconstruction of 
Burma as well as plans for economic and social development. Development hinged 
on the export of rice and an increase in agricultural production. Rice export was 
designed as the main earner of foreign exchange to be subsequently invested in 
various economic and social projects. An increase in agricultural production was 
intended to pay for the necessary infrastructure for industrial development, power and 
transport. In addition, the report envisaged a comprehensive exploration of mineral 
resources and a master plan for industrial development with growth centres in 
Rangoon and Myingyan in Central Burma as well as Akyab in Arakan. The selection 
of economic development projects depended on factors such as the location of the 
relevant natural resources, closeness to the market, the presence of skilled labour, 
economic soundness and technical complementarity (FEER 1955).  
The main actors in the design of the plan were foreigners and the union 
government, while the states played a minor role. The planning process was co-
ordinated by a Union Ministry of Planning, while the implementation of the plans 
depended primarily on agencies of the union government (Pyidawtha 1954: p.14). 
Furthermore, no mention is made in the Pyidawtha report (1954) of the impact of 
economic development on ethnic relations. The report argued that an end to the civil 
war was a priority because it was deemed necessary for economic development. But 
it did not address demands for economic autonomy or equality for ethnic minorities. 
Nor did it examine the consequences of various economic strategies and goals for 
ethnic groups and ethnic minority areas.   
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8.3.4 Land nationalisation 
 
Land redistribution and nationalisation were a key demand for the AFPFL since the 
anticolonial struggle. The purpose of the policy was to get rid of peasant indebtedness 
and absentee landownership that had developed during the colonial era and that had 
become an acute problem after the economic depression in the 1930s. By 1939 
absentee landlords owned half of the land in Lower Burma (Tinker 1957: p.224). It was 
part of a nationalist drive against the immigrant Indian community, as Indian 
moneylenders (Chettyars) owned 25 percent of the cultivable land in the major rice 
growing districts in Burma (Taylor 1987: p.144).   
After 1948 control over land developed into a major source of conflict between 
the union government and several ethnic nationalists, particularly in Arakan and Shan 
State. The first land nationalisation act was passed by parliament in October 1948, 
but halted by the civil war. A second law was passed in 1954. In Shan State, the 
saohpas argued that nationalisation fell within the mandate of the states. Tinker (1957: 
p.240) notes that land nationalisation was pressed forward by the union government, 
but that land legislation was on the legislative list of the states. Fairbairn (1957: p.305) 
also notes that land nationalisation played a role in the conflict between the AFPFL 
and the Independent Arakanese Parliamentary Group (IAPG). While the IAPG did 
not oppose land redistribution, it opposed land nationalisation. In 1952, the conflict 
between union and states over competence in land issues was brought to the Supreme 
Court, which ruled in favour of the union government (Silverstein 1980: p.203-204).   
The issue split Shan leaders. Shan parliamentary deputies were split between 
those who supported the AFPFL government’s policies and those who opposed the 
policy. The supporters of the act were known as the anti-feudalists. For the anti-
feudalists, the struggle for land reform was part of a greater reform movement to 
change the traditional power structure and class relations in Shan State. Indeed, land 
played a major role in the social structure of the Shan. As Wiant (1984: pp.85-89) 
explains, the perseverance of Shan society and identity depends on the position of the 
Shan saohpa, which stems in part from his control over the land and his relationship 
 128
to the farmers who till the land. Land nationalisation could therefore undercut the 
basis for Shan pyramidal society and Shan identity.  
8.4 Summing up 
 
A number of studies of ethnic relations in Burma have emphasised the political and 
cultural relationship between Burmans and non-Burmans. These studies have 
analysed Burma’s political institutions and the assimilation policies of the 
government after 1948. This chapter shows that the examination of political and 
cultural factors needs to be complemented by an analysis of the economic factors in 
ethnic relations in Burma and that economic issues were a significant part of the 
ethnic relations in Burma after 1948 because they underscored the disparities between 
the Burman-inhabited lowlands and the ethnic minority areas in the border and hill 
areas.  
An analysis of the economic aspects of ethnic relations can be carried out in 
Burma by comparing regional disparities given the pattern of settlement of various 
ethnic communities. Such a comparison shows that there were significant disparities 
between regions, partly as a legacy of colonial rule, and that the situation did not 
improve after 1948. Combined with the political development after 1948 and the 
government’s culture policies, this strengthened the sense of non-Burman groups that 
they were being dominated by Burmans. The AFPFL’s failure to develop the 
economy in the periphery was not a result of ethnic discrimination, but had clear 
ethnopolitical consequences as the failure to do so provided a basis for the discontent 
that led to the civil war.  
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9. Chapter nine: The failure to consolidate 
democracy: The civil war 
 
Attempts to consolidate democracy and to address political, economic and cultural 
demands by various ethnic minority groups took place against the backdrop of civil 
war, which erupted in Burma Proper in 1948-1949. Despite a lull in the fighting in 
the mid-fifties, the war resumed in the late fifties and early sixties, and extended to 
ethnic groups in the Frontier Areas as well. The civil war is the main indication that 
the consolidation of democracy failed. As I showed in chapters six-eight, the war had 
a major impact on the development of the democratic process after 1948 as well as on 
the prospects for economic and social development in a country that had been 
devastated during World War II. In the present chapter, I will describe the pattern of 
the war and examine the consequences of the civil war for democratisation after 
1948.  
9.1 The pattern of the civil war 
 
The civil war broke out in two waves, first in Lower Burma and Karenni State in 
1948-1951, then in Shan and Kachin States in 1958-1961. During the first phase of 
the war, the main challenge to the authority of the elected government came from 
Communist and Karen armed organisations (Burma and the Insurrections 1949: pp.32-33). 
Armed organisations also emerged among other ethnic groups in the area, such as 
Arakanese, Mon and Rohingya, as well as among Pao in Shan State during the later 
1940s and early 1950s. A Kachin military commander from the government’s armed 
forces, Naw Seng, mutinied and joined the KNU/KNDO in 1949, but most Kachin 
did not support armed struggle at this stage, nor did most Chin and Shan (M. Smith 1991: 
p.141, p.191; Burma and the Insurrections 1949: pp.53-55). This first phase of the war can 
therefore be interpreted as a consequence of the lack of response to ethnic concerns 
during the transition between 1945 and 1947. In the cases where these concerns had 
been addressed – by the Panglong agreement and in the 1947 constitution – armed 
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conflict was averted. The case of Burma thus supports de Nevers’ argument that 
ethnic conflicts are more likely to occur when ethnic interests are not addressed at an 
early stage of a transition to democracy.  
The manner in which the various insurgencies broke out produced a general 
state of chaos. The Karen insurgency provided a model for other ethnically based 
uprisings and Karen nationalists were involved in setting up armed organisations in 
various parts of the country. Forces from the Karen National Democratic 
Organisation (KNDO) were instrumental in forming the Mon National Democratic 
Organisation (MNDO) in 1948. The KNDO was also active in western parts of 
Karenni State as early as 1948. This was a result of the opposition of many Karen 
nationalists to the existence of Karenni State in favour of a pan-Karen state that 
would encompass all Karen, including subgroups such as Pao, Kayan and Karenni (M. 
Smith 1991: p.172). The KNDO in 1948 thus included members from each of these ethnic 
groups. Later, the KNDO played an active role in encouraging the formation of local 
armed organisations among various Karen subgroups, such as the Karenni National 
Progressive Party (KNPP), established in 1957 (M. Smith 1991: p.173) and the Pao 
National Organisation (M. Smith 1991: pp.144-146). The KNU/KNDO remained the largest 
ethnic insurgent group during the 1950s.  
While ethnicity was a central dimension to the war, the ethnic insurgencies were 
also mixed with the communist insurgency (M. Smith 1991: p.28). One reason was the 
geographical pattern of the war and the strategies applied by the government in 
response to the two insurgencies. The civil war broke out when the CPB went 
underground in March 1948, but the situation was already tense in Arakan, Karen and 
Mon areas. A year later, most of lower Burma was enmeshed in battles between 
government forces and insurgents. The CPB established its strongholds in the densely 
populated and mainly Burman-inhabited regions of Central Burma, while the KNU 
established its bases in the largely Karen-inhabited areas of lower and eastern Burma. 
The KNU and the CPB both gained a foothold in the ethnically mixed Irrawaddy 
Delta. The Arakan region also became a base area for the CPB in 1948, and the CPB 
insurgency quickly became mixed up with the Arakanese uprising (M. Smith 1991: p.135). 
However, a sense of mistrust between ethnic armed organisations and the CPB – 
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many ethnic leaders regarded the CPB as a Burman force – and ideological 
differences prevented the development of closer co-operation between the two 
organisations (M. Smith 1991: pp. 28-29, p.149). The KNU and the CPB made their first 
agreement for mutual co-operation in 1952, when the tide of the war was turning in 
favour of the government forces and the KNU came under heavy pressure in the 
Irrawaddy Delta (M. Smith 1991: pp.148-149).  
The outbreak of the communist insurgency led to large-scale mutinies in the armed 
forces, the Union Military Police (UMP) and the PVO (Burma and the Insurrections 1949: 
pp.21-25). During 1948-1949, the government therefore used Karen, Kachin, Chin and 
other non-Burman military units to quell the communist insurgency (Hall 1964: p.798), 
but this led to resentment among many Burmans and further impaired relations 
between Burmans and non-Burmans, in particular Karen (M. Smith 1991: p. 109; 111).  
The government also made several attempts to prevent the communist uprising 
from spilling over into an ethnic insurgency. The communist uprising thus provided a 
motivation for the government to address ethnic issues that had been postponed in 
1947. Several rounds of negotiations took place between the government and the 
KNU in 1948 and a Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission was set down to 
inquire into the question of autonomy for Karen, Arakanese and Mon. However, by 
the time the commission presented its conclusions in 1949, negotiations between the 
government and the KNU had broken down and the Karen insurrection had begun. 
The government responded differently to the ethnically based and the communist 
insurgency. The KNU was outlawed four days after the rebellion broke out, while the 
CPB remained legal until 1953 (M. Smith 1991: p.116).  
The Karen community was deeply affected by the outbreak of war. In the armed 
forces, Karen officers were placed on indefinite leave and isolated after 1949. The 
Karen army commander-in-chief, Smith Dun, was forced to resign, and replaced by 
his deputy, General Ne Win (Callahan 1998a: p.28). Karen were also isolated in other 
sections of government. In 1949, the two Karen ministers in the union government 
resigned. Thousands of Karen civil servants, soldiers and policemen were arrested 
and interned. Many lost their jobs (M. Smith 1991: p.147).  
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 The insurrections reached a height in the period between 1948 and 1951, when 
various armed groups controlled most of Burma except Rangoon and outlying areas 
(M. Smith 1991: p.119). After 1952, the war gradually receded. CPB activity in Central 
Burma slowed down, and by the mid-fifties, the CPB was no longer a serious threat 
for the government (Lintner 1990: p. 19). Military operations pushed the KNU into the 
hills of East Burma and forced KNU troops in the Delta on retreat. The government 
was, however, largely unsuccessful in getting the armed organisations to surrender 
voluntarily. Amnesties were proposed in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1955 but met with 
little response, until the AFPFL launched an Arms-for-Democracy-programme in 
1958. This programme triggered large-scale surrenders in the PVO as well as in 
Arakanese, Pao and Mon armed organisations (M. Smith 1991: pp. 168-170).  
Overall, the foundation for an effective democratic government seemed 
improved by the late 1950s. More territory was under government control, while the 
armed opposition had been weakened by the surrenders (M. Smith 1991: p.169). The 
government was also about to overcome other forms of challenges to its authority at 
the local level. As Cady (1957: p. 602) explains, several districts in Burma were run like 
semi-independent units under local bosses during the first post-independence years, 
and the central government in Rangoon was often powerless in local affairs. Instead, 
the government frequently depended on militias organised and controlled by such 
local bosses in order to beat back the insurgencies (Callahan 1998a: pp.22-26). By 1955, 
however, the government had become more stable, and had begun to eliminate these 
private armies. By 1957, national authority was beginning to supersede the power of 
the local bosses  (Callahan 1998a: pp.26-32).  
Shortly thereafter, the second wave of civil war broke out in Shan and Kachin 
States. The Noom Suk Harn was established in Shan State in 1958, while the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were 
established in 1961. There was little direct relationship between these uprisings and 
the first phase that occurred in lower Burma. The causes of the outbreak of the second 
phase of the civil war were also different. In Shan State, a combination of three 
factors explains the outbreak of armed rebellion: The invasion by the Chinese 
Kuomintang and the subsequent deployment of the Burma Army, the transfer of 
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power of the saohpas in 1959 and the debate about the secession clause in the 
constitution. A combination of three factors is also held out to explain the outbreak of 
armed rebellion in Kachin State: The fallout from the Sino-Burmese border 
agreement, the decision to proclaim Buddhism state religion in 1961 and the poor 
economic conditions in the state. A major source of disaffection in these states thus 
stemmed from policies carried out by the government after 1948, which were seen as 
gradually undermining the autonomy promised by the Panglong agreement. The 
second phase of the civil indicated a degradation of relations between the elected 
government and ethnic minorities in these areas from 1948 to 1962.  
9.2 Consequences of the civil war 
 
The consolidation of democracy hinges on the ability to extend authority of the 
elected government after the transition to democracy has occurred and to change 
popular attitudes and behaviour towards democracy. There were three major 
consequences for democratisation in Burma as a result of the civil war. Firstly, a large 
portion of the country remained outside the effective control of the democratically 
elected government until 1962, thus in practice restricting the geographical scope of 
democracy. It can therefore be said that Burma did not fulfil the first criterion set by 
Linz and Stepan for a consolidated democracy, namely that the authority of the 
elected government be effectively extended across the state. Secondly, the war was an 
indicator of behavioural non-compliance with democratic requirements. Democratic 
processes such as the organisation of elections were postponed for three years after 
1948, while activities in the parliament and government were overshadowed by the 
war during the 1950s. The outbreak of armed rebellion in Shan and Kachin State 
indicated a loss of faith in the political system that had been devised in 1947. It can 
therefore also be said that Burma did not fulfil Linz and Stepan’s second and third 
criteria for a consolidated democracy: attitudinal support and behavioural compliance 
with democracy.  
Thirdly, the civil war contributed to strengthen the armed forces at the expense 
of the civilian government. The military has played a central role in Burmese society 
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since the armed forces were established as a part of the anticolonial struggle (Butwell 
1961: p. 75). However, the nature of the Burmese armed forces changed considerably 
between 1948 and 1962. By 1948, an estimated half of military troops and half of the 
military’s equipment were lost in mutinies (Callahan 1998a: p.20). During the early 1950s, 
the government therefore relied on private armies controlled by local and national 
leaders from the Socialist Party, which were often organised and armed by the 
government. Callahan (1998a: p. 23, p. 25) points out that a long-term consequence of the 
civil war was the institutionalisation of “a kind of local authority in village and town 
defence units that grew increasingly autonomous from Rangoon”. The situation 
began to change in 1951. A restructuring of the armed forces created a more 
organised and efficient military force (Callahan 1998a: pp. 29-30). In 1955, an army of 
volunteers, the Pyisawthis, was formed to replace the private militias. A unified 
command that made field operations easier was created (Maung Aung Myoe 1998: pp.5-8). 
Many officers, in particular conservatives and Karen, were removed from the Army 
during the reforms. By 1958, most leading officers in the Army were Socialists. The 
most powerful were officers who were not closely linked to the AFPFL, and who had 
grown increasingly frustrated with corruption among civilian politicians (Callahan 
1998a: p.29).  They played a key role when U Nu temporarily handed over power to the 
caretaker government led by Ne Win in 1958. The caretaker government gave the 
military practical experience in government and established the military as an 
influential public institution with which any elected government would have to 
contend in major political decisions. In 1961, Butwell (1961: p.79) argued that Burma 
Army had become “the single most important group in the life of this country today”. 
In addition, the military strengthened itself politically under the caretaker 
government, through the creation of a National Solidarity Association, and 
economically, through the establishment of a number of military run enterprises 
under the Defence Services Institute. After the coup d’état in 1962, these institutions 
formed a basis for military rule.  
The empowerment of the military was significant for the policy towards ethnic 
demands in the late 1950s as the Army resisted the idea of accommodating ethnic 
demands. For instance, Maung Maung (1969: p.203) describes the opposition expressed 
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by general Ne Win and leading officers in 1948 to the creation of ethnically 
segregated units in the army, which they argued would “only tempt them (i.e. the ethnic 
minorities) with the thoughts that they could dictate their terms by force”. The impact of 
martial administration in Shan and Karenni State has also been accounted for. Under 
the caretaker government from 1958 to 1960, the military was able to put its views 
into practice. Under Ne Win, the Arms-for-democracy programme was terminated, 
the process of removing the traditional powers of the Shan saohpas was completed, 
and the promise to establish Arakan and Mon States was postponed. After 1962, 
policies of non-accommodation under the military rule have predominated in the 
government’s dealings with ethnic minorities.  
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10. Chapter ten: Some concluding remarks 
 
In conclusion, I will present the answers that I found to the questions presented in the 
first chapter as well as some theoretical implications of these findings. I will also 
assess some lessons that this analysis of Burma’s past may hold for the country’s 
future. Indeed, there is a thread running from Burma’s pre-1962 history to current 
Burmese politics, as demonstrated in chapter three. Aung San Suu Kyi (1995: p.193) 
referred to the post-World War II struggle for national liberation in her first major 
public speech, when she spoke of the events in 1988 as a national crisis that “could in 
fact be called the second struggle for independence”. In late December 2002, she 
brought up the same reference when she described her father Aung San as a major 
source of inspiration and argued that one of her aims is to build up “the kind of 
country that he would like to have seen” (BBC 2002).  
10.1 Findings 
 
What characterised the democratic regime that was established in Burma in 1948, and 
what foundation did this framework lay for ethnic relations? The political system 
established in 1947-1948 combined a semi-federal state with parliamentary rule and 
elections based on a majoritarian formula. British Westminster democracy provided a 
model for the 1947 constitution, while the political structures that had been 
established in Burma since the 1920s provided some experience with such a political 
system. The combination of parliamentary rule and first-past-the post elections, 
however, produced conflicting outcomes. A bicameral parliament institutionalised the 
representation of ethnic diversity in the Chamber of Nationalities. The use of 
majoritarian formulas for the election of representatives to parliament, however, 
reduced the representation of smaller and territorially non-concentrated interest 
groups in either chamber. The Burmese party system was furthermore dominated by 
the AFPFL. Although ethnic identity played a significant role for political behaviour, 
as testified by the establishment of ethnically based organisations, including parties, 
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student groups and religious organisations, ethnic groups were comparatively less 
influential in parliament. The examination of the Burmese political structure and of 
the party system suggests that they were important frameworks for ethnic relations, 
but that the parliament did not serve as an efficient channel for ethnic minority 
concerns. Unfortunately, we lack some of the information necessary to draw 
definitive conclusions as to the full impact of these aspects of the political system. In 
addition, the time span that has been examined is relatively short. We cannot 
therefore fully test the theories presented in chapter two about the advantages and 
drawbacks of presidential versus parliamentary rule, nor can we fully test Horowitz’ 
theory about the role of elections and of the party system in politicising ethnic 
identity in democracies.  
The 1947 constitution produced some strategies for dealing with ethnic 
diversity. The principle of accommodation was applied in the political arena, where it 
was a result of the demand for autonomy raised by non-Burman groups. The main 
strategy was the creation of autonomous states within a semi-federal polity in ethnic 
minority areas, but this strategy was only applied in the Frontier Areas. It was thus 
only effective for ethnic groups living in these areas and only as a strategy for centre-
periphery relations. The constitution did not institutionalise strategies of power-
sharing or group rights for ethnic groups in Burma Proper. In addition, issues related 
to ethnic relations within the states were not addressed, except in Kachin State were 
provisions were made to ensure the representation of the Burman minority. Secession 
was accepted with a ten-year trial period for Shan and Karenni, and denied other 
ethnic groups. In the economic and cultural arenas, ethnic minority concerns were 
accommodated within the federal framework of union- state relations. Instead, 
socialism provided an important overall guideline for economic affairs. There were 
no additional measures to deal with ethnic diversity in these arenas, and the choice of 
strategies was left to the elected post-1948 governments.  
 
What nationality policies did the government formulate and carry out after 1948 in the 
political, cultural and economic fields to address ethnic demands? A nationality policy 
that comprises strategies to address ethnic diversity underpinned by a political 
programme did not fully exist in Burma after 1948. Firstly, there was no consensus in 
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the Burmese political elite over what political programme to adopt. Viewpoints 
differed within the AFPFL as well as between the AFPFL and other leading political 
actors, such as the military, as to how to deal with ethnic diversity. One viewpoint 
held that ethnic diversity ought to be addressed by accommodating ethnic demands. 
An alternative viewpoint was that ethnic identities ought to be replaced by a common 
national identity and that strategies of accommodation ought to be used only as a last 
resort. Finally, it was also argued by some, particularly in the armed forces, that 
accommodation would fuel new demands and thereby contribute to dissolve the 
union. Secondly, as a result of this lack of consensus, strategies of accommodation 
and strategies of rejection were both applied. In some cases, different strategies were 
applied towards similar demands by different ethnic groups. In other case, strategies 
differed in relation to demands by the same ethnic group. Such inconsistencies were 
one reason for ethnic dissatisfaction in the 1950s-1960s.  
Strategies of accommodation continued to be applied more commonly in the 
political arena, where accommodation had been made a constitutive principle of the 
democratic regime in 1947. Political strategies of accommodation applied after 1948 
included the creation of Karen, Arakan and Mon States. In the case of the Karen, 
however, this statement must be qualified. Indeed, the creation of Karen State was 
accompanied by the abolition of Karen representation rights. In the cultural arena, the 
government’s policies aimed at a weak form of assimilation of non-Burman and non-
Buddhist groups into a national identity based on Burman culture and Buddhism - 
except for the Mon, who were recognised as a cultural minority and granted certain 
collective cultural rights.  In the economic arena, the government’s policy was 
dominated by negligence of ethnic minority demands. Economic collective rights 
remained absent.  
 
What were the ethnopolitical consequences of these policies and other efforts to 
consolidate democracy after 1948? There were two phases to the outbreak of armed 
conflict in Burma. Firstly, there was an outbreak of armed conflict in Burma Proper 
in connection with the transition to democracy in 1947-1948. This was a result of the 
failure to include ethnic groups such as the Karen, Arakanese and Mon in the 
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transition and to address their concerns. The conflict did not extend to the Frontier 
Areas. The second outbreak of armed violence, however, occurred in the Frontier 
Areas in the late fifties and early sixties. By this time, it was linked to the failure to 
consolidate democracy and to develop a consistent set of nationality policy strategies 
after 1948. This pattern indicates that the accommodation of ethnic groups in the 
Frontier Areas was initially successful in preventing armed conflict from breaking 
out, while the lack of concern for ethnic demands in Burma Proper brought armed 
conflict to that area.  
The failure to manage ethnic diversity after 1948 had three major 
consequences. Firstly, it meant a continuation of the civil war, which had erupted in 
1948, and now spread to new geographical areas and ethnic groups.  Secondly, it 
empowered the armed forces and justified an extended role for the military. Finally, it 
contributed to the collapse of democracy in 1962 and the imposition of military rule.  
10.2 Some theoretical implications 
 
In chapter one, I introduced four perspectives regarding the nature of ethnic relations 
in Burma: those of M. Smith, Silverstein, Fistié and Brown. I have drawn heavily on 
the findings of Smith for data to support my analysis. However, as stated in the 
critique in chapter one, Smith made few attempts to develop a theoretical framework 
for understanding ethnic relations in Burma. This thesis is therefore an attempt to 
complement his analysis of ethnicity and insurgency in Burma.  
The analysis supports Silverstein’s argument that the principle of 
accommodation that was established by the Panglong Agreement and partly in the 
1947 constitution was not followed up after independence, and that this accounts for 
some of the ethnic disaffection of the 1950s-1960s. But the analysis has also revealed 
more complex aspects of ethnic conflicts in Burma and that the contrast between 
what was seemingly agreed upon in 1947 and what was enacted after 1948 was not as 
significant as argued by Silverstein. I have argued that there were lacunas in the 
process leading up to the Panglong Agreement, as well as in the text of the 
agreement, and in the constitution-drafting process in 1947, which played a 
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significant role in the outbreak of civil war in 1948-1949. Furthermore, the 1947 
constitution did allow for strategies of disregarding ethnic diversity. The strategies 
that were selected after 1948 were thus also an inherent part of the constitutional 
arrangements in 1947.  In addition, I have shown that government policies in the 
cultural and economic arenas played a central role in producing the pattern of 
ethnopolitics that characterised post-independence Burma. 
Fistié and Brown represent two opposite viewpoints as to the impact of 
colonisation. I have shown that there was a degree of continuity between the 
precolonial and the postcolonial era. For instance, I demonstrated in chapter four that 
a proto-national identity existed in Central-Burma before the arrival of the British. 
Still, my analysis does not support Fistié’s argument that ethnic relations after 
independence ought to be regarded as merely continuing the precolonial pattern. 
Instead, I agree with Brown that the colonial era was a period of significant change in 
Burma. In chapters three and four, I show that the process of colonisation brought a 
reappraisal of the significance of ethnicity and nationhood in Burma, that it changed 
the nature of the state and of political institutions, and that it introduced the idea and 
institutions of Western liberal democracy to Burma.  
The theoretical framework that guided the analysis is a synthesis between the 
works of several scholars. It is based on contributions by Linz and Stepan and by 
Gunther et al., on democratisation in Europe and Latin America, on work by Brass 
and Brown’s regarding the role of the state in ethnic relations, on work by de Nevers 
on the impact of the democratic transition for ethnic relations, as well as on the 
typology developed by McGarry and O’Leary over nationality policy strategies 
addressing ethnic diversity. I found Snyder’s distinction between the transition and 
the consolidation phase of democratisation to be useful as an analytical tool, but I 
also found that the consolidation phase continues to play a key role in shaping ethnic 
relations. It is thus necessary, but not sufficient to follow de Nevers in focusing the 
analysis on the transition phase. The two phases need to be analysed in relation to 
each other. Indeed, the failure to engage in a major political reform in Burma in 1958 
indicate that what had been achieved during the transition to democracy had not 
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consolidated, and that much had not been achieved in terms of ethnic integration 
during the first decade of independence.  
Post-independence Burma reveals the challenges associated with the promotion 
of democracy in a multiethnic state. It shows that ethnic concerns need to be 
addressed at an early stage in the transition, or risk derailing the democratisation 
process at a later stage. It does not support the argument that democracy ought to be 
achieved first, and ethnic concerns addressed later, nor that strategies of 
accommodation ought to be avoided. It also does not support Rustow’s argument that 
nation-building must precede democratisation. Instead, it has shown that ethnic 
relations are an inherent factor in the process of introducing and consolidating 
democracy, and that the two issues need to be addressed simultaneously. The analysis 
revealed that an arsenal of strategies is available to deal with ethnic diversity in 
democracies, but that the selection of strategies and the combination of strategies 
have to be done with care. The rush to draft the constitution during the final months 
of the summer of 1947, the lack of consensus-building during the constitution-
drafting process as well as after independence, and inconsistencies in the manner in 
which ethnic concerns were addressed during and after 1947-1948 all had a negative 
impact on the development of multiethnic democracy in Burma. The outbreak of war 
was a consequence of these lacunas. But the war also became a cause of further 
ethnic resentment. Indeed, the civil war became a factor that shaped perceptions of 
how the elected government would address ethnic minority demands and thus 
contributed to further reduce the trust between the state and non-Burman groups.  
10.3 Lessons for the future   
 
With the hindsight of fourty years, I have drawn conclusions that show a mixed 
record for democracy in Burma. While there was progress in the process of 
democratisation before 1962, there were also impediments to the consolidation of 
democracy. Does this signal that Burma lacks the necessary preconditions for 
democratisation to succeed? We cannot answer such a question and assess the future 
prospects of democracy and ethnic relations in Burma unless we take into account the 
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experiences from the period after 1962. This includes forty years of military rule, 
nationality policies carried out since 1962, the popular uprising in 1988, the 
emergence of new political actors in the wake of the events in 1988 and the election 
in 1990, and the ebb and flow of the civil war. Overall, the situation has changed a 
great deal since 1962, and return to past arrangements is no longer possible. In 
addition, the current political actors in the country are different from those that 
dominated Burmese politics fifty years ago. In particular, the current military 
government has more interests vested in influencing political change in Burma than 
the British government had in 1948. Still, some lessons can be drawn from the past. 
Ethnicity continues to play a central role in Burmese politics today, as it did in 1948 
and the need to deal with ethnic diversity will remain a paramount issue for any 
future democratic government. Knowledge about strategies to address ethnic 
demands has improved compared to 1948. However, the demands of ethnic minority 
groups today show that the emphasis remains on political issues as the root cause of 
ethnic conflicts. The key demands remain federalism and autonomy for ethnic 
minorities. As a result, democracy and ethnicity will continue to be related in the 
future, and a process of democratisation will have to contend with the concerns of 
ethnic minority groups. The civil war and the collapse of democracy in 1962 have 
been diagnosed as a constitutional failure. Indeed, lacunas and inconsistencies in 
constitution drafted in 1947 were reasons for the conflicts that erupted. Burma’s 
history is testimony of the need to devise a comprehensive constitutional solution to 
deal with ethnic diversity and the need to include all relevant actors in this process 
from an early stage. But from this diagnosis also follows the argument that much can 
be achieved to improve ethnic relations by constitutional design. A suitable 
constitution would thereby settle the premises on which the relationship between the 
state and ethnic groups as well as among ethnic groups will be based, “once and for 
all”. This thesis has shown that ethnic diversity cannot be addressed solely by 
constitutional design at a given point in time. Ethnic relations are also the result of the 
dynamics of everyday politics and of events that cannot be foreseen when the 
constitution is drafted. An appropriate political structure and good leadership are 
equally important factors for democratisation in multiethnic societies. 
Appendix: Acronyms and Burmese glossary 
 
Acronyms: 
 
ABFSU: All Burma Federation of Student Unions 
AFPFL: Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League. Split in 
“Stable” and “Clean” faction in 1958 (the “Clean” 
faction later renamed Pyidaungsu Party)  
ANC: Arakan National Congress 
ANUO: Arakan National Unity Organisation 
APLP: Arakan People’s Liberation Party 
BIA/BNA: Burma Independence Army/ Burma National 
Army 
BKNA: Buddhist Karen National Association 
BSC: Buddha Sasana Council 
BWPP: Burmese Workers and Peasants’ Party 
CNO: Chin National Organisation 
CNUO: Chin National Unity Organisation 
CPB: Communist Party of Burma 
DSI: Defence Services Institute 
FACE: Frontier Area Commission of Enquiry 
GCBA: General Council of Burmese Associations 
IAPG: Independent Arakan Parliamentary Group 
KCO: Karen Central Organisation 
KIO/KIA: Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin 
Independence Army 
KNA: Karen National Association 
KMT: Guomindang (Kuomintang) 
KNPP: Karenni National Progressive Party 
KNU/KNDO: Karen National Union/Karen National 
Defence Organisation 
KSA: Presiding Sayadaws’ Association 
KYO: Karen Youth Organisation 
MFL/MNDO: Mon Freedom League/ Mon National 
Defence Organisation 
NUF: National Unity Front 
NSUF: Nationalities Students United Front 
PBF: Patriotic Burmese Forces 
PNO: Pao National Organisation 
PVO: People Volunteer Organisation 
RAEC: Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission 
RUSU: Rangoon University Student Union 
SAMB: State Agriculture Marketing Board 
SCUHP/UHPC: Supreme Council of United Hills 
Peoples/ Council of United Hills Peoples 
UMP: Union Military Police 
YMA: Young Monks’ Association 
YMBA: Young Men’s Buddhist Association 
 
Burmese glossary: 
 
Burma Proper/Ministerial Burma: Central Burma 
during British colonial rule 
Chettyar: Indian money-lending caste 
Dobama Asiayone: We Burman Association  
Duwa: Jingpaw term. Title of traditional 
Kachin/Jingpaw ruler 
Dyarchy: government in which power is vested in two 
rulers or authorities  
Frontier Areas: hill areas not under direct British 
administration 
Kyat: Burmese unit of currency 
Mahadevi: Shan title for a female ruler. Used as title for 
the wife of the saohpa 
Mandala: Circle 
Noom Suk Harn: first Shan armed organisation  
Pali: Indo-Aryan language used as the liturgical and 
scholarly language of Theravada Buddhism 
Pyidawtha: “Happy Country”, programme for the 
development of a welfare state  
Pyisawthi: Armed semi-official militia  
Sangha: The institutionalised community of Buddhist 
monks 
Saohpa/saohpya: “Lord of the Sky” in Shan/Karenni. 
Traditional title of rulers of the Shan and Karenni 
principalities. “Sawbwa” is the equivalent Burmese term  
Sao: polite form of address in Shan language 
Thakin: meaning “Master” in Burmese, used to address 
the British in the colonial era, then used by the 
nationalist movement to name nationalists 
Thawtuzana: Young monk in Buddhism 
Theravada: literally, docrtine of the elders. Dominant 
branch of Buddhism in Burma  
U: Polite form of address to elder male in Burmese 
languuage
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